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Abstract
This thesis consists of four essays that use micro-datasets from Statistics Canada’s surveys
on research and development (R&D) and innovation mainly to investigate the relations
between ﬁrms’ strategies in R&D. In the ﬁrst essay we shed some light on how ﬁrms
make decisions on how to acquire the technology measured by the research and develop-
ment activities. More speciﬁcally, we propose to expand the conceptual ”Make and Buy”
framework for the choice of modes of participation in R&D partnership. We consider
that the R&D performer can do R&D for its own purposes, have it done by other orga-
nizations, or do it for other organizations, be it external partners or subsidiaries. The
intensity of the relationship is quantiﬁed in monetary terms (R&D expenditures) and not
by a mere count of the ﬁrms involved, as is more generally done in the empirical liter-
ature. The descriptive portrait shows that during the period 1997 to 2002 the majority
of R&D spending, around 62%, was of internal origin and conducted by the performer.
The remaining portion (38%) included two groups: one group (24%) performed R&D on
behalf of another organizations that is, they contracted in. The remaining 14% had the
R&D conducted by another performer, that is, they contracted out. An estimated 13%
of research and development was conducted with no external partnerships.
In the second essay we consider the same idea but in a context where the decisions on
technological choices are not independent of each other. Furthermore, we show how tran-
sitions in the way of acquiring R&D over time can aﬀect the ﬁrm’s labour productivity.
The panel dimension of the data allows controlling for individual unobserved heterogene-
ity to analyse the transitions of the decisions regarding the location of funding (execution)
of R&D generated by a ﬁrst-order Markov process. By applying a maximum simulated
likelihood estimator we show that there is strong true state dependence in all states of
R&D (the manner of acquiring the R&D). Also, we see that not only the way of organizing
the R&D matters, but also that the ﬁrm’s growth in labour productivity depends on the
nature of the R&D and on its persistence. These factors can easily increase the returns
to R&D for all performers in Canada. Our ﬁndings on the importance of R&D performed
internally appears to contrast, to some extent, with the results of other studies looking
i
at similar issues, in which the R&D performed extramurally has a higher impacts on the
ﬁrm’s productivity.
The third essay deals with the eﬀects of the geographic distance that separates R&D
performers from universities on the extent of knowledge spillovers. It is found that a 10%
increase in distance decreases the proportion of total R&D paid to universities by 1.4% for
ﬁrms that do not report any codiﬁed knowledge ﬂow, and by 0.7% for ﬁrms that report
codiﬁed knowledge ﬂows.
Finally, given the growing importance of the role played by governments in the stimula-
tion of innovation, the last essay is dedicated to the evaluation of the impacts of R&D tax
credits on a series of innovation indicators. Using a non-parametric matching approach,
we ﬁnd that compared to a hypothetical situation of no R&D tax credits, recipients of
R&D tax credits show signiﬁcantly higher proportions of world-ﬁrst and Canadian-ﬁrst
new products, numbers of new products and shares of sales due to new products. How-
ever, these ﬁrms do not perform better in terms of proﬁtability, domestic market share,
international sales or ability to keep up with competitors. We therefore conclude that tax
credits lead to additional innovation output, but not necessarily better ﬁrm outcomes.
ii
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Chapter 1
General Introduction
1.1 The Survey of Research and Development in Cana-
dian Industry
Without access to unique data collected by the statistical oﬃce of Canada this work have
not been done. With the exception of the last essay (chapter 5), which uses the micro-
dataset from the innovation survey of Canadian manufacturing ﬁrms, the three essays
discussed in this dissertation are all based on the survey of Research and Development in
Canadian Industry (RDCI) which collects information on all Canadian enterprises that
claimed R&D tax credits on an annual basis. The survey contains information about the
source of payments for R&D services as well as about the amounts of R&D expenditures
by enterprise, type of organization and industry (manufacturing and services). The design
and the annual collection of this survey allow us to manage the dataset under the form
of a cross sectional pooled dataset covering the period 1997 to 2006. Furthermore, this
exceptional dataset has been, so far, an underused resource for analysis, other than for
quality assurance. Indeed, the original purpose of this survey was to assure the availability
of pertinent statistical information to monitor science and technology related activities in
Canada and to support the development of science and technology policy.
Additionally, this dataset is used as a key component in the Gross Domestic Expendi-
1
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tures on Research and Development in Canada (GERD) series. Three out of four essays in
this thesis are among the few empirical econometric studies using this survey and explor-
ing the broad opportunities it oﬀers. The database resulting from this survey nevertheless
has a major drawback: it has few control variables, especially on the characteristics of the
enterprise, which could limit the explanatory power of some of our model speciﬁcations,
in particular to calculate the stock of business capital. However, we consider that these
disadvantages are largely oﬀset by the richness of the quantitative data on R&D and the
exceptional coverage of this quasi-census.
Finally, I should mention that with the exception of chapter three, each of these
chapters has appeared as a peer reviewed working paper or journal article and they have
not been substantially revised since they ﬁrst appeared. As a result, the data used are
from diﬀerent periods and have not been updated. However, the ﬁndings have been
reviewed to ensure that more recent data would not make signiﬁcant diﬀerence.
1.2 Technological knowledge acquisitions
It is widely recognized that research and development (R&D) is a major component of the
complex process of innovation [Cre´pon and Mairesse (1998)]. For the enterprise, engaging
or not in R&D is not a trivial decision. The uncertainty and risk associated with a
such choice are decisive for the future positioning of the enterprise on the chessboard
of competitiveness. Those that do not engage in this activity seriously jeopardize their
creativity and market positioning. However, for those who choose to engage in such
activity, the main challenge is to determine what will be the required level of internal
and external resources to achieve their innovation target. In a world where technologies
are commercialized more quickly and where transaction costs of acquiring external R&D
decrease, the issue of the choice of the technological organization takes a considerable
importance [Narula (2001)]. As evidenced by the vast literature particularly in industrial
organization [(Williamson, 1983; Nelson, 1982; Veugelers, 1997; Veugelers and Cassiman,
1999; Leiblein and Dalsace, 2002; Love and Roper, 2002; Beneito, 2003; Piga and Vivarelli,
2004; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006, 2007; Lokshin and Carree, 2008)], enterprises mainly
face three alternatives to acquire their R&D: they make R&D for themselves, they buy
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R&D services, or they do a combination of both alternatives. In the “transaction cost
theory” introduced by Coase (1937), this choice between internalizing or outsourcing the
R&D refers to the classical “Make or Buy” decision.
Despite the fact that the literature related to the “Make or Buy” decision is huge,
there is no study so far describing this decision based on the funding source for R&D.
The possibility to take into account the funding source as a decision criterion to deﬁne
how to organize R&D activities brings a new perspective on the literature in this ﬁeld.
Hence, viewed from this angle, the “Make” decision includes the portion of the R&D that
is done by the enterprise for itself (the “Make” decision), and also the portion of the
R&D that is done internally for other organizations (the “Sell” decision). The expansion
of the classical conceptual framework for the choice of modes of participation in R&D will
form the pillar of the two ﬁrst chapters of this thesis. As one might guess, an important
component of the strategy ”Sell” corresponds to knowledge transfers between subsidiaries.
The classic distinction in this literature between “Make or Buy” has consistently ignored
the portion of the R&D performed internally for other institutions or subsidiaries. Hence,
the overestimation of the importance attached to the “Make” strategy has certainly been
the direct consequence of not making the distinction between R&D done for oneself and
from the R&D performed for other organizations.
Chapter 2 provides a contribution to the empirical foundations as well as to our the-
oretical understanding and the practical relevance of industrial economics by considering
an alternative way to present the classical “Make or Buy” decision: ﬁrst, by examining
ﬁrms’ organizational behaviour with respect to R&D according to how technological ser-
vices are carried out: doing R&D for oneself (Make), doing it for others (Sell) or having
other organizations do it (Buy), second, by assessing the importance of complementari-
ties between modes of acquisition of R&D using R&D expenditures as a criteria to deﬁne
choices rather than using discrete practices.
Chapter 3 can be viewed as an extension of the analysis done in Chapter 2 because
we intend to examine the dynamic process by which ﬁrms engage in R&D (why they
switch from one strategy to another). We ask whether there is an evolutionary process
that determines the choice between the “Make, Buy or Sell decisions”. As far as we
know, no study has so far addressed the transitional dynamics in the manner of acquiring
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R&D services. This analysis diﬀers from that in Chapter 2 not only because we are
evaluating the technology choice under its dynamic aspect by a method of simulation,
but also because we consider choices (alternatives) as mutually exclusive but also because
we introduce in the econometric model an interdependent between those alternatives.
Furthermore, the probability to choose a given R&D strategy depends on observed
individual ﬁrms’ characteristics (observed heterogeneities) and on R&D strategy in the
previous period (state dependence). Additionally, in our model presented in Chapter 3 we
account for unobserved heterogeneity across ﬁrms (three random eﬀects), similar to the
ﬁrst-order Markov model proposed in Heckman (1981). The introduction of variation in
unobserved individual ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects allows us to overcome the unrealistic limitation
of non-correlation between alternatives as in the standard multinomial Logit model. To
the extent, enterprises attach considerable importance to their past R&D strategies, they
tend to choose the same strategy repeatedly. This type of technological trajectory can
be explained by either state dependence or unobserved heterogeneity (enterprises diﬀer
in some unobservable characteristics that inﬂuence their probability of choosing an R&D
strategy). In order to test the state dependence assumption for the three modes of R&D
acquisition (Make, Buy or Sell),we estimate the econometric speciﬁcation including lagged
dependent and exogenous variables [Erdem and Sun (2001)].
1.3 R&D organization, R&D incentives and ﬁrms’
performance
As stated earlier, the mode of R&D acquisition and the choice dynamics are the subject
of Chapter 2 and 3. Understanding how the choices of ﬁnancing R&D inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s
labour productivity growth is of substantial importance to both the theory of industrial
organization and managers who are especially interested in the private returns to R&D
investment. From the point of view of the managers, information knowledge on the
returns to R&D investments should certainly help and guide their decisions and strategic
choices in technological matters. These concerns are the subject of the third chapter
of this dissertation. Also, Chapter 3 examines the role of the organization of R&D on
labour productivity in a 10-year panel of 1,730 Canadian R&D performers. We mean by
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organization of R&D, the choice of R&D strategies and their combinations available to
the ﬁrm.
Regarding other related literature, the study of Lokshin and Carree (2008) is the ﬁrst
to examine the eﬀects of internal and external R&D exploring a panel dataset. As in
the Lokshin and Carree (2008) article, we propose an empirical model which allows us
to control for the presence of individual eﬀects as well as time-variant unobserved factors
that are likely to aﬀect the mode of R&D acquisition (R&D strategy). The model used
takes into account expenditure on R&D that helps to deﬁne the R&D strategies. Also,
it allows us to estimate the magnitude of eﬀects instead of using only discrete practices
that usually deﬁne the Make or Buy decision. However, our work diﬀers from previous
analysis in several ways. We mainly contribute to this literature by using the framework
described in chapter 3 where the “Make or Buy” concept is enlarged. More importantly,
we measure the returns to R&D on productivity growth for all possible transitions between
the Make, Buy or Sell R&D strategies. Additionally, the model presented in this chapter
shows evidence that the organization of the R&D activities matters and that the growth
of labour productivity depends on the nature of R&D and its persistence (cumulative
experience in R&D performed by the enterprise).
1.4 Technological knowledge spillovers
In 2008 the Nobel price in Economics has been attributed to Paul Krugman for his analysis
of trade patterns and location of economic activity, thus highlighting the importance of
the localization of activities as a source of increasing returns. Geographic proximity
allows enterprises to share knowledge and information more easily, creating incentives to
enterprises to locate near of the knowledge sources.
The major premise of the location argument is that enterprises would like to reduce
their knowledge acquisition costs by locating close to the knowledge source [Link and Scott
(2003)]. However, the enterprises’ decision to locate close to knowledge sources such as
universities is not only based on costs. Facilitating knowledge transfers is considered
as a major determinant to justify the geographic proximity because of the impacts on
regional income growth [(Bernstein and Nadiri, 1988; Autant-Bernard, 2001; Doring and
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Schnellenbach, 2004; Audretsch and Warning, 2005)]. As Jaﬀe and Henderson (1993)
remark, the capacity to absorb ﬂows of new knowledge is facilitated by geographical
proximity.
The understanding of the incidence of geographic proximity on knowledge transfer
(generally measured by R&D expenditures or by the number of patents), becomes partic-
ularly important for the links between businesses and universities for which information
ﬂows create externalities [(Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Audretsch and Warning, 2005)]
and promote innovation and business performance [Stuart and Sorenson (2003)]. How-
ever, despite the importance of this relationship, relatively little empirical work has been
done on the spatial relationship between business enterprises and universities, and, more
importantly, few studies quantify the range of the distance eﬀects. Moreover, the few em-
pirical studies [(Jaﬀe, 1989; Acs and Feldman, 1992; Autant-Bernard, 2001; Karlsson and
Anderson, 2005)] that have addressed this issue have used data on patents as a measure of
spillovers and measure the geographic proximity by the contiguity of regions. These two
measures are unfortunately very imperfect. The main weakness of a measure based on
patents is its inability to reﬂect the quality and intensity of the externalities. The main
weakness of a distance measurement based on contiguity is its lack of precision. Instead,
this thesis proposes to measure the knowledge spillovers between business enterprises and
universities by a direct measure of R&D expenditures made from business enterprises to
universities, taking into account the individual distance between these two institutions.
This approach will overcome the limitations imposed by the measurements on the patent,
namely the extent of patent quality and the lack of coverage of patents by industry.
Usually, in the literature related to the theoretical importance of the distance in the
relation between enterprises and universities, arguments are grouped in three major ex-
planations to the role of the distance. A common distinction is made between codiﬁed
and tacit knowledge. Codiﬁed knowledge can be transfered over great distances, while the
transfer of tacit knowledge involves a face-to-face interaction and requires spatial proxim-
ity [Anselin and Acs (1997)]. As pointed out by Camagni (1991) and Breschi and Lissoni
(2001), inside of a geographic cluster innovation diﬀusion is faster. The second argu-
ment refers the the existence of social networks for cultural or linguistic reasons [Ozman
(2006)]. In Canada social networking becomes particularly pertinent due to the linguis-
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tic diﬀerence between the two more populous provinces (Ontario and Que´bec). The last
argument emphasizes the importance of how past experience aﬀects knowledge spillovers
(self-reinforcing dynamic eﬀect) [Den Hartigh and Commandeur (2002)].
In Chapter 4, we present an econometric model that evaluates the impact of geo-
graphic proximity on knowledge spillovers by taking into account the three arguments in
the previous paragraph. In particular, we test the importance of geographical distance
in the transfer of knowledge between businesses and universities conducting the analysis
respectively at the enterprise level and at the level of individual payments for R&D ser-
vices. Additionally, the applied econometric model considers the distinction between tacit
and codiﬁed knowledge. This work goes a step further in our understanding of the role
played by the geographic distance on knowledge transfers. This empirical analysis could
help policy makers in their policies related to the issue of industrial development and lo-
calization choice for public R&D performers (Industrial research institutes, laboratories).
Also, it could help policy makers facilitate technological diﬀusion by direct subsidies (see
chapter 5).
1.5 Public support for innovation-related activities
in Canada
The last essay (Chapter 5) tackles the issue of the eﬃciency of tax credits as a preferred
means to improve innovative performance of enterprises and to correct market failures. It
is generally accepted that governments have a non-negligible role in encouraging R&D ex-
penditures [OECD (2002b)]. Usually, the government has two policy instruments, namely,
direct grants and tax credits. In this dissertation we are only interested on tax credits
mainly because Canada has one of the most generous R&D tax credit programs among
major industrial countries and because tax credits do not involve arbitrary decisions re-
garding the distribution of expenditures among sectors, regions and industries. In some
respects, they are more neutral and less costly for their administration as compared to
direct subsidies.
The underlying idea of tax credits is to encourage private ﬁrms to spend more on R&D
because the social rate of return of such investments exceeds the private rate of return.
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The theory of public policy stresses the need for the government to provide incentives to
private ﬁrms to compensate for the gap between private and social returns in order to
ensure the socially eﬃcient eﬀort of R&D by the private sector. Hence, the availability
and amounts of R&D tax credits increase the probability that some ﬁrms that would not
have invested in R&D do so. The existence of R&D tax credits is likely to increase the
number of R&D investors and the aggregate investment in R&D. Some empirical studies
examine the eﬀects of government support on output measures in the Canadian context.
The Bernstein (1986) study shows that R&D investment tax credits generate about .80$ of
additional R&D expenditures per dollar of foregone tax revenues to the government. This
incremental measure is commonly known as the cost eﬀectiveness ratio. More recently,
three other Canadian studies have found respectively an incremental ratio of 1.38 [Finance
Canada (1998)], 1.3 [Klassen and Reed (2004)] and 0.98 [Dagenais and Therrien (1997)]
in R&D. However, these studies used parametric methods that despite distinguishing
between receivers and non-receivers of R&D tax credits do not distinguish whether the
performance of ﬁrms that use tax credits diﬀers from that of non-users and whether the
superior performance can be attributed to the eﬀect of R&D tax credits [Be´rube´ and
Mohnen (2009)].
In this chapter we will use a valuation method that takes into account possible selection
bias in the empirical analysis. We propose to apply a matching estimator to estimate the
impact of R&D tax credits on innovation activities of Canadian manufacturing ﬁrms
using data from the Canadian 1999 Survey of Innovation that have been linked with the
Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM). The idea behind matching is simply to select a
group of non-beneﬁciaries of tax credits in order to make them resemble the beneﬁciaries
as closely as possible in order to take into account the selection bias issue. To the best of
our knowledge, this is one of the ﬁrst studies assessing the eﬀect of R&D tax credits on
recipient ﬁrms’ general economic performance in the Canadian context using a matching
estimator. The only other known precedent using the a non-parametric approach, is the
study of Be´rube´ and Mohnen (2009). Contrary to the study of Be´rube´ and Mohnen that
looks at the eﬀectiveness of R&D grants for Canadian plants that already beneﬁt from
R&D tax credits, our group of treated ﬁrms contains a subset of ﬁrms that have received
both R&D tax credits and public R&D grants. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms that received R&D tax
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credits do more R&D, and are more innovative in terms of higher proportion of world-ﬁrst
and Canadian-ﬁrst new products and share of sales due to new products. However, these
ﬁrms do not perform better in terms of proﬁtability, domestic market share, international
sales or ability to keep up with competitors. This result suggests that the expected private
economic beneﬁts from public support of innovation by R&D tax credits may not be as
large as is sometimes claimed.
Chapter 2
Performing R&D for Oneself, for Others or by Others 1
2.1 Introduction
Research and development (R&D) is one possible activity in the innovation process, but
a crucial one. More ﬁrms innovate than do R&D and that tells us that other activities are
also important, like capital expenditure, patents, inventions, for example. However, ﬁrms,
especially those with high technological content that do not engage in this activity seri-
ously jeopardize their competitiveness and their creativity in relation to competitors. The
cost of access to R&D is a major barrier for many ﬁrms. Added to this cost constraint is
the appropriation constraint, namely the inability of ﬁrms to retain all the beneﬁts result-
ing from eﬀorts invested in research. This is an additional barrier dissuading ﬁrms from
performing R&D [Arrow (1962)]. Lastly, to engage in R&D activities, a ﬁrm must ﬁrst
have suﬃcient absorptive capacity to recognize the value of new information, assimilate
it and apply it to commercial ends [Cohen and Levinthal (1990)].
Not every ﬁrm is in a position to overcome all these constraints. For ﬁrms that decide
to conduct R&D activities, there is a crucial strategic choice to be made. R&D performers
must choose between engaging in an R&D partnership process2 and conducting research
intramurally. Should the ﬁrm decide to enter into a partnership, there are various ways
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to proceed.
As identiﬁed in the literature, there have traditionally been two diﬀerent modes or
strategies3 by which a ﬁrm may perform its R&D activities. It may do so internally,
or it may acquire R&D services externally, that is, from outside the R&D producing
unit. Several empirical and theoretical studies have adopted these twin strategies as a
conceptual framework to explain ﬁrms’ strategic behaviour [(Radnor, 1991; Veugelers and
Cassiman, 1999; Kamien and Zang, 2000; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Arundel and
Bordoy, 2002)]. Mindful of this body of literature, the present study seeks to expand the
conceptual framework for the choice of modes of participation in R&D partnership that
are available to ﬁrms engaged in R&D.
A practical way to determine whether or not a ﬁrm is participating in an R&D part-
nership is to observe the source or destination of R&D funding. According to this logic,
a ﬁrm that funds its research intramurally that is, without any ﬁnancial exchange with
other organizations for R&D purposes may, a priori, be considered not to have a part-
nership agreement for R&D services. On the other hand, if a ﬁrm reports that it has
another organization as a funding source or pays to ﬁnance its R&D under either a sub-
contracting arrangement or some form of external participation, it may, broadly speaking,
be said to have a partnership. The term partnership is interpreted broadly here to in-
clude subcontracts, alliances, co-operation agreements, consortiums, equity participation,
technology transfer and joint R&D agreements [Davy (2004)]. Can a monetary exchange
for R&D purposes reasonably be considered to exist if there is no contact or exchange
of information? Partnership is not perceived exclusively in the formal sense (active and
participatory exchange between two entities); it includes both formal and informal links
as deﬁned by [Bo¨nte and Keilbach (2005)].
This study examines ﬁrms’ organizational behaviour with respect to R&D according
to how R&D services are carried out: doing R&D for oneself, doing it for others or having
other organizations do it. This examination will be based on data on the sources of funds
1Co-authors: Antoine Rose (Statistics Canada) and Pierre Mohnen (UNU-MERIT, Maastricht
University- Netherlands). This document has been published at UNU-MERIT in Working Paper Se-
ries (No.2006-018) and at Statistics Canada in Working Documents (No. 88F0006XIE Catalogue N.2)
2The partnership process refers to whether an organization does or does not have ﬁnancial transactions
with another organization for R&D purposes.
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received and destination of payments made for R&D.
This concept is not entirely new, since [Harrigan (1985)] was already talking about
technology transfer in terms of the buying or selling of services. Drawing on the same
data source, [Rose (1994)] explored the relationships involved in R&D strategic alliances
in the form of input-output tables.
As Veugelers and Cassiman (1999)4 point out, few empirical studies have been done
on modes of participation in the R&D network. One reason why this ﬁeld of research
is underexploited, at least in the case of empirical studies, is a lack of data, especially
quantitative data [(Narula, 2001; Belderbos et al., 2004; Hagedoorn and Kranenburg,
2003; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; Bo¨nte and Keilbach, 2005)]. Most articles on ﬁrms’
mode of participation in R&D draw on qualitative data and conﬁne themselves to case
studies. A few studies are based on quantitative data Veugelers (1997), but here again,
they draw on small data sets. We identify the modes of performing R&D on the basis of
both qualitative and quantitative information, covering all sectors of the economy on the
basis of a census of all commercial enterprises performing R&D in Canada. Using this
approach, we will be able to identify the institutional players with whom R&D producers
have the most exchanges for R&D services.
The following sections describe diﬀerent modes of participation available to ﬁrms with
respect to expenditures on R&D services, followed by a rapid overview of the motives
that lead ﬁrms performing R&D to co-operate with other institutions. On the basis of
this contextualization, a descriptive analysis of the characteristics of the diﬀerent modes
of participation in the R&D partnership process is provided. A ﬁnal section presents the
results of econometric estimates for modeling and identifying the determinants of each of
the strategy choices previously identiﬁed.
3The terms ”mode” and ”strategy” are used interchangeably.
4“Technology sourcing strategies have not been well explored in the theoretical literature and the
empirical evidence remains anecdotal.”
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2.2 An extension of the choice of strategies for im-
plementing research and development
Traditionally, the economic literature on the choice of strategies for performing R&D
basically considers two alternatives: either R&D is performed in-house or it is acquired
from outside; these two alternatives could also be combined. Many studies attempted to
answer the question of substitutability or complementarity of internal and external R&D
[(Aurora and Gambardella, 1990; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Radnor, 1991; Veugelers
and Cassiman, 1999; Leiblein and Dalsace, 2002)]. The ﬁndings of these diﬀerent studies
seem to indicate that the answer to the question of best strategy is far from deﬁnitive
and that the structure and characteristics of the ﬁrm are likely to play an important role
in the choice of how R&D is performed.
The choice of the strategy for performing R&D is commonly described in the literature
as “Make” or “Buy.” However, we think that these choices are too restrictive. The R&D
strategy adopted by a ﬁrm depends very broadly on the environment and on potential
interactions between partners. Some ﬁrms fund R&D services, while others buy or sell
those services. Therefore, to gain a good understanding of these choices, it is necessary
to provide a complete picture of the options available to ﬁrms performing R&D.
Such an approach is possible only if we are able to determine more precisely who
performs R&D and for whom this R&D is performed. To this end, we must identify the
partners (if any) for whom the R&D service is intended and by whom it is acquired. This
type of analysis can be carried out by observing ﬂows of ﬁnancial transactions for R&D
purposes. If we know the source and destination of payments for R&D purposes for each
ﬁrm performing R&D, we can identify the structure of the R&D partnership and deﬁne
the strategy choices related to obtaining and ﬁnancing knowledge.
So far, the various studies conducted on ﬁrms’ decision-making choices regarding R&D
expenditures have been based on qualitative criteria or a simple enumeration of ﬁrms. This
study is based on the Survey of Research and Development in Canadian Industry (RDCI),
conducted by the Science, Innovation and Electronic Information Division of Statistics
Canada. This survey provides details on the origin and destination of industrial R&D
funding by ﬁrms conducting R&D or ﬁrms that fund it. It will be described in greater
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detail in Section 2.4. At the same time, we use these quantitative data to expand the
conceptual framework for the strategy choices of ﬁrms deciding on their R&D expenditures
and to measure the intensity of transfers of funds between partners for R&D purposes.
A ﬁrm engaged in R&D has a choice between various strategies. It can perform the
R&D itself, in a closed environment. It may also choose to enter into relationships with
outside parties. In this case, it may choose to meet its R&D needs by purchasing services
from other organizations. It may also do R&D for other organizations. These three basic
strategic options may be combined, or they may be reduced to mutually exclusive choices.
How a ﬁrm carries out its R&D activities has a direct impact on how it manages the
R&D cost- and risk-sharing model. Policy decision-makers who must introduce new regu-
lations and incentives regarding research must consider this matter, which is important for
understanding the ﬁrm’s organizational environment. The United States and Japan have
precedents as to their policy choices with respect to partnership and risk sharing. The
best known examples are the VLSI project 5 for Japan in 1975 and SEMATECH (consor-
tium of manufacturers in the semiconductor sector) for the United States in 1987. As a
result of these two developments, governments have been induced to relax their antitrust
regulations to allow the formation of partnerships in the semiconductor ﬁeld [Sakakibara
(1997)]. For Canada, the issue of R&D performance strategies is also important.
2.3 Motivations and partnerships in research and de-
velopment
The motivation for ﬁrms to enter into R&D partnerships is a research topic that came
into its own only in the 1990s, advanced by authors such as [(Mahoney, 1992; Sakakibara,
1997; Veugelers, 1997; Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999; Hagedoorn and Vonortas, 2000)].
Partnership has become a joint and complementary way to organize research 6. This
phenomenon has gone hand-in-hand with the growing complexity of innovation processes.
Must of studies indicate that cooperation is complementary rather than a substitute to
R&D.
There are many reasons why ﬁrms co-operate in R&D. These reasons may be grouped
into two main categories: those related to the need to reduce the level of technology risk
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and those related to a lack of endowments7 on the part of the ﬁrm, which, in order to
compensate for its technological deﬁciencies, seeks to establish complementarities in R&D
[Tether (2002)].
Many articles have emphasized the positive inﬂuence of R&D intensity as a factor fa-
voring R&D partnership, including [(Fritsch and Lukas, 2001; Bayona and Huarta, 2001)].
Thus, having one’s own R&D department is considered a factor that reduces risk while
increasing the probability of having partners [(Kleinknecht and Reijnen, 1992)]. [Piga and
Vivarelli (2004)] consider the decision to enter into a partnership relationship as a choice
that arises from the ﬁrm’s prior choice to conduct R&D activity. Indeed, absorptive ca-
pacity depends on a previous R&D eﬀort [Davy (2004)]. In the article by [Veugelers and
Cassiman (1999)], the motivation for partnership is essentially the perception of the level
of risk and of appropriation of innovation.
Included in the second category of motivations toward partnership is the question of
complementarity of resources and competencies [(Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Cohen
and Levinthal, 1990; Vornotas, 1997; Belderbos et al., 2004; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003)].
In these models, partnership is seen as a mechanism for eﬃciently exploiting the partners’
combined resources those individual members of the partnership lack [Hagedoorn and
Vonortas (2000)]. Firms enter into partnership to acquire complementarities to their
internal resources, and these complementarities are not necessarily technological. This
form of motivation is also a way to repatriate comparative advantages to the ﬁrm when
the partner is a foreign ﬁrm [Miotti and Sachwald (2003)]. Knowledge complementarity
is considered one of the main motivations that lead Japanese ﬁrms to co-operate in R&D
[Sakakibara (1997)].
However, most factors that motivate some form of partnership generally involve both
the reduction of technology risk and the diﬀerential in ﬁrms’ endowments. One example is
the size of the ﬁrm, which, according to many studies and in accordance with Schumpeter’s
theory, plays a large and positive role in increasing the probability of co-operating in R&D
[(Sakakibara, 1997; Veugelers, 1997; Fritsch and Lukas, 2001; Bayona and Huarta, 2001;
Miotti and Sachwald, 2003)].
An important ﬁnding of the study of [Sakakibara (1997)] is that motivations related
to resource sharing (specializations) are more important than motivations related to risk
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sharing in R&D partnerships where the partners have more heterogeneous endowments.
This ﬁnding reminds us that a ﬁrm’s motivation largely depends on its environment and
on diﬀerences in the abilities of the partners to conduct R&D activities.
2.4 Data source and limitations
Our study is based on Statistics Canada Research and Development in Canadian Industry
survey which collects data on R&D performed in the business sector in Canada. The
Statistics Canada database is constructed using two sources: an annual survey of major
R&D performers, and administrative data. In 1997, a new methodology was introduced
for estimating R&D expenditure in the business sector in Canada. The new approach
uses administrative data from the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) instead of survey data
for any ﬁrm that funds or performs less than $1 million worth of R&D. This enabled
the elimination of around 8,000 survey mail outs for the 2002 survey, thus reducing the
survey reporting burden, (Statistics Canada, 2004). The survey is conducted annually and
includes data for a four-year period. However, there is an eighteen-month lag between
the publication of the data and the availability of the information provided by CRA. For
this reason, Statistics Canada publishes revised data the following year, after receiving
all the information. In the meantime, the data published for the reference year are
preliminary. To avoid possible underestimation, our study period ends in 2002. The
preliminary data are not used in this analysis. The coverage of the survey is national.
A questionnaire was sent to all ﬁrms performing or funding R&D valued at $1 million
or more. The population of ﬁrms covered includes those that reported R&D activities in
the previous survey, those that claimed tax relief for R&D work performed, those that
reported receiving R&D contracts or grants, those that are reported by other ﬁrms as
funding sources or as performers of R&D, and those that are identiﬁed in newspaper
articles or trade journals.
5VLSI: Very large-scale integrated circuit.
6The question as to whether partnership is a complement or a substitute to in-house R&D has also
been examined in empirical studies; see [Sakakibara (1997)] and [Belderbos et al. (2004)]. Most of these
studies show that co-operation is complementary to R&D rather than being a substitute for it.
7By lack of endowments, we mean deﬁciencies in terms of resources (specialized jobs, materials, natural
resources, etc.).
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The various results in this chapter use data collected for the period 1997 to 2002
inclusive. We present cumulative statistics for these six years. This approach has the
advantage of taking account of possible changes in the structure of the industry. We have
excluded from our study those industries that reported only capital expenditures. The
eﬀect of this exclusion is to eliminate ﬁrms that reported performing R&D but reported
no employees in R&D, since they were spending only for buildings, land or equipment.
The three basic strategies identiﬁed in this document are not mutually exclusive. In this
study, these strategies may be treated either in binary mode or using continuous values.
In binary mode, each strategy takes the value 1 if the reporting ﬁrm checks at least one of
the choices corresponding to the deﬁnitions in Appendix A. For each of these strategies,
the total amount spent on R&D can be associated with it.
In Statistics Canada industrial R&D survey, the choice of organizations with which
the reporting unit has monetary transactions for R&D purposes was made according to
the recommendations of the [OECD (2002a)]. In this study, a partner is an entity that
either provided R&D services by receiving a payment or purchased R&D services by
providing funds to the reporting unit. Consequently, this study covers the following types
of organizational entities: ﬁrms in the same group, that is, parent and aﬃliated ﬁrms;
other ﬁrms; the government and its agencies; universities; private non-proﬁt organizations;
provincial research organizations; industrial research institutes or associations; hospitals,
educational and foreign institutions. A ﬁnal point to be noted is that when collecting
survey data, it is in practice impossible to capture accounting information that is perfectly
balanced between the reporting unit that is the source of funding and the unit that reports
receiving the funding. There are various reasons why this problem arises, starting with
the diﬀerences in how R&D is interpreted between the respondent at the source of the
payment and the recipient.
2.5 Descriptive analysis
The RDCI database contains data compiled over a number of years. This analysis focuses
on years 1997 to 2002. The use of compiled data implies that a ﬁrm may be observed
several times over the study period. It may also happen that some ﬁrms will appear
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only once (these ﬁrms have not been removed from the database because we made the
assumption that the exit process is fully random and in consequences will not aﬀect the
estimates results). This assumption is reasonable considering that our estimates are not
based on a random draw of the population [Wooldrige (2001)].
Table 2.1 shows the number of ﬁrms for each year covered by the study. The column
total represents the number of ﬁrm years, that is, the sum of the number of ﬁrms over
the six years, including observations that may extend from one year to the next. In the
subsequent analysis, this concept of ﬁrm year will be applied. Thus, the number 60,577
is the number of observations compiled over the six years.
Table 2.1: Firms distribution by country of control
Year Canadian controlled Foreign controlled Total number
ﬁrm ﬁrm of ﬁrms
1997 9 109 540 9 649
1998 9 316 468 9 784
1999 9 542 425 9 967
2000 10 418 433 10 851
2001 11 001 434 11 435
2002 8 591 368 8 891
Total year’s ﬁrms 57 977 2 668 60 577
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey
The number of ﬁrms performing R&D declined slightly between 1997 and 2002. Over
the same period, the number of Canadian-controlled R&D performers grew steadily except
in 2002, when there was a sharp drop in the overall number of performers. Foreign-
controlled ﬁrms performing R&D accounted for 4.4% of all performers over the period as
a whole.
Figure 2.1 gives an initial picture of how R&D expenditures evolved according to the
ﬁrm’s performance strategy. The “Perform own R&D” strategy is not only the most pop-
ular, but it is also the one that shows the greatest growth over the period from 1997 to
2002. It should be noted that the year 2002 marks a general slowing of industrial R&D
expenditures. The “Sell R&D services” and “Buy R&D services” strategic behaviors re-
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mained very stable over time. Thus, from 1997 onward, ﬁrms performing R&D exhibited
more dynamic behaviour in R&D production carried out intramurally (within the walls
of the production unit). Strategies involving external partnerships, including those with
subsidiaries, were much less dynamic. For these strategies involving external exchanges,
the level of exchanges actually declined in absolute terms.
Figure 2.1: R&D expenditures by strategy for 1997 to 2002 period,(billions of dollars)
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey
In 2002, total expenditures for the three R&D strategies reached more than $14 billion.
Expenditures for ﬁrms doing their own R&D stood at nearly $10 billion while ﬁrms doing
R&D for other organizations and those having it done by other organizations had total
R&D expenditures of respectively $2.8 billion and $1.7 billion.
For information purposes, the annualized growth of expenditures for the main strate-
gies by industry is shown in Appendix D. Some industries, such as the semi-conductor
and other electronic components industry increased their expenditures for all strategies,
whereas other industries, such as the non-metallic mineral products industry, reduced
their R&D expenditures for all strategies.
Table 2.2 gives an overview of the distribution of the cumulative number of ﬁrms
performing R&D over the period 1997 to 2002 according to the strategic option chosen
and the country of control. As is immediately apparent, the strategy that consists of
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performing one’s own research is by far the strategy most often used by R&D performers,
with 59,019 respondents out of a total of 60,577, or 97% of all observations.
Among those ﬁrms performing their own research, 24,590 or nearly 43% of the total
of Canadian-controlled ﬁrms reported “Performing own R&D” as their only performance
strategy. The corresponding proportion for foreign-controlled ﬁrms is 35%. In dollar
terms, R&D done in-house accounts for almost $49 billion over the period 1997-2002,
representing 62% of all R&D transaction amounts (see table 2.4)8.
Table 2.2: Total years’ ﬁrms by type of strategy and country of control,1997 to 2002
period
Strategy Canadian Foreign Total
controlled ﬁrms controlled ﬁrms number of ﬁrms
Perform own R&D 56 540 (97.6) 2 479 (92.9) 59 019 (97.4)
Sell R&D services 5 089 (8.8) 596 (22.3) 5 685 (9.4)
Buy R&D services 31 299 (54.0) 1 532 (57.4) 32 831 (54.2)
Perform own R&D exclusively 24 590 (42.5) 926 (34.7) 25 516 (42.1)
Sell R&D services exclusively 634 (1.1) 91 (3.4) 725 (1.2)
Do R&D for aﬃliated ﬁrms 1 627 (2.8) 441 (16.5) 2 068 (3.4)
Total year’s ﬁrms 57 977 2 668 60 577
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey. (calculation from the author).
Brackets indicates the number (in percentage) of total years ﬁrms by column.
Doing R&D in-house is thus the most common strategy. The amounts spent on exter-
nal strategies doing R&D for others or having it done by others account for respectively
24% and 14% of all transaction amounts for R&D purposes. Canadian ﬁrms essentially
do R&D themselves, do it for others or ﬁnally have it done by others.
There are a number of factors that lead ﬁrms to fund their R&D internally only, but
among the factors most commonly cited in the economic literature is information asym-
metry. Information asymmetry implies that one of the co-operating parties holds more
information not shared with its partner. Information asymmetry can undermine bonds of
8R&D performed by ﬁrms that do it exclusively for themselves accounts for 13.6% of the total amount
of R&D transactions.
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conﬁdence between partners, and this can eventually create an obstacle to external part-
nering. Also, the uncertain nature of R&D and the tacit knowledge that is important in
this activity can often cause ﬁrms not to share their knowledge with other organizations.
As a result, a large proportion of ﬁrms fund their R&D internally only. This ﬁnding
is consistent with the results of the study by Tether (2002), in which 46% of ﬁrms in the
United Kingdom have no partners. Our ﬁndings also point in the same direction as those
reported in [Piga and Vivarelli (2004)], in which 53% of ﬁrms do R&D intramurally only.
By contrast, in the study by [Veugelers and Cassiman (1999)], only 17% of innovators
opted for the “Perform own R&D” strategy, but that study is based on data from an
innovation survey rather than a survey designed to measure R&D expenditures directly.
The study by [Kaiser (2002)] also found that only 13.6% of ﬁrms co-operated for R&D
purposes in Germany. Among ﬁrms engaging in an R&D partnership, most participated
in a vertical association (relationship with customers and suppliers), rather than in a
horizontal association (relationship with competitors). The study by Kaiser (2002) con-
centrates on the service sector only, in which R&D activity is known to be much more
diversiﬁed and observed only 165 ﬁrms co-operating in R&D, which limits the robustness
of the results. The “Buy R&D services” strategy is chosen by 54% of performers. It is
interesting to note that in relative terms, this strategy is at least as important for foreign-
controlled ﬁrms as for ﬁrms under Canadian control. More important yet in relative terms
for foreign-controlled ﬁrms is the “Sell R&D services” strategy, which is chosen by 22%
of all foreign-controlled performers, compared to 9% of Canadian performers. However,
if these same proportions are compared in terms of the amounts spent (see Table 2.4), it
emerges that foreign- and Canadian-controlled ﬁrms spend similar proportions, that is,
approximately 23% and 25% respectively.
It is recognized in industry organizational theory that businesses strategic behaviors
are not homogeneous according to the size. Table 2.3 illustrate that most R&D ﬁrms
(76%) have less than 50 employees. Businesses with more than 500 employees represent
less than 4% of all R&D performers. Nevertheless, whatever performing strategy used,
these ﬁrms account for 63% of R&D expenditures over 1997 to 2002, more than $49 billion
(table 2.4).
For very large ﬁrms, over 2000 employees, the share of outward strategies increase
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signiﬁcantly. The perform own R&D strategy remains relatively constant whatever the
size. This suggests that the use of outward strategies requires a substantial level of
resources, at the level available in large ﬁrms. A large absorptive capacity together with
a high R&D intensity is required to increase the likelihood of engaging in partnerships,
[Leiponen (2001)].
Table 2.3: Number of years’ﬁrms by size and strategies, 1997 to 2002 period
Strategy 1-49 50-99 100-199 200-499 500-999 1000-1999 2000-4999 ≥5000
Perform own R&D 44714 5 842 3 703 2 537 905 677 392 249
(percentage) (97.4) (97.8) (97.7) (97.6) (96.6) (97.3) (95.6) (96.9)
Sell R&D services 4 058 540 372 281 143 118 86 87
(percentage) (8.8) (9.0) (9.8) (10.8) (15.3) (16.9) (20.9) (33.8)
Buy R&D services 24 493 2 225 2 096 1 508 537 452 318 202
(percentage) (53.3) (37.2) (55.3) (58.0) (57.3) (64.9) (77.6) (78.6)
Total year’s ﬁrms 45 914 5 973 3 790 2 600 937 696 410 257
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey (calculation from the author).
Brackets indicates the number (in percentage) of total years ﬁrms by column.
It is remarkable to see how important the “Sell R&D services” strategy is for ﬁrms with
more than 4,999 employees (34%). This observation also applies to the relative importance
of large ﬁrms with respect to expenditures on R&D. As table 2.4 shows, for ﬁrms with
more than 500 employees, the “Sell R&D services” and “Buy R&D services” strategies
account for respectively $14 billion and $7 billion, or 75% and 68% of total expenditures
on each of these strategies, whereas the corresponding percentage for the “Perform own
R&D” strategy is only 58%. In comparison, expenditures on the “Perform own R&D”
strategy by ﬁrms with fewer than 50 employees account for 15% of total expenditures on
this strategy, while the percentages for the “Sell R&D services” and “Buy R&D services”
strategies are only 8% and 14% respectively.
As already noted, the theoretical literature with [Leiponen (2001)] and the applied
literature with [Belderbos et al. (2004)] make much of the positive relationship that ex-
ists between R&D intensity and the diﬀerent types of external relationships that R&D
performers may have. We analyze the eﬀects of these types of relationships in section
2.6. But before engaging in such an analysis, it is important to diﬀerentiate industries
according to R&D intensity and their propensity to enter into partnerships with outside
23 Chapter 2. Performing R&D for Oneself, for Others or by Others
players9. This allows us to form four separate groups of industries according to these char-
acteristics. In ﬁgures 2.2 and 2.3, the horizontal and vertical lines represent the medians
separating axes into four separate quadrants.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show types of relationship for the various observations over the
period 1997 to 2002. The diﬀerence between these two ﬁgures is attributable to the y-
axis, where in the ﬁrst case we reported external relationships (external-link) in terms
of the number of relationships by industry10, whereas the second ﬁgure illustrates R&D
expenditures associated with external relationships (vextern).
Figure 2.2: R&D intensity by industry and propensity to forge external links)
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey. See appendix E. for acronyms.
As expected, R&D intensity, in relation to the propensity to forge external links does
9R&D intensity is the ratio of full-time employees assigned to R&D to the total number of employees
in the ﬁrm. The propensity to forge external links is calculated in the ﬁrst ﬁgure as the percentage of
outside links, other than with subsidiaries, by industry. Figure 2.2 illustrates the amount of expenditures
associated with this propensity out of the total transaction amounts for all strategies.
10To count the number of relationships, a dichotomous variable takes the value 1 if the ﬁrm in a given
industry reports having had monetary transactions for R&D purposes with an external organization other
than a subsidiary (i.e., with a university, research centre, hospital, etc.)
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not vary signiﬁcantly according to the number of external relationships per industry or the
associated amounts of R&D expenditures. Only certain industries construction, textiles,
navigational instruments, measuring, medical and control instruments, other services and
ﬁnance underwent major changes. The ﬁnance industry went from being an industry
with high-intensity R&D status and a low number of external relationships to being a
high-intensity R&D industry with a high propensity to spend for R&D services (ﬁgure
2.3).
Figure 2.3: R&D intensity and propensity to expend in R&D for external links)
 
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey. See appendix E. for acronyms.
The scientiﬁc research and development services industry shows both the highest level
of R&D intensity and the highest propensity to forge external links. The pharmaceutical
and medicine industry and the utilities industry, as well as the health care and social
assistance industry, are also high R&D-intensity industries with a high level of external
relationships. The pharmaceutical industry accounts for a sizeable share of ﬁrms conduct-
ing biotechnology activities. The utilities industry includes distributors of electricity and
gas and sanitation services. In both these industries, the level of research and external
links is naturally high, owing to the nature of the activity involved. The importance of
external relationships and complementarities was already highlighted in earlier research,
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namely [Arora and Gambardella (1990)].
In the lower left quadrant is the group of industries with a low level of R&D intensity
and a low level of external relationships. The industries in this group include plastic
products, petroleum products, machinery, furniture and related products, printing, and
motor vehicles and parts. Most of these industries are indeed low-intensity R&D indus-
tries; our ﬁndings corroborate the indicators of current intramural R&D expenditures as
a percentage of the performing ﬁrms revenues, reporting Table 12 of Statistics Canada
(2004). Many of the industries found in this part of ﬁgures 2.2 and 2.3 are subcontracting
or primary processing production units. They have few research laboratories and have
reached a state where they no longer really produce research; in particular, this is the
case with the automotive and textile sectors, in which R&D is done elsewhere than in
Canada.
In the group of industries that have low-intensity R&D and a high propensity to
engage in external relationships, there are paper products, wood products, primary metal
manufacturing and mining and oil and gas extraction. These industries require a high
level of specialized skills. They have a high level of know-how and probably carry on
many inter-industry exchanges. However, these are also industries in which there are
large economies of scale and the average number of employees per ﬁrm is among the
highest. Another point to be noted is that this is the quadrant with the fewest industries,
which tends to support the commonly held idea that it is the high-intensity R&D sectors
that have the most external ties.
Lastly, many industries fall into a central tendency zone, that is, near the center of
the median axes. This is notably the case with agriculture, forestry, ﬁshing and hunting,
communications equipment, semiconductors and other electronic components, wholesale
trade, and aerospace products and parts.
Table 2.4 shows that the manufacturing sector does much more R&D intramurally
than does the service sector. Of all ﬁrms that receive federal grants a total of 4,081
ﬁrms perform and fund their own R&D for a total of $10,243 million. While only 6.4%
of all ﬁrms that perform R&D received federal grants, those ﬁrms account for 21% of
total expenditures devoted to the “Perform own R&D” strategy, 20% of those devoted to
the “Sell R&D services” strategy and 22% of those devoted to the “Buy R&D services”
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strategy. Thus the amount that grant-receiving ﬁrms spend on R&D is out of proportion
with their numbers.
The group of industries with high-intensity R&D and a high level of external relation-
ships spend the most on R&D, regardless of the strategy adopted. Figure 2.4 shows that
R&D activities are highly concentrated. Foreign-controlled ﬁrms account for only 4.6% of
all performers but generate 32% of all R&D expenditures. The manufacturing and service
sectors represent respectively 9.8% and 3.7% of performers but generate 66% and 30% of
expenditures.
Table 2.5 illustrates how R&D performance strategies are deﬁned. The amounts indi-
cated in this table show the source and destination of R&D funding for ﬁrms performing
R&D. Almost $49 billion in funding was provided between 1997 and 2002 by ﬁrms per-
forming R&D for themselves, as shown in the ﬁrst column. This does not mean that those
ﬁrms did not also have external funding, or that they did not pay to have R&D performed
by other organizations.
The second column shows the amount of payments associated with organizations that
pay ﬁrms to do R&D. Nearly 80% of transaction amounts are from subsidiaries, with a
large proportion from foreign subsidiaries. Nevertheless, government contracts account
for 5% of payment sources. Government is the fourth-ranking partner for ﬁrms that
perform R&D. Over the six-year period, Canadian ﬁrms provided $863 million in R&D
services to government. Thus, when a ﬁrm performs R&D, it does it mainly for its
subsidiary or for another ﬁrm. The last column in table 2.5 shows organizations that
are also partners to whom ﬁrms make payments for the performance of R&D. Once
again, subsidiaries and ﬁrms account for the large majority of transactions. Universities
(domestic and foreign) rank third in importance as partners of ﬁrms that have R&D done,
with nearly $865 million for performing R&D services. Of this amount, 12% goes to foreign
universities. Hospitals outrank research institutes and associations in terms of amounts
spent on research and development. The reason why ﬁrms enter into R&D relationships
with universities, and more generally with research institutes or the academic sphere, is
not necessarily to obtain a product or innovation that can be commercialized. More often
the main reason for entering into an agreement is either the long-term relationship or
the prestige of the university, institute or researchers [Tether (2002)]. This could also
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Table 2.4: Breakdown of the total amount expended by type of strategy for R&D
purpose according to characteristics of the ﬁrm, for the period 1997 to 2002
(millions of dollars)
Characteristics
Perform
own R&D
Sell R&D
services
Buy R&D
services
Total
Canadian Controlled ﬁrms 33 673 12 239 7 029 52 941
Foreign controlled ﬁrms 14 945 6 525 3 999 25 469
Less than 50 employees 7 278 1 548 1 410 10 237
Between 50 and 499 employees 13 230 3 197 2 185 18 612
More than 500 employees 28 110 14 019 7 431 49 560
Receive R&D grants from Federal Government 10 243 3 748 2 403 16 394
Don’t receive R&D grants from Federal Government 38 374 15 016 8 624 62 014
Manufactures 30 755 13 956 7 098 51 809
Services 15 596 4 503 3 252 23 351
High R&D int/High ext.link 19 971 13 818 7 220 41 009
High R&Dint/Weak ext.link 8 715 1 587 891 11 193
Weak R&D int/High ext.link 9 754 4 490 1 071 12 315
Weak R&D int/Weak ext.link 10 159 1 869 1 848 13 876
Perform own R&D exclusively (current activity) 10 697 - - 10 697
Sell R&D services exclusively (current activity) - 1 811 - 1 811
Total expenditures by Strategy 48 618 18 764 11 027 78 409
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey
explain why partnerships with universities are so important. It should be kept in mind
that our database covers all industries and all sizes of ﬁrms. For small ﬁrms, partnership
with universities is often the only way to acquire necessary resources, as well as a way
to access cutting-edge technology. This may also possibly explain why ﬁrms have more
R&D performed by universities than they perform for universities.
Lastly, it is useful to note that small ﬁrms (those with fewer than 50 employees) account
for the lions share of R&D performers (see table 2.3). Small ﬁrms are more often involved
in the early stages of development. This makes them less vulnerable to the problems
arising from partnership in the later stages of development of a research project. For
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Figure 2.4: Percentage of ﬁrms and R&D expenditures for selected group of ﬁrms, for
the period 1997 to 2002
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey.
example, large ﬁrms that commercialize products resulting from R&D activity are more
exposed than smaller ﬁrms to the problem of appropriation when they must co-operate
with customers and suppliers, to say nothing of competitors [Veugelers and Cassiman
(2005)]. Consequently, the nature of projects in partnership with universities and research
centres makes small ﬁrms less vulnerable to the issue of appropriation, which might explain
the success of relationships between ﬁrms and universities, especially for small ﬁrms.
In all, inter-ﬁrm transactions and transactions between ﬁrms and their subsidiaries
total more than $24 billion, representing 81% of all external transactions (excluding intra-
mural R&D amounts of almost $49 billion). In other words, partnership outside aﬃliated
ﬁrms accounts for 19% of all external transactions.
Thus, other than their spending with subsidiaries, ﬁrms mainly spent with other ﬁrms.
R&D complementarities are primarily achieved through ﬁrm-to-ﬁrm relationships. How-
ever, this is a relatively risky type of relationship, since it also opens the door to competi-
tion. As indicated in table 2.3, as ﬁrm size increases, so does the proportion of ﬁrms that
have R&D performed by others. This may be explained by the fact that large ﬁrms have
less to fear from competition from other ﬁrms with which they voluntarily do business,
provided that they share only a limited portion of their knowledge.
In the introduction and the section on motivations for entering into a partnership, we
noted the importance of complementarities as one of the main factors motivating R&D
performers to obtain outside resources. Intramural research is commonly considered a
prerequisite for any external acquisition of or investment in R&D. Accordingly, a positive
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Table 2.5: Total R&D expenditures for each main strategy by sources and destinations
of payments for R&D purpose, for the period 1997 to 2002 (millions of
dollars)
Organization at the source Perform own Sell R&D services Buy R&D services
or destination of payment R&D (source) (destination)
Reporting unit + R&D grants from federal
government 48 618
Parent or aﬃliates company 1 832 (9.8) 1 832 (16.6)
Parent or aﬃliates foreign company 13 130 (70.0) 5 285 (47.9)
Firms 1 089 (5.8) 1 089 (9.9)
Foreign ﬁrms 1 670 (8.9) 762 (6.9)
Government 863 (4.6)
Private non-proﬁt organization + Provincial
research organizations 24 (0.2)
Industrial research institutes or associations 326 (2.9)
Hospitals 516 (4.7)
Universities 762 (6.9)
Foreign universities 103 (0.9)
Other (government, educational institutions 180 (0.9) 328 (3.0)
Total expenditures by strategy 48 618 18 764 11 027
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey (calculation from the author).
Brackets indicate the amount in percentage of the total by column.
correlation between intramural and extramural R&D is to be expected. The literature
oﬀers ample evidence of the complementarity between intramural and extramural R&D,
but in almost all cases that evidence is based on discrete values. Table 2.6 shows the
complementarities in terms of amounts spent on R&D for the strategic options for R&D
performance. The amounts indicate, assuming a given strategic option, how many dollars
were spent on R&D for the other strategic options. For example, performers opting for
the “Perform own R&D” strategy spent almost $15 billion on the “Sell R&D services”
strategy and $9 billion on the “Buy R&D services” strategy.
Thus, it may be seen that opting for the “Buy R&D services” strategy implies expen-
ditures of nearly $36 billion for perform own R&D. Performers that do R&D for other
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Table 2.6: R&D expenditures complementarities by diﬀerent strategies’combinations,
1997 to 2002 (millions of dollars)
Perform own Sell R&D Buy R&D
R&D services services
Conditionally to:
Perform own R&D 48 627 14 898 9 461
Sell R&D Services 15 262 18 764 7 616
Buy R&D Services 35 927 1 562 11 027
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey (calculation from the authors).
organizations have $15 billion in intramural expenditures on R&D services. The most
signiﬁcant apparent complementarities are therefore between the “Buy R&D services”
and the “Perform own R&D” strategies and between “Sell R&D services” and “Perform
own R&D”. This would indicate that there are indeed complementarities between internal
and external strategies. [Cassiman and Veugelers (2002)] also pointed out that ﬁrms that
adopt the in-house innovation strategy introduce far fewer innovative products and pro-
cesses than ﬁrms that combine internal and external resources. Such a combination is the
result of complementarities between internal and external R&D. This ﬁnding is consistent
with the observations of [Piga and Vivarelli (2004)], for whom the decision to enter into
an external R&D relationship depends on an earlier decision to conduct R&D activities.
Firms that opted for a “Sell R&D services” strategy performed only $7.6 billion worth
of R&D services in the form of purchases of R&D services. Firms that adopted a “Buy
R&D services” strategy sold $1.5 billion worth of such services.
2.6 Multinomial analysis of R&D performance strate-
gies
A ﬁrm must choose from among several options regarding its organizational strategy.
It can perform R&D for itself, perform it for other organizations, have it performed
by other organizations or opt for a combination of these strategies11. The following
analysis illustrates how a ﬁrm makes simultaneous choices regarding the six mutually
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exclusive strategies available to it. Through this simultaneous decision-making (taking
the alternative choices into account), the ﬁrms decision to maximize its proﬁts takes the
various possible alternatives into consideration.
The assumptions associated with the multinomial logit model (MLM) are based on
precisely this type of decision. This model is appropriate for estimating how the char-
acteristics that inﬂuence the ﬁrms decision aﬀect the likelihood of opting for a given
strategy.
The estimation of this type of model must nevertheless satisfy the assumption techni-
cally known as the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). In the case of an MLM,
this assumption reﬂects the fact that the relationship of two probabilities associated with
two speciﬁc events is independent of other events. Appended are the results of Hausman-
type tests that compare the estimated coeﬃcients of a model based on the six strategy
choices with estimates of a limited model that excludes one of the strategies.
2.6.1 Description of variables
Our database limits our choice of the independent variables that determine the ﬁrms
strategic decision regarding R&D performance. We can nevertheless control the ﬁrms
decision for the most common variables found in this type of study. In accordance with
the “Schumpeterian” approach, large ﬁrms traditionally have an advantage in terms of
their ability to produce research and innovate [(Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999; Breschi and
Orsenigo, 2000)]. However, the relationship between the size of the ﬁrm and its strategic
choice on how to conduct R&D is not necessarily a linear function. It is therefore useful
to verify the relationship that exists between the size of the ﬁrm in terms of the number
of employees and the type of strategic decision made by it.
The motivations that lead foreign-controlled ﬁrms to do research in the host country
for themselves, do it for others or have it done by other organizations depend on nu-
merous factors: policies supporting R&D, the tax environment, etc. It is assumed that
national ﬁrms and foreign-controlled ﬁrms take the same factors into consideration, but
11It should be kept in mind that ﬁrms that are categorized to the Buy R&D services exclusively strategy
had only R&D capital expenditures and no current expenditures. We intentionally excluded these ﬁrms
from our study, and therefore this strategy is not included in our analysis.
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the weighting that they assign to these factors may diﬀer. For example, foreign-controlled
ﬁrms may seek endowment complementarities in host countries. If this is the case, we
should observe a diﬀerence in performance strategies for foreign-controlled ﬁrms. These
ﬁrms should more often opt for “Sell R&D services” and “Buy R&D services” strategies.
The descriptive analysis yielded some partial answers pointing in this direction. The task
now is to determine the impact of this variable on the diﬀerent strategies, controlling
for the co-variation induced by the other independent variables. Country of control is a
dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 when the country of control is Canada.
The study of [Belderbos et al. (2004)] showed that R&D intensity (R&D-intensity) in
terms of the number of employees assigned to R&D as a proportion of total employment
varies according to the type of partner. R&D intensity has an impact on the way R&D is
performed. Firms with high-intensity R&D have a higher level of knowledge appropriation
and are therefore less concerned by the risk of sharing knowledge that comes with a
partnership relationship. In such a situation, the ﬁrm might opt for a strategy of doing
R&D for other organizations or doing it for itself. We will also introduce the square
of R&D intensity (R&D int)2 in order to take the non-linearity of the relationship into
account. Beyond a certain level of intensity, the ﬁrms absorptive capacity declines as the
eﬀects of economies of scale diminish [Belderbos et al. (2004)].
Finally, we will test the hypothesis that industries that have the characteristic of being
both R&D-intensive and open to partnership have a higher propensity to produce research
for other organizations.
2.6.2 Results
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 report the marginal eﬀects of the independent variables on the proba-
bility of choosing one of the six research and development performance strategies. Coeﬃ-
cients indicate the impact on the probability of choosing one of these strategies compared
to the other choices considered. We organized the data set as a short panel data set.
The standard error of estimates have been adjusted to take into account the fact that
cross-section data are independent (heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors).
For each table12, a diﬀerent speciﬁcation applies. In the ﬁrst case, (Table 2.7), indepen-
dent variables include size, country of control, R&D intensity and sectoral diﬀerentiation.
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In the second case (Table 2.8), we replaced the variables R&D intensity and sectoral
diﬀerentiation with four dichotomous variables that cover the diﬀerent industry groups
according to characteristics that reﬂect both R&D intensity and the level of openness to
relationships with external partners (other than subsidiaries). These variables identify
the quadrants in ﬁgures 2.2 and 2.3. For these two speciﬁcations, the reference strategy
chosen is the “Perform own R&D” strategy.
Table 2.7: First speciﬁcation. Logit multinomial model, marginal impacts of various
strategies compiled data for 1997 to 2002 period
Perform
own
R&D
Sell R&D
services
Perform own
R&D and
Sell R&D
services
Perform own
R&D and
Buy R&D
services
Perform own
R&D, Sell
and Buy
R&D services
Sell and
Buy
R&D
services
Log(emp.) -0.043 (-24.4) 0.002 (9.4) 0.007 (17.7) 0.019 (11.2) 0.013 (28.7) 0.002 (6.6)
Country(cont) -0.003 (-0.3) -0.018 (-5.70) -0.008 (-2.5) 0.078 (7.4) -0.023 (5.7) -0.026 (-6.2)
R&D int -0.435 (-16.0) 0.044 (11.8) 0.103 (15.6) 0.042 (1.6) 0.196 (23.2) 0.050 (11.1)
(R&D int)2 0.223 (9.5) -0.025 (-7.8) -0.070 (-11.7) 0.030 (1.3) -0.131 (-17.1) -0.027 (-7.1)
Manufacture 0.070 (8.1) -0.006 (-4.8) -0.011 (-5.1) -0.035 (-4.0) -0.012 (-4.1) -0.006 (-4.2)
Services 0.063 (7.3) -0.0006 (0.5) -0.003 (-1.5) -0.057 (-6.6) -0.003 (-1.0) 0.0001 (0.1)
Prob. strategy 42.70 0.80 2.14 49.71 3.64 1.01
N. obs. 60451
Likelihood -61776.7
Pseudo R-sq. 0.0266
Source: Statistics Canada: RDCI Survey
Between brackets the predicted z-score, signiﬁcant at 5%. Firms with zero employees have been eliminated
The data show that the “Perform own R&D” and “Perform own R&D and Buy R&D
services” strategies have the strongest probabilities of being chosen, regardless of how the
multinomial model is speciﬁed.
Table 2.7 shows that while signiﬁcant, the increase in ﬁrm size in terms of number
of employees has a negligible impact on the choice of strategies for the performance of
R&D. An increase in the number of employees increases the probability of opting for all
strategies except the “Perform own R&D” strategy.
12Speciﬁcation after elimination of ﬁrms reporting zero employees
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On the other hand, being a Canadian-controlled ﬁrm increases the chances of opting
for the “Perform own R&D and Buy R&D services” strategy by 7.8% but reduces the
chances of opting for the other strategies.
As expected, the eﬀect of the level of R&D intensity on strategy choices is positive
and concave, since the coeﬃcients are positive for the terms that capture the linearity of
the relationship and negative and signiﬁcant for the quadratic terms, with the exception
of the “Perform own R&D” strategy where the relationship is reversed. An increase in
R&D personnel reduces the likelihood of choosing to do R&D for oneself but increases
the likelihood of doing it for others. If the ﬁrm opts to do R&D for itself, then increasing
its R&D personnel would result in increases of its marginal absorptive capacity. These
results are consistent with the ﬁndings of [Belderbos et al. (2004)].
Table 2.8: Second speciﬁcation. Logit multinomial model, marginal impacts of various
strategies compiled data for 1997 to 2002 period
Perform
own R&D
Sell R&D
services
Perform
own R&D
and Sell
R&D
services
Perform
own R&D
and Buy
R&D
services
Perform
own R&D,
Sell and
Buy R&D
services
Sell and
Buy
R&D
services
Log(emp) -0.013 (-10.3) -0.0005 (-2.2) 0.003 (7.97) 0.006 (5.02) 0.006 (14.3) -0.001 (-5.9)
Country(cont) 0.043 (4.0) -0.035 (-6.8) -0.014 (-3.8) 0.084 (8.0) -0.034 (-7.1) -0.044 (-7.2)
High R&D int/High ext.link -0.097 (-19.6) 0.012 (8.6) 0.023 (11.3) -0.004 (-0.7) 0.051 (18.3) 0.015 (9.3)
High R&D int/Weak ext.link -0.060 (-8.9) -0.002 (-1.4) -0.007 (-3.7) 0.068 (9.8) -0.0008 (-0.3) 0.001 (0.8)
Weak R&D int/High ext.link 0.003 (0.6) 0.011 (8.5) 0.008 (5.1) -0.034 (-6.8) 0.004 (2.2) 0.008 (5.4)
Prob. strategy 42.58 0.97 2.23 49.26 3.78 1.18
Number of observations 60451
Likelihood -62367.7
Pseudo R-sq. 0.0173
Source: Statistics Canada: RDCI Survey
Between brackets the predicted z-score, signiﬁcant at 5%. Firms with zero employees have been eliminated
Sectoral diﬀerentiation has only a slight impact on the ﬁrms decision as to the strat-
egy chosen. The second speciﬁcation (Table 2.8) reveals that all things being otherwise
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equal, industries that are highly R&D intensive and open to relationships with external
partners other than subsidiaries reduce their probability of doing R&D for themselves
but increase their probabilities for all alternative strategies. Thus, an increase in the
number of ﬁrms that ﬁt the characteristics of high R&D intensity industries and openness
to external relationships would increase the likelihood of doing R&D by a combination
of strategies rather than doing it intramurally. This ﬁnding suggests that an increase in
certain industries such as the pharmaceutical industry could generate an increase in the
use of strategies that involve exchanges of services for R&D purposes. As the results of
our analysis show, having a high level of both R&D intensity and openness to external
relationships yields a 5.1% increase in the chances of doing R&D by combining the three
main performance strategies, namely “Perform own R&D” “Sell R&D services” and “Buy
R&D services”
As in the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, being a Canadian-controlled ﬁrm increases the chances of
opting for the “Perform own R&D and buy R&D services” strategy but also the internal
strategy that consists in doing R&D exclusively for oneself. In both cases, the impact
is sizable and signiﬁcant. Thus, being a Canadian-controlled ﬁrm increases the chances
of opting for the strategy of doing R&D for oneself by 4.3%. These results conﬁrm the
descriptive analysis, which showed us that proportionally more foreign-controlled ﬁrms
do R&D for other organizations, while Canadian-controlled ﬁrms tend to do their R&D
themselves or have other organizations do it. However, it should be kept in mind that in
terms of amounts, the relationship is reversed: Canadian ﬁrms spend more to do R&D
for other organizations and foreign-controlled ﬁrms spend relatively more to have R&D
done by other organizations.
2.7 Conclusion
This study expands our thinking on the choice of R&D performance modes. In previous
studies, ﬁrms strategic choices regarding R&D performance are essentially binary: either
the ﬁrm has R&D performed in-house or it obtains R&D services through an external
partnership. Drawing on data from the R&D survey conducted by Statistics Canada,
we have expanded this concept of performance mode. We have shown that the R&D
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performer can do R&D for its own purposes or have it done by other organizations, or it
may also do it for other organizations.
We presented these diﬀerent R&D performance modes in the form of diﬀerent relation-
ships with external partners but also with subsidiaries. For this purpose, the intensity of
the relationship was quantiﬁed in monetary terms and not by merely counting the ﬁrms
involved, as is more often done in the empirical literature.
The study showed that 62% of R&D expenditures are of internal origin and 38% are
of external origin. More speciﬁcally, 24% of all transaction amounts for R&D purposes
are for R&D performed by ﬁrms for other organizations. The R&D that Canadian ﬁrms
have others perform for them accounts for 14% of all transaction amounts for R&D pur-
poses. The more in-depth examination also revealed that of the percentage of transaction
amounts spent on external strategies, 81% was spent in relations between ﬁrms and their
subsidiaries. Consequently, the use of external partnerships other than with subsidiaries
covers only 19% of R&D transaction amounts for the sale or purchase of R&D services.
Forty-two percent of ﬁrms performing R&D produce research internally only, with
no partnership relationship. These ﬁrms that do only in-house R&D spent $10.7 billion
on R&D, representing 13% of total expenditures recorded in transactions for the various
R&D strategies. Essentially, partnerships with other ﬁrms and between ﬁrms and their
subsidiaries explain most of the amounts transacted for R&D purposes, that is, more than
$22 billion out of the $30 billion in transactions for all strategies other than Perform own
R&D over the period 1997 to 2002. Governments account for 5% of payment sources for
ﬁrms that do R&D for other organizations. Universities too are a relatively important
external organization. Nearly 8% of all amounts spent on R&D performed by other
organizations come from universities, and 5% from hospitals. Other organizations such
as private non-proﬁt organizations and provincial research centres contribute to a very
small extent to the amounts exchanged for R&D. We have shown that the manufacturing
sector relatively does R&D for other organizations and that the service sector has R&D
done by other organizations.
Consistent with hypotheses found in the literature, entering into external R&D rela-
tionships requires a pre-existing absorptive capacity. In other words, to opt for a “Sell
R&D services” or “Buy R&D services” strategy requires a degree of complementarity with
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the strategy that consists in doing R&D for oneself.
Finally, multivariate analysis identiﬁed the determinants of each strategy. This anal-
ysis revealed that ﬁrm size is a factor that has little impact on the choice of a strategy.
Another interesting highlight revealed by this analysis is that belonging to a Canadian-
controlled ﬁrm increases the chances of doing R&D exclusively in-house. Thus, foreign-
controlled ﬁrms are more likely to carry out R&D activities in the form of a partnership.
Lastly, we showed that R&D intensity and the degree of openness to external partner-
ship relationships (other than with subsidiaries) at the industry level are variables with
diﬀering eﬀects on the choice of strategy.
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Appendix: A. Deﬁnitions
(1) Perform own R&D: R&D intramural work performed or funded within the reporting
unit (including Federal grants).
(2) Sell R&D services: R&D performed by the reporting unit but funded by other
organizations (including Parent, aﬃliated and subsidiary companies) where the results are
transmitted to funds purveyor.
(3) Buy R&D services: R&D work performed by other organizations (including parent,
aﬃliated and subsidiary companies) and paid by the reporting unit.
Appendix: B. Tests for validity of Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives
(IIA)
Table 2.9: Hausman-type test (IIA) for model 1
Omitted Strategy Chi2(28) Prob Chi2 Ho
Sell R&D Services 36.45 0.1059 Not reject
Perform own R&D and Sell R&D services 14.98 0.9696 Not reject
Perform own R&D and Buy R&D services -2.35 Statistics not deﬁned
Perform own, Sell and Buy R&D services 25.78 0.5308 Not reject
Sell and Buy R&D Services 27.55 0.4883 Not reject
Table 2.10: Hausman-type test (IIA) for model 2
Omitted Strategy Chi2(28) Prob Chi2 Ho
Sell R&D Services -114.40 Statistics not deﬁned
Perform own R&D and Sell R&D services -6.67 Statistics not deﬁned
Perform own R&D and Buy R&D services 16.18 0.8815 Not reject
Perform own, Sell and Buy R&D services 41.62 0.0142 Reject
Sell and Buy R&D Services 55.89 0.0002 Reject
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Appendix: D.
Table 2.12: Annual growth of R&D expenditures by industry
Industrial classiﬁcation from RDCI
Number of
observations
(% of total)
Annual rate of growth (1997-2002) for
R&D expenditures
Do for
oneself
Do for
others
Have
others do
Agriculture, forestry, ﬁshing and hunting 1 623 (2.68) +++ +++ ++
Mining and oil and gas extraction 622 (1.02) - +++ - -
Utilities 289 (0.48) - - - ++++ ++++
Construction 1 422 (2.34) - ++++ ++++
Food, beverage and tobacco 1 779 (2.93) - - - - - +
Textiles 735 (1.21) +++ - - - - - -
Wood products 858 (1.42) - - ++++ ++++
Paper Products 585 (0.96) ++++ - - - -
Printing 433 (0.71) ++++ - - - - - - - -
Pharmaceutical and medicine 543 (0.89) ++++ ++++ -
Other chemicals 1 856 (3.06) ++ +++ ++++
Petroleum and coal products, plastic products, rubber products 2 008 (3.31) - + - - -
Non-metallic mineral products 661 (1.09) - - - - - - - - - - -
Primary metal (ferrous) 583 (0.96) +++ - - - -
Primary metal (non-ferrous) , and Fabricated metal products 9 993 (4.94) +++ - - - - - - - -
Machinery 4 971 (8.20) +++ ++ - - - -
Computer and peripheral equipment 597 (0.98) +++ - - - - - -
Communications equipment 731 (1.21) ++++ - - - - - - - -
Semiconductor and other electronic components 803 (1.32) ++++ ++++ ++++
Navigational, measuring, medical and control instruments 1 554 (2.56) +++ ++++ ++++
Other computer and electronic products 221 (0.36) - - - - - - - - -
Electrical equipment, appliance and components 1 180 (1.94) +++ - +++
Motor vehicles and parts 935 (1.54) ++++ - - - - -
Aerospace products and parts 375 (0.62) - - - - +++
All other transportation equipment 327 (0.54) + - - - - ++++
Furniture and related products 608 (1.00) ++++ ++++ - - - -
Other manufacturing industries 1 974 (3.26) + - - - - +
Wholesale trade 4 736 (7.81) - - ++++ -
Retail trade 1 019 (1.68) - - ++++ - - - -
Transportation and Warehousing 343 (0.57) ++++ - - - - -
Information and Cultural Industries 2 058 (3.39) ++++ + ++++
Finance, insurance and real estate 743 (1.22) + ++++ ++++
Architectural, engineering and related services 3 861 (6.37) +++ - -
Computer system design and related services 8 192 (13.5) ++++ ++++ +++
Management, scientiﬁc and technical consulting services 1 584 (2.63) ++++ ++++ ++++
Scientiﬁc research and development services 2 590 (4.27) ++++ ++++ +++
Health care and social assistance 516 (0.85) ++++ +++ ++++
All other services 3 659 (6.04) + - - - - -
0 ≤ growth < 3%+ 0 ≤ decrease < −3%−
3% ≤ growth < 5% + + −3% ≤ decrease < −5%−−
5% ≤ growth < 10% + ++ −5% ≤ decrease < −10%−−−
growth ≥ 10% + + + + decrease ≥ −10%−−−−
Source: Classiﬁcation published in Catalogue 88-202 (2004) table 27, Statistics Canada.
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Appendix: E. Acronyms for Industries
Arg = Agriculture, forestry, ﬁshing and hunting
Mingas= Mining and oil and gas extraction
Utilities = Utilities
Constr = Construction
Manufacturing
Food= Food, Beverage and tobacco
Textile= Textile
Wood =Wood products
Paper= Paper products
Printing = Printing
Pharm = Pharmaceutical and medicine
Othchim = Other chemicals
Plastics = Petroleum and coal products, Plastic products, Rubber products
Nometal = Non-metallic mineral products
Fmetal = Primary metal (ferrous)
Metal = Primary metal (non-ferrous), and Fabricated metal products
Machine = Machinery
Comp equip = Computer and peripheral equipment
Com equip = Communications equipment
Comp elec = Semiconductor and other electronic components
Nav = Navigational, measuring, medical and control instruments
Othelec = Other computer and electronic products
Comp appl = Electrical equipment, appliance and components
Motor = Motor vehicle and parts
Aerospace = Aerospace products and parts
Othtransp = All other transportation equipment
Furnitures = Furniture and related products
Oth manuf = Other manufacturing industries
Services
Wsale = Wholesale trade
Retail = Retail trade
Transport = Transportation and Warehousing
Cultural = Information and Cultural Industries
Finance = Finance, insurance and real estate
Eng = Architectural, engineering and related services
Design = Computer system design and related services
Man = Management, scientiﬁc and technical consulting services
Sc rd = Scientiﬁc research and development services
Health = Health care and social assistance
Oth serv = All other services
Variables
Vextern = R&D expenditures associated with external relationships
External link = number of external relationship
Chapter 3
Doing R&D in a Closed or Open Mode: Dynamics and Impacts
on Productivity.13
3.1 Introduction
Research and development (R&D) is an important activity in the innovation process.
But, it implies to overcome a number of barriers. The cost of performing R&D is a
major barrier for many ﬁrms. Besides this cost constraint is the appropriation problem,
namely the ability for ﬁrms to retain all the beneﬁts resulting from eﬀorts invested in
research [Arrow (1962)]. What is often overlooked is that a ﬁrm must ﬁrst have suﬃcient
absorptive capacity to recognize the value of new information, assimilate it and apply
it to commercial ends [Cohen and Levinthal (1990)]. Some research projects are fairly
complex and require multidisciplinary teams. Such teams are not always readily available
within ﬁrms and are established through partnerships and collaborative work.
In other words, the decision to contract out R&D knowledge services or to perform
R&D in house, the “Make and Buy decision” as it is known in the literature, represents
13Co-authors: Pierre Mohnen (UNU-MERIT, Maastricht University- Netherlands).
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one of the more complex choices facing a ﬁrm’s managers [Leiblein and Dalsace (2002)].
Contracting-out R&D knowledge services allows ﬁrms to increase knowledge transfers
along the contracting-out process [Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998)].
On the one hand, ﬁrms have incentives to perform R&D in an open mode (perform
R&D for, or have it performed by, others ﬁrms) by attempting to maximize knowledge
externalities and complementarities through R&D. On the other hand, ﬁrms have incen-
tives to perform R&D in a closed mode (perform R&D for themselves intramurally) by
minimizing outgoing externalities through investments in knowledge protection [Cassiman
and Veugelers (2002)].
Obviously, external technological knowledge cannot easily be integrated to a ﬁrm that
performs R&D in a closed mode, because of the diﬃculties of implementing the external
know-how [Veugelers (1997)]. As pointed out by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and Piga
and Vivarelli (2004), R&D performers need to have a stock of prior knowledge (absorptive
capacity) to eﬀectively incorporate and assimilate externalities into their decisions. To
overcome this type of potential technological market failure, the ﬁrm can modify its
behavior to reﬂect the assimilation of new knowledge. For policy makers it is important
to know how this potential market failure in ”research and development activities” can
aﬀect innovation and competition.
To respond to this concern we want to address two questions: First, how do ﬁrms
evolve in the way they organize their R&D activities? Is there a dynamic, evolutionary
process under way that determines the choice between make and buy? Second, is there
a diﬀerence in the rates of return to R&D depending on the way the R&D is conducted?
Do shifts from one mode to the other aﬀect economic performance?
As far as we know, no study so far has examined the transitional dynamics in the
organization of R&D. Although, many studies have examined the factors that inﬂuence
the make and buy decision [(Aurora and Gambardella, 1990; Hanel, 2000; Cassiman and
Veugelers, 2002; Beneito, 2003; Miravete and Pernias, 2006; Cesaroni, 2004; Rosa and
Mohnen, 2006)], few have addressed the performance implications of these decisions [(Co-
hen and Levinthal, 1990; Veugelers, 1997)]. The ﬁrm’s choice for outsourcing aﬀects
innovativeness and productivity according to [Baziliauskas and Mathewson (2007)]. Our
study will be based on Canadian ﬁrm data originating from Statistics Canada RDCI (Re-
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search and Development in Canadian Industry) survey. With a full sample of 125,568
ﬁrm-years it constitutes one of the largest databases used so far to analyze the returns
to R&D. Among the many studies that have examined the association between R&D
and productivity growth [(Bernstein, 1988; Bernstein and Nadiri, 1989; Mohnen, 1989;
Mohnen and Le´pine, 1991; Bernstein, 1998)], for Canada, only the Bernstein (1988) study
was based on ﬁrm level data. We shall make use of the panel data dimension to control
for unobserved heterogeneity, to estimate dynamics and diﬀerent returns depending on
the mode of R&D organization.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the following section, we extend the traditional
concept of the make and buy decision. Data sources and descriptive statistics are described
in section 3.3. In sections 3.4 and 3.5 we set up the empirical model and present the
estimation results for ﬁrms’ transitions in the manner of performing R&D. In section 3.6
we set up the empirical model and present the estimated impact of R&D organization on
economic performance. Section 3.7 summarizes and concludes.
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3.2 Organizational choices of R&D
3.2.1 An extension beyond the traditional make and buy deci-
sions
Typically, a ﬁrm has to consider two types of decisions regarding technological funding.
Either the acquisition of R&D is internal or external. It can perform the R&D itself, in a
closed environment or it may choose to meet its needs by purchasing R&D services from
other institutions. This decision in the literature has been known as the make and buy
decision [(Williamson, 1991; Gambardella, 1992)]. The exploration of the combination of
these two types of knowledge acquisition allows ﬁrms to beneﬁt from complementarities
in technological competence. The external R&D acquisition can improve the ﬁrms’ per-
formance from internal eﬀorts [Belderbos and Lokshin (2006)]. The two decisions can,
however, also be viewed as substitutes [Fernandez-Bagues (2003)]. The decision to orga-
nize the R&D within the ﬁrm or to go for open innovation depends on internal versus
external costs and beneﬁts. But a ﬁrm may also do R&D for other institutions. We shall
deﬁne the following three ways of doing R&D based on the source and destination of
payments for R&D:
1- Make is when intramural R&D work is performed and funded within the reporting
unit (it includes federal grants but excludes parents, aﬃliated and subsidiary companies).
2- Sell is when R&D is performed by the reporting unit but funded by others institutions
(including parents, aﬃliated and subsidiary companies). 3- Buy is when R&D work is
performed by other institutions (including parents, aﬃliated and subsidiary companies)
and paid by the reporting unit. These three basic modes of doing R&D may be combined.
This study focuses on four possible strategies:
• The ﬁrm can make R&D for itself (Strat m)
• The ﬁrm can make R&D for itself and buy R&D services (Strat mb)
• The ﬁrm can make R&D for itself, buy and sell R&D services (Strat mbs)
• The ﬁrm can make R&D for itself and sell R&D services (Strat ms)
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The observed R&D amounts related to these strategies for each ﬁrm performing R&D
in the RDIC database [Statistics Canada (2006b)] are described in the next section. We
won’t distinguish between domestic and international R&D ﬂows, but we shall distin-
guish between ﬁrms under domestic or foreign control. We exclude the following three
exclusive strategies: Sell (s); Buy (b) and Sell-Buy (sb). Conceptually, a ﬁrm cannot
sell something that was not produced in the ﬁrst place. Selling in one period the R&D
services produced internally in the previous period corresponds in our frame to a switch
of strategies. The Sell-Buy (sb) strategy conceptually means that a ﬁrm could make
money just by proposing its services as an intermediary between a customer interested
in purchasing R&D output and a vendor who has performed this R&D. The population
covered by this study concerns only R&D performers, in fact, the situation where a ﬁrm
buys its R&D exclusively from others institutions (b) is unlikely. It appears reasonable
to assume that a ﬁrm that buys exclusively from R&D has a minimum of technological
absorptive capacity, otherwise it means that the ﬁrm has no knowledge about the R&D
acquired. These exclusions eliminate 2,733 observations from our data set representing
less than 2.0 % of the total observations for the period 1997 to 2006.
3.2.2 Transitions between R&D strategies
The rationale that leads a ﬁrm to carry out R&D consists of a complex sequence of
decisions. A ﬁrm adopts one or the other R&D strategy based on numerous considerations.
Whether or not the ﬁrm is able to protect and appropriate its knowledge and the beneﬁts
of its R&D investment is an important consideration. The beneﬁts associated with the
internalization of R&D such as the coordination across technological activities within the
production system or the technological interdependencies could motivate the ﬁrm to carry
out its R&D intramurally [Leiblein and Dalsace (2002)]. By contrast, the risk associated
with the research and the time required to developed the technology could motivate the
ﬁrm to acquired R&D extramurally [(Teece, 1992; Williamson, 1991)]. Finally, the ﬁrms
that engage in R&D activities for a long-term period learn from their past experiences on
R&D [Piga and Vivarelli (2004)]. In this sense, this process acquired by experience can be
viewed as a dynamic mechanism by which a performer of R&D switches from one R&D
strategy to another. This mechanism describes the trajectory of organizational learning
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in the way of performing R&D. This learning process leads the ﬁrm to adopt diﬀerent
R&D strategies over time. For example, one possible trajectory for R&D strategies could
be described as follows:
1. For immediate needs, ﬁrms initiate occasional R&D projects internally (Make). At
this stage of development, the R&D performers have not yet acquired a suﬃcient
level of specialization and know-how to beneﬁt from externalities. A further devel-
opment is the R&D performance on a continuous basis. At this stage, R&D is still
performed internally.
2. The second stage comes with the realization that not all R&D knowledge can be
generated internally. The ﬁrm acquires extramural knowledge in the form of R&D
purchases while following its in-house research activities (Make and Buy).
3. At the third stage, the ﬁrm achieves a level of expertise in R&D suﬃcient to oﬀer
R&D services while continuing its own research activities (Make, Buy and Sell).
4. Finally, the ﬁrm is completely specialized. It dedicates all its research eﬀort to
its own development, and it even sells R&D services (Make and Sell). Sometimes,
selling R&D services becomes the main economic activity. Such a stage is also
observed amongst spin-oﬀ ﬁrms and emerging ﬁrms.
This trajectory suggests that the current state of R&D strategy inﬂuences the probability
of switching to another state in the future. The determinants of transitions between R&D
strategies will be our ﬁrst object of investigation. The transition from one strategy of doing
R&D to another can be the sign of an internal change in the composition of the ﬁrms’
scientiﬁc staﬀ. It can be an indication that the ﬁrm seeks to enlarge its competences
by acquiring new knowledge that is not available internally. It can be a sign that the
ﬁrms seeks to sell its competences. Maintaining the same strategy can mean that the
ﬁrm does not wish to share its technological knowledge. Some strategies can favour or
inhibit technological diﬀusion. We propose to conduct a state dependence analysis of
R&D strategies to estimate the determinants and the probabilities of transition between
strategies.
48
Chapter 3. Doing R&D in a Closed or Open Mode: Dynamics and Impacts on
Productivity.
3.2.3 R&D strategies and ﬁrm’ performance
R&D can increase a ﬁrm’s productivity by improving the quality of its products and
processes, but also by diminishing the costs of the existing products and processes [Hall
and Mohnen (2010)]. The return on an R&D investment may diﬀer depending on how
the ﬁrm acquires knowledge. The ﬁrm could be interested in sharing its R&D activities
or not. Breaking down R&D activities on the basis of their funding sources, internal or
external, could allow us to better understand the inﬂuence of the ﬁrm’s R&D decision on
its economic performance. Our second objective is to examine the inﬂuence of the way
R&D is performed (open vs. closed mode) on labour productivity growth using a panel
of Canadian R&D performers. With the exception of Leiblein and Dalsace (2002) and
Lokshin and Carree (2008) the relation between the internal and external strategies of
R&D expenditures on the rate of labour productivity growth has not been deeply explored;
in particular this issue has not been addressed simultaneously in manufacturing and in
services. Using the same analytical approach as in Fors (1997) and Lokshin and Carree
(2008), we will estimate the returns for diﬀerent combinations of R&D expenditures on
labour productivity growth.
3.3 Database and descriptive statistics
3.3.1 The database
This study is based on Statistics Canada Research and Development in Canadian Industry
Survey, which collects data on the entire R&D performed in the business sector in Canada.
The Statistics Canada database is constructed using two sources: an annual survey of
major R&D performers, and administrative data. Administrative data come from the
Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), providing data on all ﬁrms that claimed an R&D tax
credit under the Scientiﬁc Research and Experimental Development tax credit program
(SR&ED). The coverage of the survey is national. A questionnaire was sent to all ﬁrms
performing or funding R&D valued at $1.5 million or more. The population of ﬁrms
covered includes those that reported R&D activities in the previous survey, those that
claimed tax relief for R&D work performed, those that reported receiving R&D contracts
or grants, those that are reported by other ﬁrms as funding sources or as performers of
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R&D, and those that are identiﬁed in newspaper articles or trade journals.
This chapter is based on data collected for the period 1997 to 2006. We present
cumulative statistics for these ten years. This approach has the advantage of taking into
account possible changes in the structure of the industry. In Statistics Canada’s industrial
R&D survey, the other institutions with which the reporting unit has had monetary
transactions for R&D purposes complies with the recommendations of the OECD (2002a).
The original pooled database contains 138,431 observations (enterprise-years). We
cleaned the data for its extreme values. We excluded those that reported only R&D
capital expenditures but no R&D labour. We also dropped ﬁrms with zero or negative
revenues (2,667 observations), with zero employees (252 observations), and with a ratio
of (revenue/employee) ≤ 4, 000$ or a ratio of (revenue/employee) ≥ 1, 000, 000$ (7,276
observations). Finally, we dropped ﬁrms with the improbable strategies Sell (s), Buy
(b) and Sell-Buy (sb) (2,668 observations). The ﬁnal complete sample consists of about
125,568 observations. Because the surveyed units are generally the larger R&D performers
and the behavior of ﬁrms may also vary according to their size and persistence in carrying
out R&D activities [Schelling and Gault (2006)], this analysis will be conducted on the
following three sub-samples:
• Continuous R&D performers (balanced sub-sample - 17,300 observations)
• All R&D performers (unbalanced full sample - 125,568 observations)
• Large R&D performers (unbalanced sub-sample - 10,079 observations).
The continuous R&D performers represent enterprises that are observed continuously
during the period 1997 to 2006. This sub-sample regroups mature ﬁrms with a cumu-
lative experience in R&D. The second sample includes all R&D performers. The third
sub-sample, the large R&D performers, includes only the information collected from the
surveyed units (that is, from those spending at least 1.5 million of dollars to perform or
fund R&D activities).
3.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Since neither the value added nor the hourly wage are available in the RDCI database to
construct labour productivity14, we measure the ﬁrm’s performance by the ratio of total
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revenues over employment (Q/L), serving as a proxy for labour productivity15.
The variables of interest are the R&D strategies (Strat j), where j= m, mb, mbs and
ms. The R&D strategy is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the ﬁrm opts for a given
strategy (j) and zero otherwise. For the assessment of the returns to R&D, we use the
ratio of R&D expenditures dedicated to strategy (j) to total revenues (Exp Strat j/Q).
The population covered by this study is restricted to R&D performers. The strategies
are described in section 2.1. In accordance with Schumpeter (1934), large ﬁrms have an
advantage in terms of R&D and innovation due to economies of scale [(Veugelers and
Cassiman, 1999; Breschi and Orsenigo, 2000)]. Large ﬁrms may also have more ﬁnancial
resources and a better market position than smaller ones, which makes it easier for them
to adapt to changing economic conditions [Delacroix and Swaminathan (1991)]. These
capabilities of large ﬁrms could inﬂuence both their performance and their choices on how
to perform their research. Because this analysis is carried out in a dynamic context, we
consider the compound annual growth rate of employment Δ(L)16 as a good proxy to cap-
ture the growth in the size of the ﬁrm. Firms with high-R&D intensity have a higher level
of knowledge appropriation (ability to assimilate external knowledge) and are therefore
less concerned about the risk of sharing knowledge through external R&D partnership.
In such a situation, the ﬁrm might opt for outsourcing its research or doing it in-house.
We expect to capture the absorptive capacity by the ratio of R&D staﬀ to total employ-
ment (Absorptive) and its compound annual growth by Δ(Absorptive). It is assumed
that the factors inﬂuencing the domestic and the foreign-controlled ﬁrms are the same
(policies supporting R&D, the tax environment, etc.), but the weighting that they assign
to these factors may diﬀer. For example, foreign-controlled ﬁrms may seek endowment
complementarities in host countries. If this is the case, we should observe a diﬀerence in
the performance of strategies for foreign-controlled ﬁrms and domestic-controlled ﬁrms.
Hence, we consider the country of control as an important factor contributing to the
technological decision. In order to take into account such an eﬀect, we include a dummy
variable equal to one if the country of control is Canada (Domestic) and zero otherwise.
Table 3.1 oﬀers some information regarding the R&D strategies according to the country
of control. Firms under domestic control that perform R&D continuously devote on av-
erage 10.5% of their R&D expenditures to intramural R&D (Strat m). This percentage
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rises to 15.0% for ﬁrms under foreign control. The share of R&D expenditure of con-
tinuous and large performers under foreign control dedicated to the strategy (Strat ms)
is 8.3% and 9.5% respectively, against 2.6% and 5.2% for ﬁrms under domestic control.
This observation shows that large and continuous performers under foreign control have
a higher portion of their R&D sold to others than ﬁrms under domestic control. It may
be because ﬁrms under foreign control sell R&D services to their own subsidiaries. But it
can also indicate that these ﬁrms are more specialized in R&D. Table 3.1 also shows that
there is not a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between ﬁrms under foreign and domestic control in
the ranking of their R&D expenditures by strategies whatever the sub-sample.
Table 3.1: Share of R&D expenditure, by strategy, for continuous, all and large R&D
performers (in percentage of total R&D expenditures)
R&D performers under foreign
control
R&D performers under domestic
control
Continuous All Large Continuous All Large
Strat m 15.0 18.3 14.3 10.5 20.2 15.8
Strat mb 29.8 38.9 35.1 32.7 38.7 36.9
Strat mbs 46.9 38.0 41.1 54.2 33.3 42.1
Strat ms 8.3 4.8 9.5 2.6 7.9 5.2
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey (calculation from the authors).
The eﬀect of young and dynamic ﬁrms is captured by a dummy variable equal to one if
the ﬁrm’s R&D expenditure is superior to the ﬁrm’s revenues (Startup). Generally, such
ﬁrms are very active in research and are in the ﬁrst stage of a technological development
project. For example, in biotechnology and nanotechnology it is common to observe
ﬁrms with high R&D expenditure but no proﬁts. Firms of this type are supported by
venture capital funds [(Niosi, 2000)] and are very common in the pharmaceutical industry.
14The Survey has been designed to produce national values of R&D expenditures for the whole of
Canada.
15In addition, in the rest of this analysis we have used the industrial product price indexes (IPPI
1997=100) from Statistics Canada (Catalogue 62-011-X) to deﬂate the ﬁrms’ revenues.
16The compound annual growth rate (CAGR)= [(XtnXto )
1
(tn−t0) − 1], where tn − t0 represent the number
of years between two periods.
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Usually in the literature, R&D is disaggregated into private and public R&D [Levy and
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics, means and (standard deviations) for the three
sub-samples
Variables Balanced-sample Unbalanced-sample
Continuous R&D
performers
All R&D
performers
Large R&D
performers
Q/L 169.8 (133.5) 162.42(151.9) 219.4 (182.0)
Δ(Q/L) 0.168 (1.029) 0.257 (1.778) 0.314 (2.146)
Radical R&D 0.408 (0.491) 0.458 (0.498) 0.307 (0.459)
Exp Strat m/Q 0.074 (0.318) 0.099 (0.622) 0.181 (1.513)
Exp Strat mb/Q 0.083 (0.459) 0.197 (1.744) 0.397 (2.152)
Exp Strat mbs/Q 0.021 (0.330) 0.037 (1.135) 0.163 (1.663)
Exp Strat ms/Q 0.010 (0.136) 0.012 (0.257) 0.057 (0.617)
Δ L 0.131 (0.746) 0.180 (1.188) 0.173 (1.110)
Δ Absorptive 0.226 (1.312) 0.223 (1.369) 0.365 (2.156)
Absorptive 0.266 (0.278) 0.288 (0.314) 0.344 (0.310)
Domestic 0.557 (0.497) 0.634 (0.448) 0.459 (0.498)
Startup 0.024 (0.153) 0.051 (0.220) 0.121 (0.326)
High tech 0.077 (0.267) 0.030 (0.172) 0.115 (0.319)
Medium High tech 0.424 (0.494) 0.366 (0.482) 0.469 (0.499)
Medium Low tech 0.351 (0.477) 0.368 (0.482) 0.282 (0.450)
Low tech 0.147 (0.354) 0.235 (0.482) 0.133 (0.340)
Strat m 0.450 (0.497) 0.473 (0.499) 0.327 (0.469)
Strat mb 0.475 (0.499) 0.479 (0.499) 0.493 (0.499)
Strat mbs 0.047 (0.212) 0.029 (0.169) 0.116 (0.320)
Strat ms 0.028 (0.163) 0.019 (0.132) 0.064 (0.245)
Number of observations 17,300 125,568 10,079
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey (calculation from the authors).
Terleckyj (1989)], process and product R&D [(Link, 1982; Hanel, 2000)] or basic and
applied R&D [(Mansﬁeld, 1980; Griliches, 1986)]. In this study we distinguish between
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radical and incremental R&D (see appendix for deﬁnitions). We deﬁne radical R&D
(Radical R&D) by a binary variable taking the value one if the ﬁrm performs R&D to
develop new products, processes, technical services or to perform basic R&D, as opposed to
incremental R&D, which includes applied research and improvement on existing products,
processes or technical services. This measure can be viewed as a proxy for innovativeness.
Radical R&D leads to a new technological trajectory [Battaggion and Grieco (2007)].
Such a trajectory can lead to the creation of a new market or new product applications.
The degree of innovativeness depends broadly on the nature of R&D [Duguet (2006)]: the
more a ﬁrm conducts radical R&D, the higher is its likelihood to develop new products or
processes and ultimately new markets. Generally, the literature reports higher returns for
basic R&D as opposed to applied or developed R&D [(Link, 1990; Battaggion and Grieco,
2007)] to compensate for the initial risk and the duration of the investment. Finally, we
include dummy variables representing four speciﬁc grouped industries characterized by
their level of technology intensity following the OECD classiﬁcation [Hatzichronoglou
(1997)] (High tech; Medium High tech; Medium Low tech and Low tech). The
details for these groups of industries are given in appendix G.
Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics on the variables used in the estimated models
according to the three sub-samples. We see again that the largest part of the R&D
expenditure corresponds to R&D strategies (Strat m) and (Strat mb). As compared to
table 1, we now express R&D expenditure in proportion of output. These percentages
are higher for large R&D performers than for all R&D performers, and higher for all
R&D performers in the unbalanced sample than for the balanced sample of continuous
R&D performers. It should also be noted that there is much more variability in the R&D
expenditure ratios for all R&D and large than for continuous R&D performers. At the
bottom of the table we report the frequencies of strategy choices. Most ﬁrms choose to
do make alone (Strat m) or then make and buy (Strat mb). We can also see that larger
ﬁrms pursue more often than the other ﬁrms strategies (Strat mb) or (Strat ms). This
result is probably due to the nature of research. Usually, extramural R&D activities
are more related with the learning and knowledge acquisition as compared to intramural
R&D activities, which are more oriented to the introduction of new products and process
innovations [Beneito and Barrachina (2009)]. Large R&D performers are basically under
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foreign control and do much less radical R&D than continuous R&D performers that are
mostly under domestic control.
Tables 3.3 shows the relation between the ﬁrms’ size and the proportion of R&D
performed in a closed (as opposed to an open) mode for the three sub-samples. The
R&D performed in an open mode refers to R&D payments made or received by ﬁrms for
R&D services (the make-buy, make-sell, and make-buy-sell strategies in our terminology
of section 2.1). The R&D performed in a closed mode refers to R&D expenditure made
and ﬁnanced in house (the ”make” part in our terminology of section 2.1). Whatever the
size or funding strategy of the ﬁrm, the percentage of ﬁrms that perform R&D in an open
mode is always slightly higher than the percentage of ﬁrms that perform R&D in a closed
mode.
The gap between the R&D performed in the closed and open modes becomes greater
for the sub-sample of large R&D performers. However, for the full sample and the sub-
sample of continuous R&D performers, the size of the ﬁrm is not necessary correlated with
the R&D performed in a closed mode or in an open mode, the diﬀerences in percentages
are too small. This argument is in line with Gambardella (1992) and Beneito (2003)
who have argued that larger ﬁrms are less likely to outsource their R&D because their
scale advantage allows them to undertake R&D intramurally, even though their larger
technological absorptive capacity permits them to fully beneﬁt from extramural R&D.
Table 3.3: R&D breakdown by size and executing/funding strategy for each sub-sample
(in percentage of all performers of each sub-sample)
Strat m Strat mb+Strat mbs+Strat ms
Sub sample (1-49) (50-499) (+500) (1-49) (50-499) (+500)
Continuous R&D performers 30.4 12.6 2.0 31.9 17.9 5.2
All R&D performers 37.0 9.3 1.0 38.7 11.8 2.2
Large R&D performers 7.1 18.8 6.8 16.7 32.6 18.0
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey (calculation from the author).
Not surprising, the large R&D performers behave diﬀerently. The large performers
draw beneﬁts from scale economies and are more concentrated in high and medium-
high technological industries. The greater is the ﬁrm’s size, the greater is the likelihood
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to perform the R&D in an open mode. In this sub-sample, 50.6% of ﬁrms with more
than ﬁfty employees perform R&D in an open mode, compared to respectively 14.0%
and 23.1% for the sub-samples of all and continuous R&D performers. This result is in
line with Cassiman and Veugelers (1999) who found that “small ﬁrms are more likely to
restrict their innovation to an exclusive make or buy strategy”.
3.4 Econometric issues and speciﬁcations
3.4.1 The dynamic multinomial Logit model with unobserved
heterogeneity
In this section we are interested in estimating the transitions between the four R&D strate-
gies (Strat m; Strat mb; Strat mbs and Strat ms) described in section 2.1. The transition
probabilities express the likelihood of switching from a strategy in period t to a strategy in
period (t+1). We analyze the dynamics in the choice of R&D strategies in the business sec-
tor using Canadian ﬁrm panel data. More speciﬁcally, we estimate a dynamic multinomial
Logit model with unobserved heterogeneities correlated over alternatives [(Van Nguyen
and Kaiser, 2004; Uhlendorﬀ, 2006)]. The introduction of unobserved ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects
allows to overcome the unrealistic limitation of non-correlation between alternatives con-
tained in the standard multinomial Logit model (i.e., it does not exhibit the independence
from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption). This model belongs to the class of mixed
Logit models (see Train, 2003). The mixed Logit probabilities are the integrals of stan-
dard Logit probabilities over a density of parameters. The probability for a given ﬁrm i
to adopt strategy j at time t conditional on the observed characteristics Xit, ﬁrm-speciﬁc
unobserved heterogeneity αij, and previous adopted R&D strategy Zit−1 is:
P (Zijt|Xit, Zit−1, αi) =
∫ (
exp (βjXit + γjZit−1 + αij)∑J
k=1 exp (βkXit + γkZit−1 + αik)
)
f(αi)dαi (3.1)
where j ∈ J = (Strat m;Strat mb;Strat mbs;Strat ms), and αi is a four-variate random
variable with multivariate density f(αi).
The vector of explanatory variables Xit contains observable ﬁrm’ speciﬁc characteris-
tics in period (t), and Zit−1 is a vector of dummy variables indicating the R&D strategies
adopted in period (t-1) with the make only strategy (Strat m) as the base category. βj
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and γj are vectors of ﬁxed coeﬃcients. The coeﬃcients β1 and γ1 and the unobserved
heterogeneity αi1 speciﬁc to the base category are set to zero to allow for the identiﬁca-
tion of the model. The term αij is a random eﬀect representing the speciﬁc unobserved
heterogeneity across individual ﬁrms in choosing alternative (j). This term does not very
over time. In our model we have four alternatives, in consequence the vector of the spe-
ciﬁc unobserved heterogeneities is represented by αi = {αi1, αi2, αi3, αi4}. The term αi is
identically and independently distributed over individual ﬁrms and follows a multivari-
ate normal distribution. The distribution of the unobserved heterogeneities allows for
correlation over alternatives.
3.4.2 Estimation by Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL)
Our starting point is an empirical application of a STATA routine using maximum simu-
lated likelihood (MSL) following a ﬁrst-order Markov process. The detailed discussion on
the advantage of this procedure compared to the Gauss-Hermite quadrature procedure is
proposed in (Haan and Uhlendorﬀ, 2006; Gong and Villagomez, 2000; Heckman, 1981).
Our contribution to this empirical literature consists in modeling an extension of this
procedure to a more complex choice model with four discrete alternatives. As mentioned
in Haan and Uhlendorﬀ (2006), the (MSL) leads to an equivalent estimate as the Gauss
Hermite quadrature or adaptive quadrature to solve the integration issue. However, this
simulation method is more time eﬃcient than the adaptive quadrature approach. Con-
sidering the large number of observations in our RDCI full sample, the time required for
the estimation becomes a sensitive issue.
Because the behavioral process of the ﬁrm’s choice can not be calculated analytically, it
will be estimated by approximation of parameters through maximum simulated likelihood
(MSL). But, before performing the (MSL) we apply the STATA procedure (mdraws)
proposed by Cappellari and Jenkins (2006) to generate Halton sequences. We create draws
for each ﬁrm. The individual contribution is given by the simulated likelihood function
(3.2) where the integral is replaced by the simulated likelihood expression (3.3). The
sum of the individual contribution equal the overall log-likelihood. Thus the likelihood
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expression of the multinomial Logit with unobserved heterogeneity is for ﬁrm i :
Li =
∫ ∞
−∞
T∏
t=1
J∏
j=1
(
exp (βjXit + γjZit−1 + αij)∑J
k=1 exp (βkXit + γkZit−1 + αik)
)dijt
f (αi) dαi (3.2)
where dijt = 1 is an index function equal to 1 if the alternative j is chosen by ﬁrm i at time
t, and 0 otherwise. The number of draws (R) by construction determines the variance
of the unbiased estimated probability (P) which decreases as (R) increases [Revelt and
Train (1998)]. The distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity with (j=2,3,4 ) is drawn
from a standard normal distribution and can be written as:⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
αi2
αi3
αi4
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠ ∼ N
⎛
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⎛
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0
0
⎞
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This model is estimated with a Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL) because there
exists no closed form solution for expression 3.2. Hence, equation 3.2 is simulated by:
SLRi =
1
R
R∑
r=1
T∏
t=1
J∏
j=1
(
exp
(
βjXit + γjZit−1 + αrij
)
∑J
k=1 exp (βkXit + γkZit−1 + α
r
ik)
)dijt
(3.3)
The calculation of the unobserved random term eﬀect αr is done using a Cholesky
factor C such as αr = Cr where r denotes the rth draw. Hence, the rth draw of the
distribution of α is calculated as:
αi2 = c22 ∗ 2
αi3 = c32 ∗ 2 + c33 ∗ 3
αi4 = c42 ∗ 2 + c43 ∗ 3 + c44 ∗ 4
where 2, 3, 4 follows a trivariate standard normal distribution.
The random terms αi2, αi3 and αi4 are correlated because of the inﬂuence of 2 on the
three of them and of 3 on the last two of them [Train (2003)]. The estimation results by
maximum simulated likelihood of equation (3.3) gives a direct estimate of the elements of
the Cholesky factor C. Then, we need to calculate the variance-covariance matrix W=CC’
in order to extract the variance-covariance matrix of αi. Also, to calculate the standard
errors and the conﬁdence intervals for each element of matrix W we apply the delta
method17, an asymptotic normal approximation method.
17We used the STATA command diparm where we have to specify the function of the parameters
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3.5 Results of the dynamic multinomial Logit model
with individual heterogeneity
Table 3.4 reports the observed transitions between the four R&D strategies during the
period 1997 to 2006 for the sub-sample of continuous R&D performers. The proportion
of ﬁrms that stick to the same strategy over two successive periods is highest for the ﬁrms
that opted for the strategy make (with 36%) and make-buy (with 38%). One also observes
that a non-negligible portion of performers (8%) switch from (Strat m) to (Strat mb) and
vice-versa, in other words, they switch from a strategy where they do intramural R&D
exclusively to a strategy where they also have some R&D done extramurally. But only 1%
of the ﬁrms switch from (Strat mb) to (Strat mbs) and vice-versa. Table 3.4 also shows
that ﬁrms tend to stick to the same strategy over time whatever their initial strategy.
The proportion of ﬁrms that switch from (Strat m) to (Strat mb) is higher than any
other switching of strategies. The observed transitions suggest there is strong true state
dependence. The choice of a given R&D strategy in one period is likely to be followed by
the choice of that same strategy in the next period.
Table 3.4: Observed transition matrix for continuous R&D performers (balanced panel,
in %)
Strat m(t) Strat mb(t) Strat mbs(t) Strat ms(t) Total
Strat m(t-1) 36.2 7.9 0.3 0.6 45.1
Strat mb(t-1) 7.9 38.0 1.1 0.2 47.2
Strat mbs(t-1) 0.3 1.4 2.9 0.3 4.9
Strat ms(t-1) 0.8 0.3 0.3 1.4 2.8
Total
45.2 47.6 4.6 2.6 100
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey (calculation from the authors).
The results of the estimated dynamic multinomial Logit model with unobserved het-
in the matrix W and its partial derivatives. This command is a programmer’s utility for displaying
ancillary parameters. This is useful to reverse the transformation post-estimation and derive the variance-
covariance matrix of the relevant parameters of original metric Jenkins (2003).
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erogeneity are reported in table 3.5 and their marginal eﬀects18 in table 3.6. Each column
of parameters in table 3.5 corresponds to the expression of the logarithm of the log-odds
ratio of strategy j, where j = (Strat mb, Strat mbs, Strat ms), compared to the refer-
ence strategy (Strat m). The model has been estimated only on the balanced panel19
i.e. for the sub-sample of continuous R&D performers. We also present separate esti-
mates for the sub-samples of foreign and domestic continuous R&D performers20. We
control for the annual employment growth Δ(L), the annual absorptive capacity growth
Δ(Absorptive), a dummy for startups (Startup), technological diﬀerentiation (High tech;
Medium High tech; Medium Low tech and Low tech) and year-dummies for the period
1997 to 2006. The comparison of the estimates in table 3.5 and those of the multinomial
Logit without individual-ﬁrm eﬀects (appendix C)21 shows that the inclusion of unob-
served heterogeneity in the model improves signiﬁcantly the log-likelihood and reduces
the magnitude of the transition coeﬃcients. The elements of the variance-covariance ma-
trix are for the most part signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, indicating that the strategy
choices are not mutually independent. The three ways of conducting R&D in an open
mode are positively correlated with each other through their individual eﬀects. Any unob-
served inﬂuence that increases the odds of pursuing one of the three open R&D strategies
will also increase the odds of pursuing any of the other two. Comparing the sum of the two
log-likelihoods for the continuous domestic and foreign controlled R&D performers to the
log-likelihood on the sub-sample of all continuous R&D performers provides a likelihood
ratio test of the homogeneity across ownership. The chi-square statistic is 63.786, which
exceeds the tabulated value for a chi-square with 36 degrees of freedom at the 5% level
of signiﬁcance. The model has diﬀerent parameter values for domestic and foreign-owned
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ﬁrms.
The results displayed in table 3.6 show that there is a high persistence in the way R&D
is done for all three sub-samples. A continuous R&D performer who adopts strategy
(Strat mb) in period (t-1) instead of strategy (Strat m), the reference strategy, has a
50% chance to stick to that strategy in the next period instead of switching to strategy
(Strat m). This persistence is evaluated at 34% for (Strat mbs) and 20% for (Strat ms).
What about (Strat m)? Well, since it is the reference strategy, we can compute the
odds-ratio of following strategies (Strat mb), (Strat mbs) and (Strat ms) compared to
(Strat m) in (t), if (Strat m) is adopted in (t-1). That is given by the exponentiating the
constants of table 3.5 for ﬁrms in low-tech, without growth of employment or absorptive
capacity, foreign-controlled, and non-startup. For continuous R&D performers we get
respective 0.422, 0.009 and 0.014. The odds are clearly in favor of sticking to (Strat m).
Table 3.6 also reveals that doing (Strat mbs) in period (t-1) increases the odds of
doing (Strat mb) or (Strat ms) in period (t) compared to doing (Strat m), whereas doing
(Strat ms) in period (t-1) increases by almost 10% the odds of doing (Strat mbs) in period
(t) and decreases by 14% the odds of doing (Strat mb) in period (t) compared to doing
(Strat m). Roughly the same pattern holds for domestic continuous R&D performers. For
foreign continuous R&D performers, the persistence holds for strategies (Strat mb) and
(Strat mbs), but not for strategy (Strat ms). Foreign and domestically controlled ﬁrms
18The marginal eﬀects indicate the percentage marginal change in the probability of choosing a
given strategy of R&D due to a unit change in the explanatory variable. The calculation of the
marginal change in predicted probabilities (Pi) is for continuous explanatory variables given by ∂Pi∂xi =
Pi
[
βi −
∑J
k=0 Pkβk
]
, and for dummy variables by ΔPi = Pi(1)−Pi(0), i.e. the diﬀerence in the predicted
probabilities for values 1 and 0 of the dummy variables. We apply the same deﬁnitions for the parameters
γi from the equation (3.2.)
19Estimating the model on the unbalanced panel poses some extra diﬃculties that we leave for future
work.
20Given that we only observe whether enterprises leave the sample, but do not know anything about
the causes for exiting, we cannot address any issue related to panel attrition in this study [Van Nguyen
and Kaiser (2004)]. The problem of attrition does not occurs as long as the unobserved individual
heterogeneities that inﬂuence the dynamics of R&D are not correlated with the unobserved factors that
inﬂuence the attrition process, see Uhlendorﬀ (2006).
21The multinomial Logit without individual heterogeneity reported in appendix C provides us the
initial parameters for implementing the multinomial Logit model with individual heterogeneity.
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diﬀer mostly in the likelihood of switching once they have adopted the (Strat ms) R&D
strategy. Foreign controlled ﬁrms would have a 22% higher probability to follow up the
next period with a (Strat mbs) strategy and a 26% lower probability to go for a strategy
(Strat mb). In contrast, domestic ﬁrms would have only a 14% higher chance to follow up
with a strategy (Strat mbs), and a 10% lower probability to make and buy R&D, always
of course compared to adopting an exclusive strategy (Strat m).
Not unexpectedly, there is also an industry eﬀect in the way R&D is conducted and
ﬁnanced. The strategy make-and-buy is more frequent and the strategy make-and-sell less
frequent in medium-high-tech industries than in low-tech industries, whatever the ﬁrm’s
country of control. The eﬀects of the other variables can be summarized as follows. Firms
in high technological industries in (t-1) have a higher probability of choosing the R&D
strategy make-buy-sell (Strat mbs) in the next period. Startups have more of an impact
on choosing the strategy (Strat mbs) over all others for ﬁrms under foreign control. The
marginal eﬀect of startups ﬁrms on the probability of choosing the strategy (Strat mbs)
is 19% for ﬁrms under foreign control as compared to 4% for the full sample.
The trajectory of organizational learning in the way of performing R&D that was
hypothesized in Section 3.2.2 does not seem to be validated. R&D performers tend to
reproduce their past strategies. R&D performers with an open strategy have a higher
likelihood of pursuing the open strategy compared to those who initially opted for an
exclusively intramural strategy (Strat m). The estimated matrix of transitions (table
3.7) shows that the proportion of enterprises that have moved from a closed mode to an
open mode is approximatively the same as the proportion of those who switched from
an open mode to a closed mode (12%). The model allows us to say that the probability
of switching from strategy (Strat ms) to (Strat mb) is higher than the probability of
switching instead from (Strat mb) to (Strat ms). Similarly, the probability of switching
from strategy (Strat mb) to (Strat mbs) is smaller than the probability of switching from
(Strat mbs) to (Strat mb).
Also, we tested the two models, respectively with and without unobserved hetero-
geneities in order to see whether the model with heterogeneity is preferred. We performed
a Likelihood Ratio test (LR) on the three sub-samples. The LR test statistics were respec-
tively (323.95; 153.04 and 180.22). The value for this test with 6 degree of freedom from
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the chi-squared table is (12.59). Since the computed values are larger than this critical
value at the 0.005 level, the null hypothesis Ho:(σ2αi2 = 0; σ
2
αi3
= 0; σ2αi4 = 0; σαi2αi3 = 0;
σαi2αi4 = 0 and σαi3αi4 = 0) is rejected for all sub-samples, suggesting that the model with
heterogeneity is preferred.
The probabilities that we estimated in the multinomial Logit model are conditional
on a ﬁrst-order Markov process. To get a more realistic picture of the transition process,
it would have been preferable to estimate the process with the dependent variable lagged
by two or three periods. However, such a calculation is numerically very demanding in
terms of estimation time and complexity. In our approach, we simpliﬁed the dynamic
aspect of the estimation by relying on only one period lag. This restricts our capability
of describing the entire learning mechanism.
3.5.1 Estimated matrix of transitions
Table 3.7 shows the estimated transition matrix of R&D strategies based on the predicted
average transition probabilities calculated from the dynamic multinomial Logit model
with unobserved heterogeneity (table 3.5) using a representative ﬁrm’s characteristics.
This approach is similar to the one suggested by Gong and Villagomez (2000). Predicted
probabilities are useful to validate whether the model reproduces the data and to assesses
the probabilities of switching from one R&D strategy to another one keeping observed
and unobserved characteristics constant. The predicted transition probabilities are quite
close to the observed transitions shown in table 3.4.
3.5.2 Estimated state dependence
The state dependence describes the eﬀect of favoring one strategy in the ﬁrst period on
the probability of keeping this strategy in the following period. This diﬀerence in esti-
mated probabilities is much more informative that the simple observation of the eﬀects
from the estimates of the dynamic multinomial. Following Uhlendorﬀ (2006), the state
dependence of strategy (Strat mb) is given by the diﬀerence in the probability of pursu-
ing that strategy in two successive periods and the probability of moving towards that
strategy coming from the reference strategy (Strat m). Thus, the eﬀect of choosing the
strategy (Strat mb) in period (t-1) compared to choosing the strategy (Strat m) in period
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Table 3.7: Predicted transition matrix for continuous R&D performers (balanced panel,
in %)
Strat m(t) Strat mb(t) Strat mbs(t) Strat ms(t) Total
Strat m(t-1) 32.8 (1.45) 11.4 (1.36) 0.3 (0.17) 0.5 (0.21) 45.0
Strat mb(t-1) 10.3 (1.33) 36.1 (1.31) 0.6 (0.36) 0.2 (0.09) 47.2
Strat mbs(t-1) 0.6 (0.14) 2.2 (0.38) 1.8 (0.46) 0.3 (0.06) 4.9
Strat ms(t-1) 1.3 (0.18) 0.5 (0.08) 0.2 (0.06) 0.8 (0.17) 2.8
Total 45.0 50.2 3.0 1.8 100
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey, (calculation from the authors).
Values in parentheses shows the standard error
(t-1) on the probability of being in the strategy (Strat mb) in the period (t) is given by
the expression:
SD(mb) = 1
N
∑N
i=1 (Pi (jt = mb|jt−1 = mb)− Pi (jt = mb|jt−1 = m))
Table 3.8: Estimated State Dependence (SD) with respect to reference departure state
(Strat m))
Variables Balanced-panel
All continuous
R&D performers
Foreign
continuous R&D
performers
Domestic
continuous R&D
performers
SD(mb) 0.323 (0.342) 0.302 (0.330) 0.345 (0.350)
SD(mbs) 0.176*** (0.080) 0.209*** (0.098) 0.016 (0.073)
SD(ms) 0.007 (0.047) 0.009 (0.057) 0.006 (0.039)
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey, (calculation from the author).
note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. *** p≺0.01; ** p≺0.05; * p≺0.1
This approach give us a more realistic probability of being in a given state depending
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on the state of departure. This method is more in line with the idea of the trajectory of
organizational learning [Levitt and March (1988)] in the way of doing R&D insofar as we
compare the probability of a change in strategy depending on whether the initial strategy
was the same or not. During their lifetime, ﬁrms learn from their past experience and
from the experience acquired by other R&D performers. The learning mechanism of R&D
is embedded in the organizational memory of the enterprise. The enterprise experiments
with diﬀerent R&D strategies and adopts the one that maximizes its technological perfor-
mance. However, any change in the way of acquiring R&D may result in a considerable
risk-taking and may alter the organizational memory of the enterprise in its R&D exper-
tise (know-how). In sum, the technological trajectory of the ﬁrm depends on its history
of successes or failures in performing R&D in a closed or open mode22.
The results of table 3.8 indicate that the probability of adopting a given open mode
strategy is higher if the ﬁrm was initially following that open mode strategy as opposed to
the closed mode strategy. All state dependences are positive indicating that persistence
of open mode strategies outweigh transitions from closed mode to open mode strategies,
although the diﬀerences are signiﬁcant only for strategy (Start mbs). In the sub-sample
of foreign continuous R&D performers, the state dependence eﬀect is especially high, and
signiﬁcantly so, for (Strat mbs) with a 21% higher probability of sticking to (Strat mbs)
than of switching from (Strat m) to (Strat mbs). An interesting question is whether these
strategy choices have any impact on ﬁrms’ performance.
This is what we propose to do in the next section.
3.6 R&D organization and ﬁrm performance
It is generally accepted that R&D contributes to economic growth and welfare by reducing
the production costs and by widening the variety and the quantity of goods available. A
huge empirical literature has been devoted to estimating the returns to R&D (see Hall et
22For example, to calculate the predicted conditional probability Pi (jt = mb|jt−1 = mb), we set the
R&D strategy (Strat mb)t−1 to 1 and the other lagged strategies to 0 in the expression of the multinomial
Logit model from table 3.5. For the calculation of Pi (jt = mb|jt−1 = m), we do the same: the R&D
strategy (Strat m)t−1 is set to 1 and the other lagged strategies to 0. Finally, to calculate the state
dependence, we subtract these two predicted probabilities.
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al., 2010). The way in which R&D is generated and acquired may also aﬀect economic
performance. Very little empirical research examined the role of the way of doing R&D
on ﬁrms’ performance; the studies of (D’Aveni and Ravenscraft, 1994; Kurokawa, 1997;
Veugelers, 1997; Leiblein and Dalsace, 2002; Rosa and Mohnen, 2006; Lokshin and Car-
ree, 2008) are exceptions. On the one hand, R&D outsourcing reduces risk and allows to
beneﬁt from synergies. On the other hand, R&D internalization reduces the transaction
costs and coordination problems that are likely to occur with outside technology acquisi-
tion and enhances the performance of ﬁrms due to lower administration and coordination
problems associated with it. Moreover technological independence may be preferred in
order to protect the intellectual property and minimize the problems related with exter-
nal technological appropriation [(Teece, 1984, 1993, 1996)]. In the following section we
seek to evaluate the returns from R&D depending on the internal/external organization
of R&D activities. In our evaluation we take into account the existence of possible ﬁrm
speciﬁc unobserved characteristics.
3.6.1 Framework
We start from an extended Cobb-Douglas production function, where output is produced
with the traditional inputs, capital and labour, and the R&D stock of knowledge. If we
ignore the R&D depreciation rate, we can rewrite the production function in growth rate
form as:
Δ ln
(
Q
L
)
it
= β0j + (β1 − 1)Δ ln(L)it +
4∑
j=1
γj
(
Exp Strat (j)/Q
)
it−1 (3.4)
+ β2j(Y ear) + β3j(Industry) + μi + νit
where Q is output, L is labour, Exp Stratj/Q is the R&D expenditure in proportion to
total revenue associated with strategy j (j=m, mb, mbs, ms), β0 is the rate of disembodied
technical change, β1 is the output elasticity of labour, γj are the rates of return to R&D
organized following strategy j, β2j captures the business cycle or technical change eﬀect
and β3j a possible change of main industry of aﬃliation, μi is the ﬁrm-speciﬁc individual
ﬁxed eﬀect, and νit is the idiosyncratic error term.
A few remarks are in order. First, since we do not have ﬁrm speciﬁc data on the
physical capital stock, we can only approximate its contribution via the ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀect.
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Second, nominal output has been deﬂated by the industrial product price index 1997-2006.
Measurement errors in output prices and incorrect R&D deﬂators are attenuated by the
use of year dummies. Third, γj measure the gross rate of return. To arrive at the net
rate of return a depreciation rate of say 15% ought to be subtracted from it. Moreover,
depending on the magnitude of the depreciation rate and the growth rate of the R&D
stock, the gross rate of return could be underestimated by a factor of 2.5 to 5 using the
gross investment instead of the net investment to output ratio (see Hall et al., 2010).
Fourth, because it is unlikely that the present investment in R&D becomes productive
immediately, it seems reasonable to expect a delay between the R&D investment and its
return. The use of panel data allows us to introduce lags. According to the studies of
Pakes and Griliches (1984) and Griﬃth and Reenen (2004) the lag eﬀect drops sharply
after two years. We lag the R&D intensity by one period 23. Sixth, we have included
dummies to control for industry group eﬀects according to their level of technology (see
appendix B) following a classiﬁcation similar to the one proposed in Hatzichronoglou
(1997) and Loschky (2008).
3.6.2 Rates of return to R&D depending on the way of doing
R&D
The estimates of equation (3.4) are reported in table 3.9 for the three sub-samples of data.
The usable sub-samples for this analysis have been reduced respectively to 15570, 89876
and 8504 observations representing 1730, 26109 and 2222 ﬁrms.
The ﬁndings suggest a systematic positive and highly signiﬁcant eﬀect of R&D on
labour productivity growth for the three sub-samples, whatever the chosen R&D strategy.
If we abstract from the exceptionally high rate of return of 92% corresponding to the
strategy make-and-sell, the rates of return range between 12% and 57%. The estimates
of those returns are in line with others similar studies for Canadian data.
We conﬁrm the result of the study by Lokshin and Carree (2008) that the combination
of internal and external R&D leads to higher returns than the adoption of a single R&D
strategy. For all R&D performers and for the large R&D performers we obtain higher
23We tried our speciﬁcation with various lags and without lag for R&D intensity ratio, and the most
signiﬁcant impacts for R&D occurred with a one year lag as also suggested in Lokshin and Carree (2008).
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Table 3.9: The rate of return on R&D by way of doing R&D and by sub-samples
R&D strategies Balanced-panel Unbalanced-panel
Continuous
R&D performers
All R&D
performers
Large R&D
performers
return (se) return (se) return (se)
Total R&D
Exp Strat m/Q (γ1) 0.567*** (0.031) 0.396*** (0.012) 0.117*** (0.019)
Exp Strat mb/Q (γ2) 0.422*** (0.025) 0.412*** (0.008) 0.257*** (0.015)
Exp Strat mbs/Q (γ3) 0.378*** (0.029) 0.209*** (0.012) 0.149*** (0.017)
Exp Strat ms/Q (γ4) 0.917*** (0.066) 0.333*** (0.028) 0.208*** (0.048)
Number of observations 15,570 89,876 8,504
R square 0.113 0.069 0.061
Radical R&D
Exp Strat m/Q (γ1) 0.657*** (0.043) 0.565*** (0.027) 0.317*** (0.057)
Exp Strat mb/Q (γ2) 0.677*** (0.053) 0.651*** (0.016) 0.258*** (0.036)
Exp Strat mbs/Q (γ3) 0.547*** (0.104) 0.247*** (0.027) 0.092*** (0.045)
Exp Strat ms/Q (γ4) 0.789*** (0.237) 0.548*** (0.053) 0.499*** (0.111)
Number of observations 6,307 38,982 2,450
R square 0.163 0.092 0.076
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey
Note: Standard deviation are in parentheses. *** p≺0.01; ** p≺0.05; * p≺0.1
The regressions also control for ΔL, year dummies, technological industry dummies, but the coeﬃcients are not reported.
rates of return for R&D conducted under the strategy (Strat mb) than for R&D conducted
under the strategy (Strat m). For continuous R&D performers, mostly domestic ﬁrms,
this is, however, not the case. The estimated returns are higher under (Strat mb) than
under either (Strat ms) or (Strat mbs). The (Strat mb) strategy seems to be the most
proﬁtable for all and for large R&D performers, and the strategy make-sell for continuous
R&D performers. It is also remarkable that continuous R&D performers obtain higher
rates of return than occasional R&D performers for whatever R&D strategy. A possible
explanation is that the level of R&D intensity (Exp Strat j/Q) is relatively low for the
sub-sample of continuous performers. As shown in table 3.2, the intensity of R&D ex-
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penditure is systematically lower there compared to the other two sub-samples, whatever
R&D strategy is adopted. The portion of ﬁrms in high-technological industries is also
relatively high in the sub-sample of continuous R&D performers.
The estimated rates of return earned on radical R&D for the sub-sample of all R&D
performers shows that the pattern of return across strategies is similar to what we reported
for total R&D. For continuous and large R&D performers, it is now the strategy (Strat ms)
that yields the highest return whereas the strategy (Strat mbs) is a distant fourth. Again,
continuous R&D yields higher returns than occasional R&D.
3.6.3 Impact of transitions between R&D strategies
Instead of breaking down R&D expenditures by way of doing R&D as we have done in
section 3.6.2, we break it down further into changes in the way of doing R&D. Indeed, it
seems reasonable to assume that a ﬁrm changes its way of performing and ﬁnancing the
research if it leads to better performance. The increasing speed of technological change
is an important incentive for ﬁrms to switch from one R&D strategy to another.
Equation (3.4) gets replaced by:
Δ ln
(
Q
L
)
it
= β0j +
∑
n∈J
∑
m∈J
γnm
(
Exp Strat n m
Q
)
it−1
(3.5)
+ (β1 − 1)Δ ln (L)it + β2j (Y ear) + β3j(Industry) + μi + it
where
(
Exp Strat n m
Q
)
it−1
represents the R&D intensity in (t-1) for ﬁrms switching from
R&D strategy (n) to (m) between (t-1) and (t). The coeﬃcient (γnm) represents the rate
of return to R&D associated with that R&D transition. There could be an individual
eﬀect because a ﬁrm could be associated to a given transition in year (t) and to another
transition in year (t+1). This model will be estimated by panel ﬁxed-eﬀects to take
into account individual unobserved heterogeneities. There are 16 possible transitions
associated with the four exclusives combinations of R&D.
In table 3.10 we capture a separate rate of return on R&D for all the ﬁrms that
switched between period (t-1) and period (t) from strategy n to strategy m, where n
and m correspond to (Strat m, Strat mb, Strat ms or Strat mbs). The rates of return of
table 3.9 should not be far away from weighted averages of the rates of return of table
3.10, where the weights are given by the rows of the transition matrix of table 3.4. The
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Table 3.10: Rates of return to R&D, by transitions between strategies and sub-samples
Transitions Balanced-panel Unbalanced-panel
Continuous R&D
performers
All R&D
performers
Large R&D
performers
return (se) return (se) return (se)
Exp Strat m m/Q (γ1) 0.590*** (0.032) 0.357*** (0.013) 0.148*** (0.020)
Exp Strat m mb/Q (γ2) 0.997*** (0.070) 0.597*** (0.018) 0.225*** (0.035)
Exp Strat m mbs/Q (γ3) 1.425*** (0.348) 0.399*** (0.075) 0.421*** (0.118)
Exp Strat m ms/Q (γ4) 2.712*** (0.153) 0.523*** (0.077) -0.012 (0.136)
Exp Strat mb m/Q (γ5) 1.124*** (0.099) 0.741*** (0.026) 0.433*** (0.052)
Exp Strat mb mb/Q (γ6) 0.401*** (0.026) 0.441*** (0.009) 0.383*** (0.019)
Exp Strat mb mbs/Q (γ7) 0.633*** (0.049) 0.271*** (0.021) 0.199*** (0.031)
Exp Strat mb ms/Q (γ8) 0.413*** (0.083) 0.323*** (0.082) 0.359*** (0.123)
Exp Strat mbs m/Q (γ9) 0.119 (0.217) 0.240*** (0.067) 0.007 (0.152)
Exp Strat mbs mb/Q (γ10) 0.246*** (0.076) 0.151*** (0.019) 0.063*** (0.027)
Exp Strat mbs mbs/Q (γ11) 0.257*** (0.033) 0.136*** (0.014) 0.108*** (0.020)
Exp Strat mbs ms/Q (γ12) 0.577* (0.339) 0.248*** (0.062) 0.098 (0.117)
Exp Strat ms m/Q (γ13) 0.336 (0.321) 0.250*** (0.044) 0.142*** (0.064)
Exp Strat ms mb/Q (γ14) 2.085*** (0.398) 0.255*** (0.053) 0.221*** (0.071)
Exp Strat ms mbs/Q (γ15) 0.173 (0.240) 0.229*** (0.075) 0.288*** (0.140)
Exp Strat ms ms/Q (γ16) 0.866*** (0.150) 0.284*** (0.037) 0.243*** (0.060)
R-square 0.095 0.077 0.060
number of observations 15,570 89,876 8,504
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey
Note: Standard deviation are in parentheses. *** p≺0.01; ** p≺0.05; * p≺0.1. The regressions also control forΔL,
year dummies, technological industry, dummies and ﬁrms eﬀects, but the coeﬃcients are not reported.
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analysis of impacts in table 3.10 suggests that it can be beneﬁcial for a ﬁrm to switch
to an alternative strategy. For example, moving from a strategy (Strat m) to a strategy
(Strat ms) when the ﬁrm performs R&D continuously, provides an exceptional return of
271%, as opposed to a return of 59% had the ﬁrm remained in the (Strat m) mode. Even if
that performance appears excessively high, it is entirely plausible that a ﬁrm that receives
external research contracts increases its productivity signiﬁcantly. For most strategies of
doing R&D, there is at least one switch that turns out to be more proﬁtable than the
no-switch option, but also other transitions that look less proﬁtable. The only systematic
pattern that table 3.10 reveals is the higher return (whenever it is signiﬁcant) obtained
when switching from a closed mode to any of the three open modes of doing R&D.
The other striking feature that continuous R&D performers earn higher rates of return
than the average ﬁrm24.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the strategic choices in the way of doing R&D. We have
expanded the scope of organizational choices beyond the traditional make and buy to
distinguish four options. Firms can either operate in closed mode and carry out R&D
for their own purpose (the make decision). They can also operate in a more open mode
either by combining make and buy (i.e. have some of the R&D done internally and some
externally), or by combining make and sell (i.e. do R&D for themselves but also for others)
or combine all three activities (make, buy and sell). Using an exceptionally large panel
data set, namely the Research and Development in Canadian industry Survey conducted
by Statistics Canada from 1997 to 2006, we have ﬁrst estimated the determinants of the
four choices of doing R&D, allowing for dynamics and individual heterogeneity. Then we
have estimated the rate of return on R&D in Canadian ﬁrms for various ways of doing
R&D and even for various changes in the way of doing R&D.
Our analysis has shown that there is a high level of persistence in the way of doing
R&D at the ﬁrm-level (strong true state dependence), in particular for continuous R&D
24We have also estimated equation 5 only for radical R&D. We could not ﬁnd any systematic pattern
other than the one obtained in table 3.10, in addition to the result already noticed in table 3.9 that
radical R&D yields a higher return to total R&D. The results are available upon request.
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performers. Thus, opting for a given strategy in the ﬁrst period increases signiﬁcantly
the probability of keeping that same strategy in the next period. The state dependence is
especially high for ﬁrms that operate in the make-buy-sell mode. Thus we can conclude
that past experience in R&D is an important driver in the way that ﬁrms do their R&D.
The returns to R&D are signiﬁcantly higher for ﬁrms that are continuous R&D per-
formers and for ﬁrms that do radical R&D, by which we mean R&D that leads to new
products, processes or technical services, as well as basic R&D. We do not ﬁnd any sys-
tematic pattern on the ranking of the rates of return by strategy and switch of strategies.
Our analysis has some methodological limitations. We have few control variables to
explain productivity growth. In particular, we do not control for the stock of physical
capital. The practical implementation of the Maximum Simulated Likelihood (MSL)
raised many technical estimation issues for the non-balanced sub-samples. It would be
interesting to treat the presence of attrition (if the ﬁrm does not perform R&D during some
years). Finally, the availability of diﬀerent instrumental variables for each R&D decision
would have allowed us to estimate the production function considering each strategy as
endogenous.
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Appendix: F.
Table 3.11: Variable deﬁnitions
Variables Deﬁnitions
Dependent variables
(Q/L) Total revenues over total employment
Δ(Q/L) Compound annual growth rate of revenues per employee
Radical R&D Binary: 1 if the ﬁrm performs R&D exclusively to develop new products,
process or technical services or to perform basic research
Independent variables
(Exp Strat (j)/Q) R&D intensity: Ratio of R&D expenditures dedicated to strategy (j) over
total revenue, where j= m=make, mb=make-and-buy,
mbs=make-buy-and-sell, ms=make-and-sell
(Strat (j)) Binary:1 if ﬁrms R&D strategy (j) is used, where j= m,mb,mbs,ms
Δ(L) Compound annual growth rate of total employment
Δ(Absorptive) Compound annual growth rate of the ratio of R&D staﬀ over total
employment)
Absorptive R&D staﬀ over total employment
Domestic Binary: 1 if the enterprise is under Domestic control
Startup Binary: 1 if R&D expenditures ≥ revenue
Industry Binary dummies for grouped industries (High tech; Medium High tech;
Medium Low tech and Low tech) see appendix B for more details on the
industrial classiﬁcation
Year Binary dummies for years
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Appendix: G.
Table 3.12: Classiﬁcation of industries by level of technology
Level of technology Industries NAICS 2002
High tech
Pharmaceutical and Medicine;
Communications Equipment; Computer and
Peripheral Equipment;Aerospace product and
parts
325110-325999;334110;334210-334290;336410
Medium High tech
Other Chemical;Semiconductor and Other
Electronic Component;Navigation,Measuring,
Medical and Control Instruments;Other
Computer and Electronic Product;Electronic
Equipment,Appliance and Component;Motor
Vehicle and parts;All other Transportation
Equipment;Transportation and
Warehousing;Finance,Insurance and Real
Estate;Architecture,Engineering and
Related;Computer System Design and
Related;Management,Scientiﬁc and Technical
Consulting;Scientiﬁc Research and
Development
334410;334511-334512;334310-334610;335110-
335990;336110-336390;336510;336611-
336612;336990;481110-493190;521110-533110;
541310-541380;541510;541611-541690;541710,
541720
Medium Low tech
Oil and Gaz Extraction;Mining;Electric
Power;Other Utilities;Petroleum and Coal
Products;Plastic Product;Rubber
Product;Non-Metallic Mineral
Product;Primary Metal(Ferrous);Primary
Metal(Non-Ferrous);Fabricated Metal
Product;Machinery;Furniture and Related
Product;Other Manufacturing
Industries;Information and Cultural
Industries;Health Care and Social
Assistance;All Other Services
211113-221330;562110,562210,562910,562920,
562990;324110,324121-324122,324190;
326111-333990;337110-339990;511110-519190;
621110-624410;541110,541120,541190,
541212-541213,541215,541410-541490,541810,
541820,541830,541840,541850,541860,541870,
541891,541899,541910,541920,541930,541940,
541990,551113-551114,561110,561210,561310,
561320,561330,561410,561420,561430,561440,
561450,561490,561510,561520,561590,
561611-561613,561621-561622,561710,
561721-561722,561730,561740,561791,561799,
561910,561920,561990,562110-562990;611110,
611210,611310,611410,611420,611430,611510,
611610,611620,611630,611690,611710,
711111-919110
Low tech
Agriculture;Forestry and Logging;Fishing,
Hunting and Trapping;
Construction;Food;Beverage and
Tobacco;Textile;Wood
Product;Paper;Printing;Wholesale
Trade;Retail Trade
111110-115310;236110-238990;311111-
323120;423110-425120;441110-454390
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Chapter 4
Knowledge transfers between Firm’s and universities in spatial
context25
4.1 Introduction
Success in research and development (R&D) depends to some extent on the possibility
of sharing knowledge and outsourcing some of the R&D activities within partnerships.
A ﬁrm may not possess full technical expertise in all areas of science or it may con-
sider specializing in certain R&D activities and outsourcing others. In this study we
focus on the outsourcing of R&D by Canadian business enterprises to universities. We
consider payments for R&D services from business enterprises to universities as the mone-
tary counterparts of transfers of knowledge ﬂows (TKF) between business enterprises and
universities. Among the many factors that determine the extent of business-university
networking we want to test whether the geographical distance between ﬁrms and univer-
sities plays any role. The existence of such a spatial dimension in the industry-science
link is greatly contested [Veugelers (1997)]. If the knowledge transferred is suﬃciently
codiﬁed, ﬁrms do not in principle need to be located close to the universities they deal
25Co-author: Pierre Mohnen (UNU-MERIT, Maastricht University- Netherlands). This document has
been published in the Annals of Economics and Statistics (2008)- (No. 87/88), p.303-323 and at CIRANO
(Inter university center of Research, Liaison, and Transfer of Knowledge on the Analysis of Organizations)
in Scientiﬁc Series (No.9) in March 2008.
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with. If, however, the knowledge to be transferred is tacit, then geographical proximity
may be a plus, because face to face contacts are needed to assimilate the knowledge. If
payments for R&D are part of collaborative research proximity may be preferred, if R&D
is purely contracted out, distance may be less important. Finally distance as such may be
less crucial than the existence of institutional and personal links between the ﬁrm and the
university on the basis of a longstanding collaboration in ﬁnancing research and recruiting
personnel, or an the basis of an alma mater/alumni relationship.
Most empirical studies on the role of geographical proximity between business enterprises
and universities use either qualitative data or quantitative data on patents or patent ci-
tations. Our study is based on hereto unexploited data of R&D transactions between
ﬁrms and universities from Statistics Canada annual R&D survey. This survey covers all
Canadian enterprises engaged in R&D activities for at least 1 million dollars during the
1997 to 2001 period.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 4.2, we sketch the results of previous
studies relating to the industry-science link with a speciﬁc focus on spatial eﬀects. In
section 4.3 we present the description of variables and the gravity model we will be used
to test the importance of physical proximity for ﬁrm-university knowledge transfers. In
section 4.4 we present our data source. In section 4.5, we proceed to a descriptive analysis
of some of the potential explanatory variables of TKF. In section 4.6 we report the results
of a multivariate statistical analysis. Section 4.7 summarizes and concludes.
4.2 Literature review
Starting with the work of [Jaﬀe (1989)] many studies have found that ﬁrms enjoy exter-
nalities from being physically located close to universities. The number of patents [Jaﬀe
(1989)] or the number of innovations [Acs and Feldman (1992)] by enterprises increases
with the geographic proximity to academic research. Recent investigations in the spatial
dimension of knowledge spillovers conﬁrm the role of geographic proximity as a major de-
terminant of the transfer of knowledge [(Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Mansﬁeld and Lee,
1996; Acs and Feldman, 1992; Carrincazeaux and Rallet, 2001; Keller, 2002; Audretsch
and Warning, 2005)].
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However, [Audretsch and Stephan (1996)] and [Zucker and Armstrong (1994)] show
that distance per se is not all that matters. Star scientists in biotechnology can have
business connections with far away places. What really matters is the kind of involvement
by the star scientist. Founders of biotechnology enterprises are often local researchers,
advisors need not be local.
The distinction between tacit and codiﬁed knowledge is a central tenet in the argu-
mentation of the localization of knowledge spillovers [Kogut and Zander (1992)]. It is
usual in the economic literature to argue that the geographical proximity matters to ex-
plain the ﬂows of tacit knowledge because this type of knowledge is diﬃcult to exchange
without direct face-to-face interaction [Karlsson and Anderson (2005)]. Several studies
support this point of view arguing that the cost of the absorptive capacity to assimilate
the tacit knowledge is not invariant with respect to distance [Jaﬀe and Henderson (1993)];
[Feldman (1994)]. The theory of localized knowledge spillovers suggests that proﬁts will
be greater in agglomerations and spatial clusters, since there access to tacit knowledge is
easier [Audretsch and Warning (2005)]. At the opposite, the cost of transmitting informa-
tion in codiﬁed form is basically invariant with respect to distance. But there is another
twist to the argument. As stressed and documented in [Breschi and Lissoni (2006)] and
earlier work by the authors, the tacit nature of knowledge is neither necessary nor suﬃ-
cient to explain localized ﬂows of knowledge. What is also important is the existence of
social connectedness. Knowledge ﬂows more easily among members of a social network
bonded by trust and unwritten rules of reciprocity. Transfers of knowledge between a
business enterprise and a university, in whatever form, is facilitated when ﬁrm owners or
managers have long-standing relationships with the university, as alumnis, collaborators
or co-owners.
Indeed, another reason for having ﬁrms locate in the vicinity of universities is related
to the phenomenon of university spin-oﬀs. These spin-oﬀs are becoming an increasingly
important means to commercialize science. With and without a Bayh-Dole act, univer-
sities feel pressured to try and reap some commercial beneﬁt from academic research.
Technology transfer oﬃces have been created to help academics to apply for patents and
to create spin-oﬀs. If these spin-oﬀs are located around the universities, faculty members
can more easily monitor these spin-oﬀs while keeping their academic positions, Graduate
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students and postdocs can be hired at the beneﬁt of both parties. Students and postdocs
can get a ﬁrst job or hand-on experience that can be beneﬁcial for their future career,
whereas start-ups can easily recruit qualiﬁed researchers. University licensing of intellec-
tual property to university spin-oﬀs may be a fruitful way to capitalize on their academic
research with possible back-ﬁnancing from the spin-oﬀ to the university. As indicated
by [Feldman et al. (2002)] and [Lee (1998)], universities have long served as a source of
scientiﬁc knowledge for industries.
In order to facilitate the transfers of knowledge and to internalize the knowledge
externalities, federal and local governments may encourage the creation of science parks
around universities. As start-ups and spin-oﬀs get created and become successful, clusters
may develop close to universities, such as the Silicon Valley in California or Route 128 in
Massachusetts.
As noted by [Karlsson and Anderson (2005)], despite a vast literature on how university
and industry R&D aﬀect innovation output, relatively little has been written on the spatial
relationship between universities and business enterprises. The studies by [(Jaﬀe, 1989;
Acs and Feldman, 1992; Anselin and Acs, 1997; Kenneth and Kakinuma, 1999; Autant-
Bernard, 2001; Karlsson and Anderson, 2005)] are exceptions. Most of these studies,
however, use the number of patents as a measure of output externality. This measure has
two weaknesses: it does not provide a good coverage of all industrial sectors and it does
not always correct for the quality of patents by using for instance patent citations, as in
[(Jaﬀe and Henderson, 1993; Thompson and Fox-Kean, 2005; Breschi and Lissoni, 2006)].
Therefore, we ﬁnd it interesting to revisit the issue of university related spatial spillovers
by using a diﬀerent type of data, namely the payments for R&D services from industry
to university. Moreover, in the literature on spatial spillovers, distance is often measured
by the contiguity be it of statistical metropolitan areas or administrative regions, as in
[Jaﬀe and Henderson (1993)] and [Autant-Bernard (2001)]. We, instead, shall propose a
ﬁner measure of the actual distance between an enterprise and a university.
Many types of knowledge ﬂows may occur between business enterprises and universi-
ties, some are of a tacit and some are of a codiﬁed nature. Some of these ﬂows may be
related to cooperative research between ﬁrms and universities; others may purely corre-
spond to outsourcing of R&D activities, as for instance by small ﬁrms that do not have
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the internal capacity to do R&D on their own. The tacit nature of knowledge, the co-
operative nature of research, and the existence of historical or social links would favour
the geographical proximity between the enterprises and the universities they deal with.
In case of codiﬁed knowledge, pure outsourcing of R&D activities, and historical links
between the universities and the ﬁrm’s decision makers, distance is less likely to matter.
4.3 The description of variables and the measure of
the distance
To model the eﬀect of distance on the transfer of knowledge from universities to ﬁrms
we borrow from the gravity models of international trade. In these models, similar to
Newton’s law in physics, distance enters as a major explanatory variable in the amount
of bilateral trade ﬂows. Besides distance between two trade partners, the individual char-
acteristics of each partner are controlled for. This study uses the same type of model, but
applies it to the spatial link between enterprises and universities in determining knowl-
edge ﬂows. The distinction is important because in our case distance does not capture
transportation costs as in the traditional gravity models, but it captures the transaction
costs in knowledge transmission between enterprises and universities.
The dependent variable (exfund) is the ratio of total payments for R&D services made
to universities over total R&D expenditures by Canadian enterprises that perform R&D.
This variable could be viewed as an indicator of knowledge ﬂows (TKF) from universities
to R&D performers. In the economic literature the greatest diﬃculty in testing the eﬀects
of distance on knowledge transfers or spillovers comes from the fact that these knowledge
transactions are invisible. The data on R&D expenditures devoted to enterprise-university
scientiﬁc partnerships or R&D outsourcing allow us to test more directly the inﬂuence
of spatial proximity on the magnitude of knowledge exchanges between enterprises and
universities. We express these payments in logarithms to take into account a potential
non-linearity in the knowledge transfer. The extensive literature on industry science links
is mainly based on qualitative measures: whether ﬁrms cooperate or not with universities
[(Mohnen and Hoareau, 2003; Veugelers and Cassiman, 2005; Belderbos et al., 2004)].
We instead measure TKF quantitatively by the amount of dollars paid by enterprises to
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universities for R&D activities. These TKFs can take various forms: R&D joint ventures,
contract research, technology transfer, R&D services etc. The advantage of this indicator
is that it captures not only the number but also the intensity of transfers between enter-
prises and universities. In the recent literature on this topic, very few empirical studies
are based on quantitative data. One exception is [Fontana and Matt (2006)] who use the
number of R&D projects to measure industrial-science link.
Our interest centers on the eﬀect of the physical distance (dist in kilometers) between
an enterprise and a university for each transaction.We measure distance as follows:
Distance =
6370,997*arcos[sin(ent latrad)*sin(univ latrad)+cos(ent latrad)*cos(i latrad)
*cos(ent longrad-univ longrad)]
where:
(ent latrad) and (univ latrad) are the latitudes in radians for enterprise and university
respectively, and (ent longrad) and (univ longrad) are the respective longitudes. The
geographic co-ordinates (in degrees and decimals) are converted to radians by dividing by
57.29577951 [(Frenette (2006))].
To test whether distance aﬀects not only the size of payments from business en-
terprises to university but also the mere fact of having a university link, we compute
for every business enterprise the average distance to all identiﬁed Canadian universi-
ties (avg dist alluniv). In the database the university’s name has not been systemati-
cally reported even when the amount of the transfer was declared. The dummy variable
(Unident) captures the eﬀect of unidentiﬁed Canadian enterprise-university links or links
with foreign universities.
As in the gravity models in international trade we also control for ﬁrm and univer-
sity characteristics. We include size measured by the number of employees. We expect
larger enterprises to have more TKF because larger enterprises are likely to be engaged
in multi-link technological partnerships. It is not certain though that large ﬁrms spend
proportionately more in knowledge ﬂows from universities than small ﬁrms. [Fontana and
Matt (2006)] also indicate that ﬁrm size measured by the number of employees aﬀects the
propensity to collaborate with external partners.
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We control for absorptive capacity (absorptive), which is measured by the ratio
of R&D staﬀ over total employment. In line with the economic literature [(Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990; Veugelers and Cassiman, 2005; Belderbos et al., 2004; Fontana and Matt,
2006)], enterprises need to be endowed with the absorptive capacities necessary to assim-
ilate scientiﬁc knowledge and to beneﬁt optimally from partnerships with universities.
Enterprises that receive government support are more likely to collaborate with univer-
sities according to [Mohnen and Hoareau (2003)]. Collaboration with universities is often
required to get direct government support, and some provinces oﬀer R&D tax incentives
if ﬁrms collaborate with universities. Therefore we also control for grants measured as the
amount of Federal R&D grants normalized by total R&D expenditures by enterprises.
Some recent articles argue that the geographic distance is a proxy for a more impor-
tant dimension in knowledge diﬀusion, which is the social connectedness [(Moen, 2000;
Breschi and Lissoni, 2006)]. The social network is based on the mutual sharing of knowl-
edge with the same professional colleagues or across intra-ﬁrms ties in the same localized
communities. The role of social network within ﬁrms has gained importance because of
its eﬀect on knowledge diﬀusion and knowledge sharing see [Ozman (2006)]. When an
enterprise interacts with a university, it gets access not only to the professors’ expertise
and reputation but also indirectly to the students and to the professors’ social network.
Localized knowledge ﬂows are encouraged by geographical, cultural and linguistic prox-
imity [Arundel and Geuna (2004)]. To capture such social networks we introduced in the
model a dummy variable that takes value one when the transaction between an enterprise
and a university occurs in the same province (Same prov).
Although the period of analysis from 1997 to 2001 is rather short, we ﬁnd it never-
theless interesting to assess the possible presence of a self-reinforcing dynamic between
partners who learn to work together over time [Den Hartigh and Commandeur (2002)].
In order to take in account such an eﬀect we include a dummy variable equal to one if
the R&D performer has already had a transaction with the same Canadian university in
the past (Learn eﬀect).
We include a dummy equal to one if a Canadian enterprise controls (Canadian-
control) the head oﬃce and also dummies for speciﬁc groups of industries and doc-
toral programs supplied by universities (see appendix). The knowledge output of uni-
84 Chapter 4. Knowledge Transfers Between Firm’s and Universities in Spatial Context
versities is heterogeneous. Scientiﬁc ﬁelds of research like natural sciences are considerably
more codiﬁed compared to social sciences [Audretsch and Warning (2005)]. We expect
to capture this eﬀect by introducing dummy variables characterizing doctoral program
supplied by universities. Finally, we include dummies for the provinces to control for
diﬀerences in legislation.
If knowledge ﬂows from universities, proxied by R&D expenditures ﬂowing to univer-
sities, correspond to codiﬁed knowledge, we would not expect the distance between a ﬁrm
and a university to determine the amount of R&D. Firms would seek knowledge from the
university that is best able to deliver the required knowledge. If, however, knowledge is
tacit, requiring personal contact between the university and the research personnel of the
ﬁrm, or if the R&D payments serve primarily to place attract university graduates, it may
well be that distance increases the transaction cost of interacting with the universities.
We control as best as we can for other possible reasons for local knowledge transfers,
namely social proximities and historical ties.
4.4 The database
This study is based on data from Statistics Canada’s Research and Development in Cana-
dian Industry survey, which collects data on R&D performed in the business sector in
Canada. The Statistics Canada database is constructed using two sources: an annual
survey of major R&D performers and administrative data.
The coverage of the survey is national. The population of ﬁrms covered in the survey
includes those that reported R&D activities in the previous survey, those that have claimed
for R&D tax credits, those that have reported receiving R&D contracts or grants, those
that are reported by other ﬁrms as funding sources or as performers of R&D, and those
that are identiﬁed in newspaper articles or trade journals. A questionnaire is sent to all
ﬁrms performing or funding at least $1 million of R&D, which represents around 90 % of
total industrial R&D performed in Canada.
In 1997, a new method was introduced for estimating R&D expenditure in the business
sector in Canada. It was decided that administrative data from what later became the
Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) would be used instead of survey data for any ﬁrm that
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had funded or performed less than $1 million of R&D. This enabled the elimination of
around 8,000 survey mail outs for the 2002 survey, thus reducing the survey reporting
burden.
The survey is conducted annually and includes data for a four-year period. However,
there is an eighteen-month lag between the publication of the data and the availability
of the information provided by CRA. For this reason, Statistics Canada publishes revised
data the following year, after receiving all the information.
The sample used in this study is restricted to the business enterprises that have been
surveyed over the period 1997 to 2001. Enterprises that report performing R&D but
having no R&D employees, i.e. those that were spending on R&D only for buildings, land
or equipment, have been eliminated. Have also been dropped the observations for which
there were no postal codes, making it impossible to calculate distances to universities.
Enterprises where the head oﬃce is located abroad were also excluded. The analysis
is restricted to the period 1997 to 2001 because after 2001 Statistics Canada stopped
collecting detailed information on the destination of payments for R&D performed by
other organizations, including universities.
A ﬁnal point to be noted is that in practice it is impossible to have perfectly balanced
accounting information between the reporting unit that is at the source of the funding
and the unit that reports receiving the funding and executes the R&D. There are vari-
ous reasons why this problem arises, starting with diﬀerences in interpretation of what
constitutes R&D. The Frascati manual recommends to focus on the amount reported by
the performing unit. Unfortunately it is not possible to have the information about the
R&D performed by universities and transferred to business enterprises, neither in this
survey nor in other surveys. Hence we have to rely on the information provided by the
enterprise funding the R&D performed by universities. We know that the total amount of
R&D funding reported by business enterprises is smaller than the total amount received
as reported by the higher education sector see Statistics Canada (2006a).
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4.5 Descriptive analysis
This section presents some descriptive statistics about the dataset used to analyze the
transfer of knowledge ﬂows from universities to business enterprises.
The database will be analyzed at two levels, at the business enterprise level and at
the transaction level. At the business enterprise level an observation represents a business
enterprise that performs R&D. At the transaction level, each observation represents a
TKF between an R&D performer and a university. We have an unbalanced panel of
business enterprises with university links over a ﬁve year period, representing a total of
4,896 R&D performers (business enterprises). At the individual transaction level between
business enterprises and others institutions including universities we have a total of 13,797
transactions.
Table 4.1: Number of respondents for business enterprises performing R&D
expenditures, by year
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total number of business enterprises26 880 858 921 1049 1190
Number of business enterprises
with a university link 141 130 138 141 136
Percentage of R&D performers that transfer
payments for R&D services to universities 16.0 15.2 15.0 13.4 11.4
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey (calculation from the author).
Table 4.1 shows that between 11% and 16% of the large R&D performers have transfers
of payments for R&D services with universities. As a point of comparison, [Veugelers and
Cassiman (2005)] report that 10% of Belgian innovative ﬁrms have cooperation agreements
with universities. The relative number has decreased over time probably because of an
increased number of ﬁrms that pass the threshold for being included in the survey, that
have not yet established links with universities.
Table 4.2 gives for each year the decomposition by frequency of appearance of business
26The original RDCI database contains respectively 911; 892; 961; 1,099 and 1,250 responses to the
long questionnaire for the period 1997 to 2001.
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Table 4.2: Frequency of appearance of business enterprise with university links, in
percentage of total by year
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Percentage of ﬁrms appearing once in the panel 26.24 8.46 9.42 5.67 21.32
Percentage of ﬁrms appearing twice in the panel 11.35 15.38 12.32 22.70 16.91
Percentage bof ﬁrms appearing three times in the panel 10.64
13.85 20.01 13.48 13.24
Percentage of ﬁrms appearing four times in the panel 17.02 24.62 21.74 23.40 12.50
Percentage of ﬁrms appearing ﬁve times in the panel 34.75 37.69 35.51 34.75 36.03
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey (calculation from the author).
enterprises with university links. Hence, in 2001 36% of the business enterprises with
university links appeared ﬁve times in the period 1997 to 2001. The likelihood to build
a network of partnerships with universities depends on the technological maturity of
the ﬁrm. If the ﬁrm has performed R&D continually during ﬁve years, its ability to
assimilate the knowledge and the odds of having a large network is higher than for a ﬁrm
that performed R&D only once. In all years, about half of the ﬁrms with university links
appeared at least four times in our sample during the ﬁve year period. A count by ﬁrm of
the number of links with universities can give us a picture of the importance of a network
between business enterprises and universities.
Table 4.3: Total number of business enterprises with university links, breakdown by
number of links and by year
Number of links 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
1 60 64 71 66 69
2 34 25 29 35 20
3 23 15 15 9 20
More than 3 24 26 23 31 27
Number of business enterprises with university links 141 130 138 141 136
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey (calculation from the author).
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Table 4.3 shows the frequency of links. Most of the business enterprises have only
one link with a university. In 2001, almost 20% of the business enterprises with univer-
sity partnerships had more than three university partners. This measure captures the
willingness of a ﬁrm to look for external information in order to increase its R&D stock.
Table 4.4: Total number of transactions for R&D services according to the average
distance from universities, by year
Average distance in km between
enterprises and universities
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total
period
10 ≤ ave-dist 63 51 71 72 64 312
10 < aveg-dist ≤ 50 15 24 17 26 20 102
50 < aveg-dist ≤ 100 32 21 15 11 22 101
100 < aveg-dist ≤ 200 20 22 34 41 18 135
200 < aveg-dist ≤ 500 66 49 40 48 49 252
Aveg-dist > 500 192 160 157 190 181 880
Total number of transactions
with universities 388 327 335 380 352 1782
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey (calculation from the author).
Table 4.4, shows the total number of R&D transactions between ﬁrms and universities
broken down by distance intervals. It is evident that the majority of transactions occurred
between partners that are separated by more than 500 km. In 2001, only 17 transactions,
6% of the total, were in a radius of less than 10 km and 29% were in a radius of less than
100 km. According to these ﬁgures, distance does not seem to matter in order to acquire
speciﬁc R&D knowledge from universities. In the Canadian context, most transfers of
knowledge ﬂows are long distance transfers. Nevertheless, the amounts of transfer are on
average higher for short distances than long distances (see table 4.6).
As clearly shown in table 4.5, the number of R&D ﬂows with universities varies across
industries. There are more of them in pharmaceuticals and medicine than any other
industrial sector. These industrial heterogeneities are also notable in terms of the amounts
of transfer. Obviously the industries of pharmaceutical and medicine spend on average
more for TKF than any other industry (see table 4.6).
In the appendix we report some summary statistics of the variables that are used in
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Table 4.5: Total number of transactions for R&D services for selected industrial
groupings, by year
Industry group
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Total
period
Scen(science-engineering) 36 45 43 49 47 220
Cpelec(Computer-electronic;equipment of
navigation)
49 36 37 22 44 188
Transp(motor vehicule; transportation equipment)
11 13 15 18 17 74
Chpharm(pharmaceuticals and medicine)
87 70 75 93 74 399
Others industries
205 163 165 198 170 901
Total number of transactions with universities 388 327 335 380 352 1782
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey (calculation from the author).
the analysis. R&D payments to universities, reﬂecting transfer of technology ﬂows from
universities, represent on average 13.2 per cent of total R&D expenditures. On average,
the individual identiﬁed distances between enterprises and universities are of 820 km, i.e.
420 km less than the average distances with respect to all universities. Most transactions
are with large universities. On average, only 5% of the transactions are with universities
located in the same province as the headquarters of the enterprise and 4% are transactions
between partners that have transacted in the past. Unidentiﬁed university links, among
which links with foreign universities, make up no more than 3% of all transactions. The
average proportion of R&D employment in total employment is 28.9%. If we computed
an employment-weighted average of this ratio, we would obtain an order of magnitude of
10.9%.
4.6 Results
The analysis of the determinants of TKF can be conducted at the level of the enterprise
or at the level of the individual transaction. In the former case the basic observation is
the total TKF transactions of a particular enterprise with all universities, in the latter
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Table 4.6: Average amounts of transaction for R&D services according to selected
industrial grouping and average distance of business enterprise from
universities in period 1997 to 2001,(in thousands of dollars)
Industry group
Scen(science-engineering) 113
Cpelec(Computer-electronic; equipment of navigation) 65
Transp(motor vehicule; transportation equipment) 96
Chpharm(pharmaceuticals and medicine) 514
Average distance in km between enterprises and universities
10 ≤ ave-dist 948
10 < aveg-dist ≤ 50 266
50 < aveg-dist ≤ 100 85
100 < aveg-dist ≤ 200 89
200 < aveg-dist ≤ 500 130
Aveg-dist > 500 155
Source: Statistics Canada, RDCI Survey (calculation from the author).
case it is the individual TKF transaction between a business unit and a university. We
shall present the results at both levels of aggregation. In order to account for the codiﬁed
or tacit nature of knowledge, we separate out and estimate apart the enterprises that
report signs of codiﬁed knowledge ﬂows and those that did not. The codiﬁed group
of enterprises are identiﬁed by the fact that the R&D performer declares to make or
receive payments from Canadian or foreign ﬁrms for patents, know-how (unpatented),
inventions, trademarks, patterns, design and R&D technical assistance. This measure
is far from perfect, but it has the merit to be directly extracted from the survey and
to capture a tangible, observable characteristic that corresponds to the deﬁnition of a
codiﬁed transfer27.
27Mariani (2002) concluded that the location of ﬁrms in proximity to production locations was less
important for scientiﬁc sectors. We consider our proxy for codiﬁed knowledge, however imperfect, never-
theless superior to the use of high-technology sector dummies. First, not all universities have a scientiﬁc
program. Second, there may be low-tech ﬁrms in high-tech industries and vice-versa. And third, the
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Our dependent variable, the transfer of payments for R&D services, is not observed for
all observations in our sample. The selected sample where such transfers are observable is
thus not representative of the whole population. In order to correct for sample selection,
we follow the Heckman two-step method, allowing for random individual eﬀects. Hence
we ﬁrst estimate a Probit with random individual eﬀects to determine the probability to
have R&D links with universities. We compute the inverse Mills ratio for that regression
and introduce it in the GLS estimation with ﬁrm-speciﬁc random eﬀects of the equation
explaining R&D payments to universities28. This model has been estimated at the business
enterprise level (table 4.7) and at the transaction level (table 4.8) for all observations, for
ﬁrms with only tacit knowledge ﬂows and those with codiﬁed knowledge ﬂows.
Table 4.7 presents the estimation results for the analysis at the business enterprise
level. The dependent variable for each business enterprise is the logarithm of the sum
of payments for R&D purposes made to all universities it deals with, normalized by
the total amount of R&D expenditures of that enterprise, to correct for size related
heteroscedasticity. If an enterprise has multiple links with universities, then the average
distance to partner universities is computed (avg dist). In some cases we observe the
total amount of expenditures for R&D services performed by universities, but we are
unable to identify the particular universities in which the expenditures were performed.
This is particularly the case when the university is located in a foreign country. In
these cases of unidentiﬁed links (unident) we have put the distance to zero and added a
dummy variable to correct for the resulting measurement error. We control for various
ﬁrm and university characteristics, as explained in section 4.3. Many business enterprises
have no R&D payments to universities: only 686 out of 4,898 report R&D payments to
universities in the period 1997 to 2001. As mentioned we correct for selection bias by the
two-step Heckman approach. For each set of observations, we report in the ﬁrst column
classiﬁcation of a ﬁrm in a high-technology industry is not a grant for tacit or codiﬁed ﬂows of knowledge.
We must admit, however, that not all transactions of an enterprise that reports codiﬁed knowledge ﬂows
are of the codiﬁed nature and that certain ﬁrms may fail to report codiﬁed knowledge ﬂows.
28The standard errors of the estimates are not corrected for the fact that the inverse Mills ratio is itself
estimated. We doubt, however, that the underestimation of the standard errors would be so big as to
render insigniﬁcant at conventional levels the coeﬃcients that we report to be signiﬁcant. Moreover, our
correction for selectivity assumes no correlation between the individual eﬀects in the selection equation
and the equation of interest.
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the estimation of the Probit equation and in the second column those of the payments
for R&D services equation.
At this point, it is also worth mentioning that distance is measured with respect to
the location of the head oﬃce of an enterprise. It is generally accepted that the R&D
activities tend to be concentrated at the ﬁrm’s headquarters [Fontana and Matt (2006)]29.
One could also argue that the decision to make payments for R&D services from ﬁrms to
universities is essentially a decision taken at the head oﬃce30.
Surprisingly, Canadian controlled ﬁrms are less likely to source knowledge from uni-
versities than foreign controlled ﬁrms, at least for codiﬁed knowledge. The probability of
TKF from universities to enterprises is positively correlated with ﬁrm size, absorptive ca-
pabilities (although only at 10% level of signiﬁcance for ﬁrms with tacit knowledge ﬂows),
and the amount of federal grants (at least for ﬁrms that have no codiﬁed knowledge ﬂows).
The amount of R&D transactions with universities is positively and signiﬁcantly cor-
related with the average distance to universities that ﬁrms transact with (avg dist) if we
run the regression on all enterprises. By a likelihood ratio test, however, we ﬁnd that the
coeﬃcients are diﬀerent for enterprises with tacit and codiﬁed knowledge ﬂows. We reject
the homogeneity hypothesis (χ2) statistic of 260.74 against a tabulated value of 30.14 for
19 degrees of freedom at 5% level of conﬁdence). In each subsample, our variable of in-
terest, the average distance to universities, is insigniﬁcant, as are all the other covariates.
The analysis at the enterprise level thus leads to an inconclusive response to the question
whether distance matters for TKF.
We now turn to the estimation at the more micro level of individual enterprise-
university transfers as shown in table 4.8. At this level of analysis, each observation
corresponds to a transaction between a business enterprise that performed R&D and any
other institution including universities, other companies, hospitals, federal or provincial
government, industrial research institutes or associations, individuals etc. The higher
number of observations and the higher variability at the more disaggregated level should
produce more conclusive results.
29Among business enterprises that perform R&D with universities, between 58% and 74%, depending
on the year, have only one location where R&D is performed (the head oﬃce).
30In the period 1997 to 2001, 26% to 41% of the enterprises with university links were multi-
establishment enterprises.
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Out of a total of 13,797 potential R&D transactions between R&D performers and any
other institutions, we only observe 1,782 positive transactions with universities. In this
model, the dependent variable is the amount of R&D payment between a business enter-
prise and a particular university divided by the total R&D expenditures of the enterprise.
We can now measure the exact distance for each transaction.
The probability of a bilateral TKF transaction between a business enterprise and a
university yields signiﬁcant coeﬃcients at the 5% level only for ﬁrms reporting codiﬁed
knowledge ﬂows. For them it is positively related to size and absorptive capacity, and
lower for ﬁrms with Canadian control. We have introduced the average distance that a
ﬁrm has to all universities as an explanatory variable, but it does not show up signiﬁcantly.
The amount of individual TKF transaction with universities as a percentage of total
R&D is also negatively correlated with the size of the enterprise and its absorptive ca-
pacities, and it is lower for ﬁrms under Canadian control (at least for enterprises with
codiﬁed knowledge ﬂows). This time it is clear that the distance between an enterprise
and a university decreases the amount of knowledge ﬂows between the two. The point
estimate of distance reveals that if the distance between a business enterprise and a uni-
versity increases by 10%, the fraction of the total R&D expenditures of that enterprise
directed to that particular university decreases by 1.02%. As expected, the marginal eﬀect
of distance is greater in the case of enterprises with only tacit knowledge ﬂows. A 10%
greater distance between enterprise and a university decreases the fraction of the total
R&D expenditures of that enterprise to that particular university by 1.42% in the case of
enterprises with only tacit knowledge ﬂows and by only half as much for enterprises with
codiﬁed knowledge ﬂows. To test for the existence of a network eﬀect, we checked whether
dealing with a university in the same province (Same prov) had a signiﬁcant eﬀect. This
variable turned out insigniﬁcant. We also wanted to control for the fact that an enterprise
might learn from its past experience of knowledge ﬂows with universities (Learn eﬀect).
This eﬀect is positive and signiﬁcant suggesting a self-reinforcing dynamic in borrowing
knowledge from universities. The learning eﬀect has a slightly bigger impact for ﬁrms
with only tacit knowledge ﬂows. Even after controlling for some social network and ex-
perience eﬀects, distance remains signiﬁcant in determining the amount of TKF between
enterprises and universities, and the fact that it bears a negative sign even for ﬁrms that
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declare codiﬁed ﬂows of knowledge could reﬂect the existence of tacit knowledge ﬂows
even there31.
31For transaction data, the homogeneity hypothesis could actually be accepted (χ2) statistic of 29.76
against a tabulated value of 43.77 for 31 degrees of freedom at 5% level of conﬁdence). We nevertheless
report the estimation on the two sub-samples because it produces diﬀerent estimates for the distance
variable that we are interested in.
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4.7     Conclusion 
 
This study examines whether  the distance that  separates an enterprise and a university 
is an obstacle to the transfer of knowledge flow between  an enterprise and a university in 
Canada. The transfer of knowledge  flows are measured by the amount of R&D payments 
from business enterprises  to universities  that  are directly reported  in Statistics Canada’s 
survey on Research and Development  in Canadian  Industry. We use data from the 1997 
to 2001 surveys. The analysis  is conducted at  the level of the enterprise and at  the level 
of individual payments  for R&D services  from an enterprise  to a university. 
The estimates control for unobserved  individual heterogeneity  eﬀects, for a potential 
selection bias  as well as  for other  covariates that  could aﬀect  the  extent  of  industry‐ 
university R&D transactions: absorptive capacity, country of firm control and other firm 
and university characteristics. We also control for the existence of social networks  (when 
enterprises  and universities  belong  to  the same province) and for past experience with a 
given university. Even after controlling for all these factors, it is found that the geographic 
distance has a  statistically  significant negative impact on  the magnitude  of knowledge 
flows between   R&D  industrial  performers and universities. It  is, however, worthwhile  to 
point out  that  such an eﬀect is only visible when the unit of analysis is  the  individual 
transaction, not the enterprise. Provincial  networks do not influence the transfer of knowl‐ 
edge flows, but past experience does. We find that  a 10%  increase in distance decreases 
the proportion of  total R&D paid to a university by 1.4 percent for enterprises  that do 
not report any codified  transfer of knowledge  flow, and by half as much for enterprises 
that  report codified  knowledge flows. 
The  hypothesis  of  the  need  for  face  to  face  contacts  in  the  case of  tacit  knowledge 
transmission seems corroborated.  The transmission of codified knowledge is less hampered 
by distance.  It may be  though  that R&D payments  to universities are concomitant with 
student placement, firm recruitment on campuses, and university spin‐oﬀs.  Proximity 
could be a simple consequence of other  joint activities between universities and enterprises, 
independently of the character of knowledge  transfer. 
In  future work, it  would  be nice  if we could improve  the measurements  of some of 
our variables.   We  have only measured  distances with respect  to  the  headquarters  of 
an enterprise  instead of the average distance with respect to  its various R&D  locations. 
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It might be interesting to examine whether the eﬀect of geographic proximity on the
quality of transferred knowledge. The transfers of technology ﬂows reveal nothing about
their quality; output measures of innovation should be used for that. It would also be
worthwhile to measure other forms of networking or social connectedness than provincial
connections.
Finally, it would have been interesting to re-estimate the model by accounting for the
full structure of spatial interactions (multilateral resistances) as suggested by Anderson
and Wincoop (2003)
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Appendix: I.
Table 4.9: The classiﬁcation of universities
Small Medium Large
Brock University Laurentian University of
Sudbury
University of Alberta
Universite´ de Moncton E´cole de technologie
supe´rieure
The University of British
Columbia
King’s University College at
The University of Western
Ontario
Universite´ du Que´bec a`
Trois-Rivie´res
The University of Calgary
University of Northern British
Columbia
University of Prince Edward
Island
Carleton University
Nova Scotia Agricultural
College
Universite´ du Que´bec
Chicoutimi
University of Concordia
Universite´ du Que´bec a`
Rimouski
Institut national de la
recherche scientiﬁque
Dalhousie University
Universite´ du Que´bec en
Abitibi-Tmiscamingue
The University of Regina University of Guelph
Ryerson University Simon Fraser University Universite´ Laval
Saint Mary’s University University of Sudbury The University of Manitoba
Wilfrid Laurier University Trent University McGill University
The University of Winnipeg University of Windsor McMaster University
York University Memorial University of
Newfoundland
Universite´ de Montre´al
University of New Brunswick
University of Ottawa
E´cole Polytechnique de
Montre´al
Universite´ du Que´bec a`
Montre´al
Queen’s University
Royal Military College of
Canada
University of Saskatchewan
Universite´ de Sherbrooke
University of Toronto
University of Victoria
University of Waterloo
The University of Western
Ontario
The classiﬁcation of universities into three categories of size is based on: the amount
of expenditures on sponsored research, the proportion of sponsored R&D expenditures as
a percentage of general operating expenditures and the number of doctoral programs. A
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university is classiﬁed as (small) if its expenditures on sponsored R&D are less than $10
million and less than 10% of general operating expenses, and it has less than 10 doctoral
programs. A (medium) size university is one in which the sponsored research ranges
between $10-30 million, the percentage of general operating expenses is between 10% and
20%, and the number of doctoral program is between 10 and 30. A (large) university is
one where sponsored research is greater than $30 million, general operating percentage is
more than 20%, and there are more than 30 doctoral programs.
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Appendix: J.
Table 4.10: Descriptive statistics
Variables
Number of
observations
Mean
Std.
Dev.
Exﬁnd= TKF/Total R&D expenditures (in percentage)
1782 13.2 261.9
Dist= distance for identiﬁed transactions (in km)
1403 821.6 1114.6
Size= (total employment)
13797 3044.0 6442.9
Grant/total R&D= Grants/total R&D expenditures (in percentage)
13797 1.6 6.1
Avg dist alluniv= Average distance with all universities(in km)
13797 1238.1 677.4
Absorptive= R&D employment/total employment(in percentage)
13797 28.9 30.9
Uniden= dummy for unidentiﬁed universities link
13797 0.03 0.17
Canadian control= dummy for Canadian ﬁrms
13797 0.63 0.48
Same prov= Enterprise in the same province as the university
13797 0.05 0.20
Learn eﬀect= Enterprise with a past link with the same university
13797 0.04 0.19
Provinces
Dum qc= 1 if the head oﬃce of the enterprise is in Que´bec
13797 0.35 0.48
Dum ont= 1 if the head oﬃce of the enterprise is in Ontario
13797 0.46 0.49
Dum alb= 1 if the head oﬃce of the enterprise is in Alberta
13797 0.07 0.24
Dum bc= 1 if the head oﬃce of the enterprise is in British-Colombia
13797 0.07 0.25
Dum oth= 1 if the head oﬃce of the enterprise is in another province
or territory
13797 0.05 0.22
Group of industries
Sceng
13797 0.19 0.39
Cpelec
13797 0.14 0.35
Transp
13797 0.07 0.26
Chpharm
13797 0.16 0.36
University characteristics
Small
1403 0.03 0.16
Medium
1403 0.05 0.22
Large
1403 0.92 0.27
Engmat= 1 if the university has a doctoral program in material
engineering
1403 0.39 0.48
Engsp= 1 if the university has a doctoral program in aerospace
engineering
1403 0.13 0.33
Engbio= 1 if the university has a doctoral program in biotechnology
engineering
1403 0.46 0.49
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Biotec= 1 if the university has a doctoral program in biotechnology
1403 0.06 0.23
Engcom= 1 if the university has a doctoral program in computer
engineering
1403 0.57 0.49
Chim= 1 if the university has a doctoral program in analytical
chemistry
1403 0.31 0.46
Pharm= 1 if the university has a doctoral program in pharmacology
1403 0.47 0.50
Engsoft= 1 if the university has a doctoral program in computer
software engineering
1403 0.08 0.27
Engpet= 1 if the university has a doctoral program in petroleum
engineering
1403 0.11 0.31
In the estimations all quantitative variables are in logarithm. TKF stands for transfer of technological ﬂows.The
information to create dummies for the university scientiﬁc program comes from web site of the Association of
Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC).
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Appendix: K. Group of Industries
Variable (Sceng) = 1 if enterprise is in the following selected industries:
Architectural, Engineering and Related + Computer System Design and Related + Man-
agement, Scientiﬁc and Technical Consulting + Scientiﬁc Research and Development.
Variable (Cpelec) = 1 if enterprise is in the following selected industries:
Computer and Peripheral Equipment + Communications Equipment + Semiconductor
and Other Electronic Component + Navigational, Measuring, Medical and Control In-
struments + Other Computer and Electronic Product + Electrical Equipment, Appliance
and Component.
Variable (Transp) = 1 if enterprise is in the following selected industries:
Motor Vehicle and Parts + Aerospace Product and Parts + All Other Transportation
Equipment.
Variable (Chpharm) = 1 if enterprise is in the following selected industries:
Pharmaceutical and Medicine + Other Chemical.
Chapter 5
Evaluating the Impact of R&D Tax Credits on Innovation32
5.1 Introduction
Public support for innovation-related activities has been justiﬁed in several ways. First,
governments are responsible for providing new or improved technology for public sector
functions (security, health, and communications) and R&D for these tasks may be per-
formed in public research laboratories or contracted out to private ﬁrms and funded by
public revenues. This chapter discusses the second justiﬁcation for public subsidies which
is to correct for market failures resulting from under-investment in innovation activities
[(Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962)]. Owing to the diﬃculty that ﬁrms have in appropriating all
the beneﬁts associated with an innovation, it is argued that society beneﬁts from innova-
tion more than the innovators. Due to imperfect appropriation private ﬁrms invest less
in innovation than is ”socially desirable”. Even if the imperfect appropriation problem
did not exist or was remedied by government intervention, investment in R&D would still
suﬀer from another market failure: the gap between the private return to the innovator
and the cost of capital from external sources. [Arrow (1962)] associated this problem with
high, uninsurable risk and large minimum scale required for introduction of major innova-
32Co-authors: Dirk Czarnitzki (Leuven University-Belgium; Center of European Economic Research
(ZEW)-Germany) and Petr Hanel (University of Sherbrooke - Canada). This document has been pub-
lished in Research Policy (2011) vol.40(2), p.217-229
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tions. Hall (2002) approached it from the point of view of investment theory and argues
that ”[...] some innovations will fail to be provided purely because the cost of external
capital is too high, even when they would pass the private-returns hurdle if funds were
available at ’normal’ interest rates”. The theory of public policy based on these factors
stresses the need for the government to provide incentives to private ﬁrms to compensate
for the gap between the private and social returns to innovation expenditure (in particular
to R&D) in order to ensure the socially optimal eﬀort of research and development by the
private sector.
Even though in theory grants33 have the advantage of directly correcting market fail-
ures associated with innovation, in practice their administration by government agencies
poses problems of its own. Ignorance, information asymmetries between the innovator
and the government agency, as well as moral hazard on the part of inventor or the inno-
vating ﬁrm34, may make it diﬃcult if not impossible to distribute grants so as to reduce
or eliminate the gap between the social and private return to R&D. Furthermore, the
government agency administrating R&D grants may face inﬂuencing factors such as: po-
litical pressure, bureaucratic objectives, corruption, incompetence and the bureaucratic
procedures are costly. The resulting ’government failure’ [Winston (2006)] may be even
more important than the market failures the grants are supposed to correct.
The problems associated with direct grants to R&D and the disenchantment with
government intervention in business led many countries to gradually replace or supplement
direct grants by indirect ﬁscal measures such as tax credits for R&D expenditures. Tax
credits are considered to be a neutral form of encouragement to R&D and all ﬁrms that
incur eligible R&D expenditures, irrespective of the industry, size and the objective of
innovation activity, can claim them. The most important attraction of tax credits to
policy makers is that their administration does not involve arbitrary decisions regarding
the distribution of R&D support among sectors, regions, industries or ﬁrms. They have,
however, shortcomings of their own. They stimulate overall R&D activity but do not
address the sources of market failures involved in innovation activities. They aﬀect the
composition of R&D, favoring activities promising the largest short term proﬁts. Projects
with high potential social rates of return and investment in exploratory projects and
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development of research infrastructure may be less stimulated by tax credits [(Hall and
Reenen, 2000; David and Toole, 2000)].
In addition to direct R&D grants, Canada has one of the most generous R&D tax-credit
programs among major industrial countries. A comparison of the federal government
funding of R&D made through the Scientiﬁc Research and Experimental Development
Investment Tax Credit (SR&ED) program as opposed to direct grant programs indicates
that the size of tax credits surpassed grants by 1983 and had reached about 18% of business
enterprise intramural R&D expenditures (BERD) by 1989 [Hanel and Palda (1992)]. The
share of R&D and innovation related grants peaked at about 7% of BERD in 1982 and
declined to 1.3% in 2000.35
According to the evaluation of the Scientiﬁc Research and Experimental Development
Investment Tax Credit (SR&ED) program by Finance Canada (1998), the program was
rated as the most important component in the system of government support of R&D
followed by refundability of the federal credit, while government grants and contracts
received the lowest rating.
In addition to the federal SR&ED tax credit program all provincial and territorial
governments provide income tax deductions for research and development. The provinces
of Manitoba, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Ontario and Quebec also oﬀer
various types of additional income tax incentives for research and development conducted
within their borders. Therefore, the after tax cost of R&D is quite low in Canada. For
example, in Ontario, the manufacturing base of Canada, the after-tax cost of $1 of R&D
expenditure was 0.507$ in large ﬁrms and 0.464$ in small ﬁrms in 1996 [Warda (1999)],
for the comparisons between Canadian provinces and Warda (2001), for an international
comparison).
Owing to the administration of the program by ﬁscal authorities and the conﬁdentiality
that surrounds tax-related matters, there is little public information on the distribution of
beneﬁciaries of tax credits. The report by [Finance Canada (1998)] breaks down recipients
33For the sake of simplicity, we refer in the text to R&D grants because the chapter looks at the
alternative policy of R&D tax credits. In reality, government grants often support also other innovation-
related activities than R&D.
34These problems also explain why innovating ﬁrms face higher cost of capital.
35The ratio of R&D grants to BERD declined from 7.1% in 1982 to 4.2% in 1990 and further to 1.3%
in 2000 (see Statistics Canada (2003): Appendix, Table 19).
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of tax credits by the sector of economic activity36 only, and does not provide details on
the use of tax credits by manufacturing industry sub-sectors or groups on a two-digit SIC
level. [Baldwin and Hanel (2003)] provide a detailed description of the distribution and
use of tax credits for R&D in the manufacturing sector based on the Canadian Survey of
Innovation and Advanced Technology conducted in 1993.
According to the Statistics Canada Survey of Innovation 1999, more than one third
of ﬁrms involved in manufacturing (35%) used R&D tax credits in the 1997-1999 period.
The proportion of tax credit users is highest (65%) among ﬁrms in the high technology
industries, followed by those in the medium technology sector (41%) and lowest in the low
technology sector (26%). Among ﬁrms performing R&D, large companies use tax credits
more frequently than the medium and small size ﬁrms [Hanel (2003)]37. The tax credit
program is also extensively used by R&D performing ﬁrms in the primary and service
sectors.
In this chapter, we evaluate the impact of R&D tax credits on innovation and eco-
nomic performance of innovating ﬁrms in Canadian manufacturing38. The data from the
Statistics Canada Survey of Innovation (1999) in manufacturing provides information on
innovation activities, some indicators of their impact and the use of government support
programs for R&D; this survey will be further analysed throughout this chapter. The
survey provides a wealth of new information on innovation activities and it shows that
R&D is but one, albeit very important, source of innovation. Unfortunately, the informa-
tion on R&D from the survey is limited to questions asking if the ﬁrm carried out R&D
activity, how it was organized and whether the ﬁrm outsourced R&D. No information on
the amount of expenditures or employment in R&D was solicited. It is thus impossible
to examine whether tax credits crowded out private investment in R&D or whether ﬁrms
that claimed tax credits invested more in R&D than they would have without the public
support. However, the survey data provide an opportunity to examine the eﬀect of tax
credits on innovation activity, its characteristics, and their economic impacts.
36The value of claims by sector in 1992: primary 7%, manufacturing 48%, services 45% [Finance Canada
(1998)].
37Small ﬁrms have between 20 and 49 employees, medium between 50 and 249 employees and large
ﬁrms more than 250 employees.
38In addition to claiming R&D tax credits, ﬁrms may also apply for and receive R&D grants. In
a recent study, [Be´rube´ and Mohnen (2009)] examine the eﬀect of R&D grants on the performance
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To assess the eﬀect of R&D tax credits, it is important to correct for a possible selec-
tion bias in the empirical analysis. For example, estimates from a linear regression model
considering the receipt of R&D tax credits as an exogenous variable are likely to be biased,
because the recipients of tax credits could diﬀer systematically in several characteristics
from non-recipients. The actual recipients might, for example, show more absorptive ca-
pacity, be active in more technology-intensive industries, show more successful innovation
activities in the past etc. In this case, even in the hypothetical situation of the absence
of a tax credit program, owing to their characteristics and past performance the actual
recipients might have been more innovative than the actual non-recipients. For the same
reasons the former group may also have been more likely than the latter to claim tax
credits and other forms of government support. Thus, the mere comparison of recipients
and non-recipients leads to biased estimates, and the use of R&D tax credits has to be
considered as an endogenous variable instead. Since the data is a cross-section picture
of Canadian ﬁrms, it is not possible to use econometric methods such ”diﬀerence in dif-
ference” that require panel data. In this chapter, we correct for a possible selection bias
by using an econometric matching technique [(Heckman and Todd, 1997, 1998; Heckman
et al., 1998)].
Studies of the impact of government programs in support of R&D or more broadly
deﬁned innovation activities typically investigate the program’s impact on innovation
inputs and outputs. The distinguishing contribution of this study will be to go further.
After estimating in the ﬁrst step of the analysis the eﬀect of R&D tax credits on innovation
output of ﬁrms that used them (e.g. the number of new products, new product sales and
the originality of innovations), it estimates in the second step the impact of tax credits on
the economic indicators of ﬁrm’s performance. By shifting the focus of our investigation
from the program’s impact on innovation to its economic eﬀects, we are able to address
the often neglected aspect of commercial exploitation of innovations39. To the best of
of Canadian ﬁrms that received tax credits using the data from the 2005 Survey of Innovation from
Statistics Canada. They found that ﬁrms that receive R&D grants in addition to R&D tax credits were
signiﬁcantly more innovative than ﬁrms that beneﬁted only from R&D tax incentives. The R&D grants
program stimulates in particular world-ﬁrst innovations. Since world-ﬁrst innovations are more likely to
produce high externalities, the authors conclude that R&D grants stimulate innovation precisely where
market failure is highest.
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our knowledge, this is one of the ﬁrst studies assessing the eﬀect of R&D tax credits on
recipient ﬁrms’general economic performance.
The following section brieﬂy reviews the literature on R&D tax credits. Section 5.3
analyzes the eﬀect of tax credits on ﬁrm’s R&D investment in a simple model of ﬁrm level
investment behaviour. Section 5.4 describes the matching methodology used to estimate
the eﬀect of tax credits on various innovation indicators at the ﬁrm level. Section 5.5
describes the data used and presents the empirical results. We conclude with the main
results, their implications and limitations, some ideas for further research and policy
recommendations.
5.2 R&D tax credits
One central question in the literature on R&D is the eﬀectiveness of governmental market
intervention to correct the insuﬃcient supply of R&D. The under investment in R&D
occurs due to imperfect appropriability of innovation beneﬁts and owing to imperfect
ﬁnancial markets where owing to asymmetric information and moral hazard the cost of
external debt or equity ﬁnancing is high and even prohibitive, especially for new small
ﬁrms lacking physical assets to oﬀer as a collateral [David and Toole (2000)], and [Hall
(2002)] for surveys on both topics). The principal instruments of public support to R&D
are direct grants and tax credits. The principal theoretical as well as practical diﬀerence
between subsidizing R&D by tax credits rather than by a direct grant is that the former
is neutral with respect to industry or sector and the nature of the ﬁrm. The main at-
traction of tax credit programs relative to direct grants is that tax credits minimize the
discretionary decisions involved in project selection for direct government grants.
Hall and Reenen (2000) state that tax credits reduce marginal costs of R&D and the
”crowding out eﬀect on industrial R&D spending is not expected to be aﬀected except
via the increase of the real cost of R&D inputs.” Their review of econometric evidence
suggest that, indeed, on average a dollar in tax credit for R&D stimulates a dollar of
additional R&D. This is also the conclusion of the econometric study of the eﬀectiveness
of the Canadian R&D tax credit program by [Dagenais and Therrien (1997)] which found
39Mohnen and Therrien (2003)found that even though Canadian ﬁrms innovate more frequently than
European companies, the latter commercialize innovations more successfully.
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that a 1% increase in the federal tax credit generates an average of 98 additional private
R&D expenditure per dollar of tax revenues forgone. According to Finance Canada
(1998), each dollar of tax revenues forgone as a result of the Canadian federal R&D tax
incentives generated 1.38 dollars in additional R&D spending.
The microeconomic evidence regarding the eﬀect of tax credits on ﬁrms’ performance
is rather limited. Studies that examined the eﬀect of government support on output
measures: for example, on patent applications, productivity, returns on capital, returns
on sales and growth of sales or employment [Klette and Griliches (2000)], for a survey)
did not consider the eﬀects of tax credits. Hanel (2003), using the same data as the
present study, found that ﬁrms that used R&D tax credits in Canada are more likely than
other ﬁrms to introduce the most original world-ﬁrst innovations. The originality counts
because, according to [Cozzarin (2004)], in Canada the world-ﬁrst innovators display
superior performance. It is not clear, however, if this is so because the bigger ﬁrms with
large market share and superior labour productivity tend to introduce more frequently
original world-ﬁrst innovations or the other way round. Cozzarin’s conclusions are also
at diﬀerence with results of an earlier innovation survey. Firms with the most original
innovations did not report that the innovation had improved their domestic market share
and proﬁtability as frequently as ﬁrms that introduced the less original Canada-ﬁrst or
’other’ imitative innovations. Only in export performance were the world-ﬁrst innovations
superior to the less original ones [Baldwin and Hanel (2003)]40. This raises the empirical
question whether, in general, performance of ﬁrms that use tax R&D credits diﬀers from
that of non-users and whether the superior performance can be attributed to the eﬀect of
R&D tax credits.
Even though tax credits are available to all ﬁrms for eligible R&D expenditures irre-
spective of the project or industry sector, according to [David and Toole (2000)], private
ﬁrms are likely to use any tax credits to ﬁrst fund projects with the highest private rate
40The ”pilot”Survey of Innovation and Advanced Technology analyzed by Baldwin and Hanel (2003)
provides respondents’ evaluation of the eﬀect of their ﬁrms’ most proﬁtable innovation introduced in the
1989-1991 period on domestic and foreign market shares, proﬁtability and other performance indicators.
Note the subtle diﬀerence in the data between the 1993 and 1999 Innovation surveys. Respondents to the
Survey of innovation 1999 related the performance indicators to all innovations introduced by the ﬁrm.
In contrast, respondents to the 1993 provided the information on a speciﬁc, most proﬁtable innovation.
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of return. For this reason, the authors argue, tax credit users are likely to concentrate
on projects with short term prospects. These are not necessarily the projects that would
most deserve public support because of the large gap between the social and private re-
turns (spillover gap). The availability of tax credits is therefore unlikely to increase the
probability that the users will undertake projects with high social and low private rate
of return. Thus, even though tax credits are an expeditious way of distributing public
support to R&D and of minimizing the ’government failure’, they do not appear to be the
most eﬃcient tool for correction of the ’market failure’ characterized by underinvestment
in R&D and innovation activities owing to the gap between the social and private returns
from innovation.
5.3 The eﬀects of tax credits on R&D activities and
ﬁrm performance
The eﬀect of R&D subsidies on the volume of R&D performed by a private ﬁrm may be
represented by the relationship between the marginal return to R&D and the marginal
cost of R&D (Howe and McFetridge, 1976; further developed by David at al, 2000)41.
According to this model, the ﬁrm will undertake innovations, hence invest in R&D, up to
the point where the marginal return to R&D equals the marginal cost of R&D capital.
The same reasoning may be applied to analysis of R&D tax credits. The tax credits
generally reduce the marginal cost of the R&D capital; hence they shift the marginal
cost curve (MCCR&D) downwards. The eﬀect of the tax credit on private R&D expen-
ditures thus depends on the shape i.e. the elasticities of the marginal return on and
the marginal cost of the R&D capital. The greater the elasticity and the marginal rate
41The David et al.(2000) model is illustrated in the two dimensional space where the size of R&D
investment is represented on the horizontal axis and the marginal rate of return, MRRR&D, and the
marginal cost of R&D investment, MCCR&D, are on the vertical axis. The downward sloping schedule
of MRRR&D represents the derived demand for R&D for a portfolio of R&D projects. The marginal cost
of R&D capital is the opportunity cost of capital at various levels of R&D investment. It is represented
as a horizontal schedule eventually turning upwards. The horizontal section of the MCCR&D represents
the cost of internal funds and the sharply increasing section on the right extreme, the increasing marginal
cost of external equity and/or debt funding.
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of return (MRRR&D), the greater the amount of additional R&D. However, unless the
(MRRR&D) shifts upwards owing to improved overall ﬁrm eﬃciency or improved risk pat-
tern as mentioned above, the marginal return to additional R&D projects is either ﬂat
(δMRRR&D/δR&D = 0) or decreasing (δMRRR&D/δR&D < 0).
Thus, depending on the shape of the MMRR&D function, the additional R&D expen-
ditures induced by the lower after-tax cost of R&D capital are invested increasingly in
projects with the same or lower MRRR&D, i.e. less proﬁtable R&D projects. This point
was also made by [Hall and Maﬃoli (2008)] who analyzed the supply and demand for
R&D funds in the context of grants and credit subsidies.
In practical terms, and perhaps more importantly, the reduced cost of R&D funds
may shift ﬁrms’ allocation of funding for innovation activities away from the necessary
complementary activities such as marketing and after-sales service toward R&D. To illus-
trate the eﬀect of R&D tax credits on R&D investment consider two cases illustrated in
Figure 5.1. First, consider a ﬁrm of small or medium size, that has not yet invested in
R&D because of the lack of internal funds to allocate to R&D and high cost of external
ﬁnancing. In the absence of tax credits its cost of R&D is higher than the rate of return
even on the most proﬁtable project R1. MCCR&D1 > MRRR&D(R1); the ﬁrm does not
invest in R&D. The eﬀect of the ﬁrms’ decision to claim R&D tax credits lowers the cost
of R&D investment to MCCR&D1
′ < MRRR&D1(R1). The ﬁrm claims the tax credit and
becomes a new R&D performer.
The second case illustrates a larger ﬁrm that has invested in R&D project R2 with-
out tax credits. Suppose that the derived demand for R&D is again represented by
the MRRR&D. The ﬁrm’s cost of R&D in the absence of tax credit is represented by
MCCR&D2. Receiving the tax credit shifts the cost of R&D downwards and to the right
and the ﬁrm now invests more in R&D to execute project 3, anticipating the return R3.
These two cases show how tax credits increase the number of R&D performers and the
aggregate R&D expenditures. The derived demand for R&D is based on the assumption
that R&D projects are ordered in the decreasing order of their MRRR&D. The lower cost
of R&D investment, MCCR&D2
′ < MCCR&D2, induces the ﬁrm to realize increasingly
less proﬁtable projects MRRR&D(R2) > MRRR&D(R3). Using this simple framework to
predict the eﬀect of R&D tax credits on R&D decisions of ﬁrms leads to two hypotheses:
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Figure 5.1: Marginal return and marginal cost of R&D
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1. Availability of R&D tax credits increases the probability that some ﬁrms that would
not have invested in R&D will do so once they have decided to claim tax credits.
The existence of tax credits is likely to increase the number of R&D investors and
the aggregate investment in R&D.
2. The eﬀect of R&D tax credits on the performance of recipient ﬁrms depends on the
elasticity of the derived demand for R&D. In the case of low elasticity, the lower
cost and increased availability of funds for R&D investment with tax credits may
induce the ﬁrm to invest increasingly in less proﬁtable projects. When the derived
demand function for R&D projects is highly elastic or ﬂat in the region close to the
intersection of the MCCR&D and MRRR&D the additional projects funded by tax
credits would have a similar average return on R&D investment as the projects the
ﬁrm would have executed even without the help of tax credits. Accordingly, tax
credits are not expected to improve performance of ﬁrms that claimed them.
In this chapter we investigate the latter issue on innovation performance using two closely
related research questions related to the eﬀect of R&D tax credits:
• First, do users of R&D tax credits create more original Canada-ﬁrst and world-ﬁrst
innovations that require more R&D than the ﬁrm-ﬁrst imitative innovations?
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• Second, and from the policy standpoint the most important question, do tax credits
improve performance of user ﬁrms. The theory outlined above suggests that this
may not be the case.
5.4 Estimation of treatment eﬀects with the match-
ing estimator
The modern econometric evaluation techniques have been developed to identify treat-
ment eﬀects when the available observations on individuals or ﬁrms are subject to a
selection bias. The literature on the econometrics of evaluation oﬀers diﬀerent estimation
strategies to correct for selection bias [(Heckman and Todd, 1997; Heckman and Smith,
1999; Imbens and Wooldrige, 2009)] including the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator, con-
trol function approaches (selection models), instrumental variable (IV) estimation and
non-parametric matching. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence method requires panel data with
observations before and after (or while) the treatment (change of subsidy status). As
our database (to be described in the following subsection) consists of a cross-section, we
cannot apply this estimator. For the application of IV estimators and selection models
one needs valid instruments for the treatment variables. It is very diﬃcult in our case to
ﬁnd possible candidates being used as instruments. Hence, the appropriate choice is the
matching estimator42. The matching estimator has several advantages over parametric
models [Imbens and Wooldrige (2009)], its main disadvantage is that it only controls for
selection on observables, that is, one assumes that there is no unobserved factor driving
the program participation. Therefore, we have to maintain the assumption that we ob-
serve all important determinants of the use of R&D tax credit. This is a clear limitation
of the study, but unavoidable with the available data.
Matching directly addresses the question ”What would a treated ﬁrm with given char-
acteristics have done if it had not been treated?” A treatment in our context is the use
of R&D tax credits. The treatment eﬀect is deﬁned by following equation:
42Matching estimators have been applied and discussed by (Angrist, 1998; Dehejia and Wahba, 1999;
Heckman and Todd, 1998; Heckman et al., 1998; Lechner, 1999, 2000), among others.
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E(αTT ) = E(Y
T |S = 1)− E(Y C |S = 1) (5.1)
where Y T is the outcome variable. We will consider various measures of innovation in
the subsequent empirical analysis. The status S refers to the group: S=1 is the treat-
ment group and S=0 the non-treated ﬁrms. Y C is the potential outcome which would
have been realized if the treatment group (S=1) had not been treated. E(Y C |S = 1) is
a counterfactual situation which is not observable and, therefore, has to be estimated.
In the case of matching, this potential outcome of treated ﬁrms is constructed from a
control group of ﬁrms that did not receive R&D tax credits. [Rubin (1977)] introduced
the conditional independence assumption (CIA) to overcome the selection problem, that
is, participation and potential outcome are independent for ﬁrms with the same set of
exogenous characteristics X. Thus, the critical assumption using the matching approach
is whether we can observe the factors determining the entry into the program. If this
assumption is valid, it follows that
E(Y C |S = 1, X) = E(Y C |S = 0, X) (5.2)
The outcome of the non-participants can be used to estimate the counterfactual outcome
of the participants in case of non-participation provided that there are no systematic
diﬀerences between both groups. The treatment eﬀect can then be estimated as
E(αTT ) = E(Y
T |S = 1, X = x)− E(Y C |S = 0, X = x) (5.3)
Conditioning on X takes account of the selection bias due to observable diﬀerences between
participants and non-participants. In our case, we conduct a Nearest Neighbor matching,
that is, for each treated ﬁrm we pick the most similar ﬁrm from the potential control
group of non-subsidized ﬁrms43.
In addition to the CIA, another important precondition for consistency of the matching
estimator is common support, i.e. it is necessary that the control group contains at least
one suﬃciently similar observation for each treated ﬁrm. In practice, the sample to be
evaluated is restricted to common support. If the overlap between the samples is too
small the matching estimator is not applicable.
43Other matching estimators are, for example, Caliper matching, Radius matching or Kernel matching.
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As one often wants to consider more than one matching argument, one has to deal
with the ”curse of dimensionality”. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggested the use of a
propensity score as a single index and thus to reduce the number of variables included in
the matching function to just one. Therefore a Probit model is estimated on the dummy
indicating the receipt of subsidies S. The estimated propensity scores are subsequently
used as a matching argument. The matching protocol in Table 5.1 summarizes the em-
pirical implementation of the matching procedure used in this chapter. We use sampling
weights throughout the whole analysis. Thus the calculations presented in the empirical
analysis represent population ﬁgures rather than sample results. The estimated treatment
eﬀects on the treated, thus, account for all tax credit recipients in the population, and
not only the sampled ﬁrms.
5.5 Data and empirical concept
This analytical study is based on data from the Canadian 1999 Survey of Innovation which
was conducted by the Science, Innovation and Electronic Information Division of Statistics
Canada. The survey is part of an on-going program to measure innovation in Canada.
To meet this objective the survey was addressed to a representative sample of 5,944
manufacturing provincial enterprises44. The survey design can be described as a stratiﬁed
random sample by industry and by location (12 Canadian provinces or territories). The
sampling weights are used throughout the whole analysis providing estimations for the
population of Canadian manufacturing ﬁrms. The frame was the ASM (Annual Survey
of Manufactures). The population considered was all provincial enterprises (both single
and multi-establishment provincial enterprises) with at least 20 employees and at least
$250,000 in annual revenues, according to the business register (June 1997 version). The
response rate for the survey was 95% based on 5,455 completed questionnaires. The total
population was 9,303 provincial enterprises in manufacturing.
The survey collected information on topics such as sources of information for innova-
tion, problems and obstacles to innovation, impact of innovation, cooperative and collab-
orative arrangements for innovation, competitive environment, business success factors,
intellectual property protection, and use of government support programs. The question-
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Table 5.1: The matching protocol
Step 1 Specify and estimate a Probit model to obtain the propensity scores Pˆ (X).
Step 2 Restrict the sample to common support: delete all observations on treated ﬁrms with
probabilities larger than the maximum and smaller than the minimum in the potential
control group. (This step is also performed for other covariates that are possibly used in
addition to the propensity score as matching arguments.)
Step 3 Choose one observation from the subsample of treated ﬁrms and delete it from that pool.
Step 4 Calculate the Mahalanobis distance between this ﬁrm and all non-subsidized ﬁrms in order
to ﬁnd the most similar control observation.
MDij = (Zj − Zt)′Ω−1(Zj − Zt)
where Ω is the empirical covariance matrix of the matching arguments based on the sample
of potential controls. If only the propensity score is used, there is no need to calculate a
multidimensional distance. In that case, e.g. a Euclidian distance is suﬃcient.
Step 5 In this application of the matching, we restrict the group of potential neighbors to ﬁrms
active in the same industry as the particular treated ﬁrm. Select the observation with the
minimum distance from the remaining sample. (Do not remove the selected controls from
the pool of potential controls, so that it can be used again.)
Step 6 Repeat steps 3 to 5 for all observations on subsidized ﬁrms.
Step 7 Using the matched comparison group, the average eﬀect on the treated can thus be
calculated as the mean diﬀerence of the matched samples:
αˆπ =
1
nr
(∑
i(Y
T
i −
∑
i Y
C
i )
)
with Y Ci being the counterfactual for i and nT is the sample size (of treated ﬁrms).
naire follows the guidelines of the Oslo manual OECD/Eurostat (2005) and resembles
the CIS3 questionnaire used by Eurostat for innovation surveys of EU countries at the
end of the nineties. The questionnaire can be consulted and downloaded from the site of
Statistics Canada. The survey of innovation provides information for a cross-section of
manufacturing ﬁrms45. There are two scenarios for the empirical analysis. As [Czarnitzki
(2006)] points out, the public incentives may have two diﬀerent impacts on innovative
activity. In the case of the public funding actually stimulating private investment, the
question ”what would the ﬁrm have done in the absence of public support for R&D” has
two facets. On the one hand, the level of private R&D investment of the recipient ﬁrms
might simply have been lower. On the other hand, ﬁrms, especially small and medium
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sized ﬁrms, might not have undertaken any R&D activities without public support due to
lacking ﬁnancing opportunities. The ﬁrst scenario aims at the marginal increase of R&D
investment among innovating ﬁrms, and the latter one at the overall R&D status. These
two hypotheses lead us to following set-up of our upcoming empirical analysis:
-In our ﬁrst estimation, the potential control group consists of all ﬁrms, that is, inno-
vating and non-innovating ﬁrms which have not received R&D tax credits. Consequently,
we allow that recipient ﬁrms may not have conducted any innovation activity in the
absence of public support.
- In a second step, we restrict the potential control group to innovating ﬁrms in order to
check the validity of the previous estimation. On the one hand, this will indicate whether
the ﬁrst results were only driven by non-innovators. On the other hand, the treatment
eﬀects are likely to be underestimated, as we do not allow ﬁrms to change their status
from innovation to non-innovation due to the absence of public support. In this second
estimation, we also consider some additional outcome variables. These are questions on
general improvements of ﬁrm performance due to innovation. Those measures are only
considered in the innovators’ sample, because the corresponding survey questions are
asked conditional on the introduction of new products and processes in the questionnaire.
Some readers might ask whether the application of an econometric matching is the
appropriate approach to our evaluation problem. As the R&D tax credit is basically
available to every ﬁrm conducting R&D46, it raises the question, whether companies that
did not use the SR&ED program form a valid potential control group? We think the
non-users do constitute a valid control group for the following reasons. First, even though
the tax credits have been around for long time, some ﬁrms may still not be aware of its
existence or of the potential advantages they could obtain from using it. Second, it is a
well-known fact that a number of ﬁrms are reluctant to apply for tax credits, despite being
eligible to do so. They may prefer trade secrecy rather than disclosing any of their R&D
projects. Smaller ﬁrms spending only few resources on R&D or conducting R&D only
on an occasional basis may well refrain from claiming tax credit due to the perception
44The unit ”Province-enterprise” consists of all establishments of a given enterprise in the same (4-digit
NACE) industry within the same province. Details of the survey design and sample methodology are
available in Schaan and Nemes (2003)
45For more information on the questionnaire, see Schaan and Anderson (2001)
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that it involves considerable degree of bureaucracy faced in ﬁlling out the necessary forms
etc. Third, the use of R&D tax credits may increase the probability of audits of a ﬁrm’s
accounts by the taxation authorities, even in other areas of the business beside that of
R&D activities. This may also result in reluctance of claiming tax credits. Finally, some
innovations do not require R&D. In those cases, the potential control group would contain
ﬁrms that conduct a signiﬁcant amount of R&D activities (see also Schelling and Gault
(2006)). If the control group were entirely diﬀerent from the R&D tax credit users, one
would hardly ﬁnd R&D performing ﬁrms that did not use tax credits. As mentioned above,
our potential control group contains a fair number of ﬁrms showing R&D activities. For
example, about 42% of ﬁrms in the control group report to have conducted R&D activities
of which 15% maintain an R&D department and approximately 9% contract out R&D.
Therefore, we assume that ﬁrms not using R&D tax credits form a valid potential control
group. This is also supported by the upcoming matching analysis, because we ﬁnd a
broad common support for the treatment group, i.e. for most tax credit recipients the
control group contains suﬃciently similar ﬁrms that did not use tax credits, and can thus
be picked as nearest neighbours.
5.6 Description of the survey and database
The initial sample of 5,577 records was reduced to 3,562 observations which are used in this
study due to several reasons. The considered ﬁrm population of the survey takes ﬁrms with
at least 20 employees into account. However, several ﬁrms (226 obs.) that responded had
less than 20 employees and were subsequently dropped from the analysis. Furthermore,
some companies are exceptionally large and as such ﬁrms are unique in the Canadian
economy it would not be meaningful to search for comparable ﬁrms within the matching
analysis. Thus, we decided to exclude ﬁrms with more than 1,500 employees from the
upcoming empirical study (74 obs.). Further loss of observations is due to missing values
of some variables. The most important among these is the total employment observed in
1997 (the beginning year of the survey) that cuts the ﬁnal sample to 3,562 ﬁrms47.
The sampling weights were re-adjusted to take into account the usable sample in the
46To be eligible for tax credits the R&D expenditures have to be conform to speciﬁc criteria.
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respective strata. The results of the study are representative of the population of 9301
provincial enterprises, the count of the Survey of Innovation, 1999.
5.6.1 Treatment indicator
The treatment indicator is a dummy variable called GVTTAX that has unit value if a
ﬁrm received R&D tax credits from the Canadian Federal Government or from provincial
governments, and GVTTAX is zero otherwise. The sample consists of N1=1,301 recipient
ﬁrms and to N0=2,261 ﬁrms in the potential control group. Another instrument of public
support is R&D grants. Firms can apply for those public grants to receive governmental
support for particular research projects. Besides very few exceptions, all ﬁrms that re-
ceived public R&D grants have also claimed R&D tax credits. Thus, the group of treated
ﬁrms in our analysis contains a subset of ﬁrms that has received both R&D tax credits
and public R&D grants48.
5.6.2 Control variables
We use several variables that describe the ﬁrms’ characteristics. Whenever possible they
are measured at the beginning of the treatment period to avoid simultaneity bias. In
the present case, variables originating from the Annual Census of Manufactures linked
to the Survey of innovation database could be measured at the beginning of the period
under review. The number of employees accounts for size diﬀerences. The total employ-
ment of the ﬁrm (provincial enterprise), is transformed in logarithms, LNEMP1997. The
empirical evidence suggests that internal funding is the preferred way of ﬁnancing R&D
and innovation projects (see e.g. [(Harhoﬀ, 1998; Hall, 2002; Carpenter and Petersen,
47Only variables [(1) employment, (2) price-cost margin and (3) industry R&D intensity] obtained
respectively from the Statistics Canada’s: Annual Survey of Manufacturers linked to the Survey of
Innovation 1999[(1) & (2)] and from S.C. R&D statistics (3) as well as the industry and provincial
dummy variables could be traced back to 1997. The variables from the Survey of Innovation 1999, are
responses to questions soliciting information for the ”last three years”, i.e. 1997, 1998 and 1999. The
Survey had a response rate of 95%.
48We also ran the upcoming analysis excluding ﬁrms that received grants from the treatment group.
The results, however, were very similar and did not change our conclusions. Therefore, we chose not to
present these estimations in more detail.
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2002)] for Canada [Baldwin and Hanel (2003)]. The internal funding capacity is likely to
be correlated with the price-cost margin. We construct the price-cost margin (PCM) as
suggested by Collins and Preston (1969) and [Ravenscraft (1983)] with the data from the
”Annual Survey of Manufacturers 1997” linked to the Innovation Survey:
PCM1997i =
Shipmentsi − (Wagecost + Fuel&Energy + Material)i
Shipmentsi
(5.4)
The sign of the coeﬃcient of PCM in the selection equation is a priori unclear, though.
On the one hand, it would be negative if ﬁrms with scarce internal resources seek ﬁnancing
opportunities for R&D, and are therefore more likely to claim tax credits. On the other
hand, the tax credit is only granted if R&D has been undertaken, hence the coeﬃcient
could be positive.
Furthermore, we include the lagged intensity of R&D expenditures per dollar of sales
at the industry level (INDRD1997). It reﬂects industry-speciﬁc technological opportuni-
ties. Firms in industries with higher technological opportunities are expected to be more
research intensive, and thus more likely to claim tax credits.
An important feature of ﬁrms regarding R&D tax credits is how they organize their
innovation activities. We include various measures to capture the ﬁrms’ innovation be-
haviour: A dummy variable RDDEP indicating that a ﬁrm maintains its own R&D de-
partment is an important criterion to diﬀerentiate between ﬁrms that conduct R&D per-
manently from others that undertake R&D occasionally or not at all. Moreover, a dummy
RDCONTR denotes ﬁrms that contract out (some of) their R&D activities. It is a-priori
unclear how this variable inﬂuences the propensity to claim tax credits. On one hand,
the ﬁrms may not conduct their own research activities if R&D is contracted out. In this
case, the expected sign of RDCONTR would be negative. On the other hand, ﬁrms that
contract-out R&D may be well organized and conduct a substantial amount of R&D on
their own, but use external knowledge resources to supplement their skills. We would
expect that those highly technology oriented ﬁrms are more likely to receive tax credits
than others. Finally, we include a dummy for ﬁrms which have received venture capital
from the government PFVC. On the one hand, these may be R&D intensive ﬁrms in
high-tech industries and thus more likely to claim tax credits. On the other hand, they
may be less like to do so, as they typically have suﬃcient ﬁnancial resources themselves.
In addition, we consider other indicators that describe the ﬁrms’ orientation towards in-
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novation. Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004) show that ﬁrms challenging new markets invest
more in R&D than incumbent ﬁrms. Therefore, we construct a variable that identiﬁes
market challenging ﬁrms. An indicator variable NEWMT takes unit value for ﬁrms in-
dicating that either seeking new markets or developing a niche or specialized markets is
an important aim of the ﬁrms’ business strategy. NEWMT is zero otherwise. A positive
sign is expected if the results of Czarnitzki and Kraft hold for the Canadian case; chal-
lenging ﬁrms are considered to be more innovative than others and are therefore more
likely to receive R&D tax credits. In addition to the control variables mentioned above,
12 industry dummy variables enter the regression in order to control for various industry
characteristics not captured by other factors.
Moreover, the provincial R&D tax credit incentives diﬀer from province to province.
For this reason, geography is taken into account by ﬁve dummies for Canadian regions.
These provincial dummies are based on the B-index developed by Warda (1999) which
closely reﬂect the diﬀerences in tax treatment across Canadian provinces. The ﬁve groups
for provincial dummies identify ﬁrms located in Alberta and Prince-Edward Island (Group
1), British Columbia; New Brunswick and North-West Territories (Group 2), Newfound-
land, Saskatchewan; Manitoba and Nova Scotia (Group 3), Ontario (Group 4) and Quebec
(Group 5).
5.6.3 Outcome variables
The survey oﬀers a variety of potential outcome variables. First, we choose the impact of
tax credits on the originality of innovations and second, their impact on the number of new
products and the share of new products in ﬁrm’s total sales. Third, we consider general
performance indicators like proﬁtability and market power. These are, however, only
considered in the second part of the analysis (the subsample of innovating ﬁrms), because
the items which are surveyed in the questionnaire are conditional on recent innovations.
As indicators of originality of innovation, we consider two dummy variables indicating
whether the particular ﬁrm introduced a new product or process that was a world novelty
(WFIRST = 1; zero otherwise) or new to the Canadian market (CAFIRST = 1; zero
otherwise), respectively49. Note that a ”world ﬁrst” innovation is also a ”Canada ﬁrst”
innovation by construction. These variables indicate whether original innovations have
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been developed, which in our understanding are supposed to be superior to ﬁrm-speciﬁc
incremental innovations.
The variables NEWPROD and NEWSALES consider the commercialization aspect
of the innovation process. Respondents reported how many new and improved products
their ﬁrm introduced and the proportion of sales accounted for by new and improved
products. NEWPROD measures the number of new or signiﬁcantly improved products,
and has an ordinal scale taking values from 0 to 6 (see Table 5.2 for details).
Table 5.2: Ordinal scale of the count of new products and their share of new sales
Variable Unit Ordinal scale
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
NEWPROD No 0 [1-2] [3-5] [6-10] [11-20] [21-50] >50
NEWSALES % 0 [1-5] [6-15] [16-25] [26-50] [51-75] [76-100]
In contrast to the originality of the innovation indicated by WFIRST, CAFIRST,
NEWPROD, the variable NEWSALES expresses the market success of the newly intro-
duced products. Note, however, that NEWSALES only reﬂects product innovations. Cost
reductions due to the introduction of new processes may even be more important than
product innovations in mature industries. Unfortunately the survey contained no direct
questions on the rate of cost reductions.
As described above, we consider a sub-sample of innovation ﬁrms in the second step of
the analysis. For this case, we employ some additional variables on ﬁrm performance. This
is only meaningful in the sub-sample of innovating ﬁrms, as those performance indicators
are survey questions responded by innovators only. The question asks ”What impact did
new or signiﬁcantly improved products (goods or services) and new signiﬁcantly improved
production/manufacturing processes [...] have on your ﬁrm?” The opinions of the inter-
viewees are measured in a ﬁve-scale variable from value 1 indicating ”strongly disagree” to
value 5 ”strongly agree”. We transform the original ﬁve scale variables into dummy vari-
ables indicating whether the interviewee indicated ”strongly agree” or not. In particular,
we consider following impacts of recent innovations (dummy variables):
49Respondents to the Survey of innovation were asked to classify their innovations into one of the three
categories: World -ﬁrst; Canada-ﬁrst and Firm-ﬁrst.
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• ”Increased the proﬁtability of your ﬁrm” → Domestic market share Proﬁtability
• ”Increased your ﬁrm’s domestic market share” → Domestic market share
• ”Increased your ﬁrm’s international market share” → International market share
• ”Allowed your ﬁrm to keep up with its competitors” → Keep up with competitors
All these performance indicators identify positive performance outcomes of innovation.
Rather than being mutually independent, they portray related aspects of improved busi-
ness performance and reﬂect diﬀerent competitive strategies. Since the respondents were
asked to identify these performance indicators as outcomes of innovation activities that
took place over the immediately preceding three years, the time lag between introduction
of an innovation and the observed outcome may in many cases be too short for the full
eﬀects of innovations, especially the more radical ones, to take place. On the other hand,
the possible dampening eﬀect of a too short observation period may be compensated by
an inﬂated perception of self reported innovation outcomes.
5.7 Estimation results using the full sample
Table 5.3 displays the mean values for all variables of R&D tax credits recipients and
non-recipients in the full sample. All variables obtained from the survey refer to the
years 1997-1999. In order to avoid endogeneity problems, we measured ﬁrm size, the
price-cost margin as well as industry-level R&D at the beginning of the time period in
1997. For the other control variables, lagged values were unfortunately not available.
This leads to some concern for the inclusion of the variables RDDEP and RDCONTR as
those could theoretically be aﬀected by the tax credit. Although ﬁrms may not be very
likely to establish an R&D department or change their innovation strategy from a closed
to an open innovation model as response to the tax credit, we have to mention this as
data limitation. If we had more information, we would certainly prefer to measure these
variables before the treatment.
All means diﬀer between both groups on the 1% signiﬁcance level (Table 5.3). For
example, recipient ﬁrms are larger than those in the control group. Whilst ﬁrms in the
treatment group have about 101 employees (LNEMP = 4.61), on average, ﬁrms in the
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potential control group show 74 employees (LNEMP = 4.30). Moreover, almost half
(48.4%) of the recipient ﬁrms maintain an own internal R&D department, while only
15% of the other ﬁrms do so. Furthermore, 30% of the tax credit recipients contract out
(some) R&D in comparison with only 9% of the other ﬁrms. The price-cost margin is
on average approximately 26% in the treatment group, compared to 24% in the potential
control group.
Recipient ﬁrms also perform better in terms of innovation outcome. They are more
likely to introduce market novelties: 17% introduced a world-ﬁrst innovation to the mar-
ket, while only 4% of the other ﬁrms did so. The same is true for Canada-ﬁrst innovations,
where the shares amount to 40% versus 15% respectively. They also introduced more
product innovations. Even more important, ﬁrms that used tax credits commercialized
higher shares of sales with new products.
Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics
Variable
GVTAX=1 N1=1301 GVTAX=0 N0=2261 p-value of
two-tailed t-test
Mean Std.Err. Mean Std.Err. on mean diﬀerence
Covariates
LNEMP(1997) 4.611 0.027 4.305 0.018 p < 0.001
RDDEP 0.484 0.015 0.151 0.008 p < 0.001
RDCONTR 0.304 0.014 0.093 0.007 p < 0.001
NEWNT 0.917 0.008 0.839 0.009 p < 0.001
EXPMT 0.710 0.014 0.534 0.012 p < 0.001
PCM(1997) 0.261 0.004 0.242 0.003 p < 0.001
INDRD(1997) 1.767 0.069 1.070 0.019 p < 0.001
PFCV 0.049 0.007 0.014 0.003 p < 0.001
Propensity score 0.519 0.007 0.236 0.004 p < 0.001
Outcome variables
NEWPROD 2.475 0.049 1.488 0.039 p < 0.001
NEWSALES 1.977 0.032 1.192 0.032 p < 0.001
WFIRST 0.174 0.012 0.039 0.005 p < 0.001
CAFIRST 0.403 0.015 0.147 0.008 p < 0.001
Note: All statistics are computed using sampling weights and represent the respective population moments.
Industry and province dummies are not presented. The means of those variables diﬀer signiﬁcantly among groups too.
The observed diﬀerences in the outcome variables can, however, not be assigned to
126 Chapter 5. Evaluating the Impact of R&D Tax Credits on Innovation
the R&D tax credit receipt. The systematic diﬀerences in control variables between
both groups suggest that tax credit recipients are substantially diﬀerent from the control
group. The upcoming matching analysis selects a group of non-users that is similar to the
treatment group in their covariates. In the case that the innovation outcome variables
still diﬀer between these two groups signiﬁcantly, one can assign this diﬀerence to the use
of tax credits if the matching assumptions hold.
In order to balance the two samples with respect to their covariates, we ﬁrst estimate
the propensity score of claiming the tax credit using a Probit model. The regression
takes sampling weights into account. The estimated marginal eﬀects50 are presented in
Table 5.4. The larger the ﬁrm the more likely it is to use R&D tax credits. This positive
relationship between the tax credit dummy and ﬁrm size LNEMP1997 at the beginning of
the period is in agreement with Schumpeter’s theory that large ﬁrms are more likely than
the smaller ones to carry our R&D. The large ﬁrms with large R&D budget are likely to be
aware of and apply for R&D credits. They are likely to have better accounting procedures
and the administrative burden associated with the tax credit claims is relatively small
compared to smaller ﬁrms since it is spread over a large volume of R&D expenditures.
Firms that maintain an R&D department, RDDEP, are clearly more likely to use tax
credits. This is not very surprising, as an own R&D department indicates that such
ﬁrms pursue innovation activities permanently and that they are an important element
within the general ﬁrm strategy. Such ﬁrms are more organized in performing R&D and
are, thus, more likely to use tax credits. Similarly, tax credit users contract R&D out
more frequently than non-users, because ﬁrms active in R&D have a higher absorptive
capacity and complement rather than substitute their own research by contracting out
speciﬁc tasks. Firms that challenge new markets, NEWNT, or seek niches are more
likely to receive tax credits. This is in line with the ﬁndings of Czarnitzki and Kraft
(2004) who show that market-challenging ﬁrms are more innovative than others. The
price-cost margin PCM1997 shows a positive impact on the use of tax credits. According
to the ﬁnancial constraints literature, ﬁrms ﬁnance mostly R&D from retained earnings.
This eﬀect seems to be translated into an increased utilization of R&D tax credits as
well. Firms that realize only low or even negative returns may not be able to conduct
R&D activities due to ﬁnancing diﬃculties in general, and can thus not claim tax credits.
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Finally, as expected, receiving government venture capital support increases the likelihood
of receiving R&D tax credits by 27%.
As described above, the estimated propensity score is used to balance the sample with
respect to the covariates. In addition, we also require the selected nearest neighbours
to be located in the same industry and province. Thus, we select the nearest neighbour
based on the smallest Mahalanobis distance instead of using a single index, the propensity
score.
Table 5.4: Marginal eﬀects of the Probit model on the tax credit dummy (sampling
weighted regression)
Marginal eﬀect z-Value p-Value
LNEMP(1997) 0.049 4.68 p < 0.001
RDDEP 0.283 12.14 p < 0.001
RDCONTR 0.233 8.24 p < 0.001
NEWNT 0.073 2.66 p < 0.008
EXPMT 0.109 5.74 p < 0.001
PCM(1997) 0.094 2.43 p < 0.015
PFCV 0.265 4.17 p < 0.001
Log-likelihood -1726.21
McFadden R-squared 0.239
Number of observations 3562
Note: The regression includes 12 industry dummies and four regional dummies (not presented)
As outlined in Section 5.4, for each recipient ﬁrm there must be a potential control
observation with a similar propensity score stratiﬁed by industry and region. We calculate
the minimum and maximum of the propensity scores of the potential control group by
industry and region. It turns out that for 181 observations of the treatment group, we do
not have adequate equivalents in the control group. These 181 observations have to be
excluded from the following matching process. Typically these treated ﬁrms are active in
small industries in small regions. As the lost observations only amount to about 5% of
the total sample, we do not think that this restriction aﬀects the results in a signiﬁcant
way.
50The marginal eﬀects are calculated at the mean of continuous covariates, but represent the discrete
change from 0 to 1 for dummy variables.
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In order to assess the success of the matching routine as outlined in Table 5.1, we re-
estimate the Probit model presented in Table 5.4 using the matched pairs. If the matching
has been successful, one would expect that a test on overall model signiﬁcance would not
reject the null hypothesis that all coeﬃcients in this Probit estimation are jointly zero.
This is fulﬁlled in our case. Before the matching the test on joint signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients
amounted to F = 30.82 (p-value < 0.001). Once we matched the treated ﬁrms to their
nearest neighbours, this statistic is F = 0.71 (p-value = 0.85). Consequently, we can now
analyze the diﬀerence in outcome variables of the matched samples. These results are
presented in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5: Matching results (Full sample)
Variable
GVTAX=1 N1=1120 GVTAX=0 N0=1120
p-value of
two-tailed t-test
Mean Std.Err. Mean Std.Err.
on mean diﬀerence
Outcome variables
NEWPROD 2.421 0.060 2.007 0.060 p < 0.001
NEWSALES 1.941 0.046 1.492 0.045 p < 0.001
WFIRST 0.167 0.013 0.052 0.008 p < 0.001
CAFIRST 0.397 0.016 0.218 0.014 p < 0.001
Note: All statistics are computed using sampling weights and represent the respective population moments.
Industry and province dummies are not presented. The distribution of observations over industries is identical in the treatment group
and the control group and it does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly among regions.
As the variables NEWPROD and NEWSALES show, the treatment does also yield
positive eﬀects in terms of the number of product innovations as well as product inno-
vations weighted by their economic value (the share of sales). It also turns out that the
recipient ﬁrms are actually more likely to introduce a world-ﬁrst and Canada-ﬁrst inno-
vation - compared to the counterfactual situation, that is, in absence of R&D tax credits.
About 17% (40%) of tax credit recipient ﬁrms introduced a world-ﬁrst (Canada-ﬁrst) in-
novation. If they had not received the R&D tax credit, these percentages would have been
5% and 22% respectively, see Table 5.5. While we cannot make a statement about the
level of R&D expenditure due to data limitations, the increased output measures point
to higher R&D because of the tax credit receipt. R&D could have moved from case 2 to
129 Chapter 5. Evaluating the Impact of R&D Tax Credits on Innovation
case 2’ in Figure 1, for example. However, the positive innovation output results are not
necessarily coinciding with higher returns, though. Following the argumentation of David
and Toole (2000), tax credits might induce ﬁrms to favour short term projects which
may result in new products and, thus, a higher percentage of sales with new products,
but not necessarily in higher total sales or higher proﬁts or other performance measures.
Marginally improved products may just replace existing products earlier than in the sit-
uation of no tax credit receipt. Therefore, we test other performance indicators in the
subsequent section.
5.8 Estimation results using the innovators’ sub-sample
As pointed out above, our second step of the analysis considers only innovating ﬁrms, i.e.
ﬁrms that did not innovate are excluded from the sample. Rather than 2261 observations
(full sample), the potential control group includes 1689 innovating ﬁrms in this case.
Innovators are those ﬁrms that at least introduced one new product or process in the
period of 1997-1999. Note that a few observations of the treatment group are lost as well
because those ﬁrms have used R&D tax credits, but did not indicate that they introduced
a product or process in the preceding three years. The size of the treatment group reduces
from 1301 to 1184 observations. On the one hand, the innovation process may still be in
process. On the other hand, it could just have been unsuccessful. In any case, these are
only a few observations (about 9% of the treatment group) and given our large sample
size, excluding them should not aﬀect results signiﬁcantly.
Table 5.6 shows the variables’ means of the treatment group and the potential control
group before the matching process. Although we only consider innovating ﬁrms, the
groups still diﬀer signiﬁcantly in all covariates. The statistics also indicate that the
tax credit recipients show a better performance in the dependent variables NEWPROD,
NEWSALES, WFIRST, CAFIRST. However, the measures on general ﬁrm performance
included in this second step of the analysis do not show such a clear picture. The means of
variables reﬂecting the impact of recent innovations on proﬁtability, the domestic market
share and keeping up with competitors are not diﬀerent between both groups on the
conventional 5% level. Only the increase in international market share is on average
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Table 5.6: Descriptive statistics (subsample of innovating ﬁrms)
Variable
GVTAX=1 N1=1301 GVTAX=0 N0=2261
p-value of
two-tailed t-test
Mean Std.Err. Mean Std.Err. on mean diﬀerence
Outcome variables
LNEMP(1997) 4.611 0.028 4.346 0.022 p < 0.001
RDDEP 0.489 0.016 0.183 0.010 p < 0.001
RDCONTR 0.309 0.015 0.115 0.009 p < 0.001
NEWNT 0.921 0.009 0.883 0.010 p < 0.004
EXPMT 0.707 0.014 0.572 0.013 p < 0.001
PCM(1997) 0.260 0.004 0.244 0.003 p < 0.008
INDRD(1997) 1.765 0.074 1.094 0.023 p < 0.001
Propensity score 0.529 0.006 0.281 0.004 p < 0.001
Outcome variables
NEWPROD 2.555 0.05 1.966 0.045 p < 0.001
NEWSALES 2.057 0.043 1.576 0.037 p < 0.001
WFIRST 0.175 0.012 0.049 0.006 p < 0.001
CAFIRST 0.409 0.015 0.191 0.010 p < 0.001
General performance variables
Proﬁtability 0.202 0.012 0.205 0.011 p < 0.878
Domestic market
share
0.161 0.012 0.137 0.009 p < 0.116
Int’t market share 0.158 0.012 0.120 0.009 p < 0.021
Keep up with
competition
0.350 0.015 0.312 0.013 p < 0.061
Note: All statistics are computed using sampling weights and represent the respective population moments.
Industry and province dummies are not presented. The means of those variables diﬀer signiﬁcantly among groups too.
signiﬁcantly higher for the group of innovators that received the R&D tax credits.
Again, we estimate a Probit model to obtain the estimated propensity scores using the
same speciﬁcation as above. We omit the detailed presentation of the Probit estimates,
because they are quite similar to the previous ones. Like in the full sample, all covariates
(the same variables as those presented in table 5.4) are positive and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero.
Before the matching the test on joint signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients amounted to F = 23.72
(p-value < 0.001). After matching, F = 0.53 (p-value = 0.97)51.
51Again, we restricted the sample to common support as described above. In this case, we have to
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Table 5.7: Matching results (subsample of innovating ﬁrms)
Variable
GVTAX=1 N1=968 GVTAX=0 N0=968
p-value of
two-tailed t-test
Mean Std.Err. Mean Std.Err.
on mean diﬀerence
Outcome variables
NEWPROD 2.491 0.056 2.221 0.060 p < 0.001
NEWSALES 2.031 0.047 1.716 0.046 p < 0.001
WFIRST 0.167 0.013 0.058 0.008 p < 0.001
CAFIRST 0.400 0.017 0.224 0.015 p < 0.001
General performance variables
Proﬁtability 0.202 0.014 0.227 0.015 p < 0.239
Domestic market
share
0.164 0.013 0.139 0.012 p < 0.184
Int’t market share 0.146 0.011 0.121 0.011 p < 0.146
Keep up with
competition
0.345 0.017 0.329 0.017 p < 0.501
Note: All statistics are computed using sampling weights and represent the respective population moments.
Industry and province dummies are not presented. The distribution of observations over industries is identical
in the treatment group and the control group and it does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly among regions.
The matching results are presented in Table 5.7. The interpretation of results con-
cerning the variables NEWPROD, NEWSALES, WFIRST and CAFIRST do not diﬀer
from the previous estimates using the full sample.
None of the more general performance indicators-proﬁtability, domestic and interna-
tional market share and keeping up with competitors are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between
the two groups. These variables report the respondents’ assessment of the performance
impact of innovations introduced in the course of the previous three years. The lack of a
signiﬁcant performance improvement is in line with David and Toole (2000)’s theoretical
prediction that given the decreasing rate of return on R&D, R&D activity supported by
tax credits is likely to be invested in projects with lower returns (see the movement from
case 2 to 2’ in Figure 5.1, for instance). Consequently, ﬁrms that received tax credits
have undertaken more R&D projects and report higher innovation outcome, but the ad-
ditional projects did not necessarily deliver higher rates of return. This is in line with the
predictions obtained from the theoretical model presented in section 5.3
exclude 216 treated ﬁrms.
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5.9 Conclusion
This chapter analyses the impact of R&D tax credits on innovation activities of Canadian
manufacturing ﬁrms. Unlike the major part of the literature, this study focuses on the
eﬀect of R&D tax credits on innovation output and its economic impact rather than on
R&D expenditure. We employ the Canadian 1999 Survey of Innovation conducted by
Statistics Canada. The cross-sectional sample used in this study included 3562 obser-
vations. Using a non-parametric matching approach in order to control for a possible
selection bias, we ﬁnd that R&D tax credits increase innovation output of the recipient
ﬁrms. Tax credit recipients realize a higher number of product innovations, as well as in-
creased sales shares of new and improved products. The tax credit recipients’ also achieve
a higher probability with respect to the introduction of market novelties for both the na-
tional Canadian market and the world market. These results hold true for two diﬀerent
estimations. First, we considered the full sample of manufacturing ﬁrms, that is, the
potential control group for the R&D tax credit recipients is formed from all other ﬁrms,
i.e. innovating and non-innovating ﬁrms. Second, we restricted the analysis to innovating
ﬁrms only, because some might argue that the results are driven by non-innovating ﬁrms
in the control group. It turns out that the results are robust against this argument. It
should also be noted that the analysis employs sampling weights to all presented statis-
tics. Thus, all ﬁndings represent the corresponding population ﬁgures rather than sample
results.
While we ﬁnd positive eﬀects on the direct output of R&D activities, i.e. number
and sales of new products, there is no eﬀect on more general ﬁrm performance indica-
tors that have been surveyed. In particular, responses to the question ”What impact
did new or signiﬁcantly improved products (goods or services) and new signiﬁcantly im-
proved production/manufacturing processes [...] have on your ﬁrm?” were evaluated.
Dummy variables indicate whether respondents strongly agreed that recent innovations
a) increased the proﬁtability of the ﬁrm, b) increased the ﬁrm’s domestic market share, c)
increased the ﬁrm’s international market share, and d) allowed the ﬁrm to keep up with
its competitors. As we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the recipient ﬁrms and
the selected control group representing the recipients in the counterfactual situation of
the absence of R&D tax credits, we conclude that the theoretical reasoning as outlined
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by David and Toole (2000) is supported in our data. The ﬁrms may indeed conduct more
R&D, but some are likely invest in short-term projects that have a lower marginal rate
of return than projects that would have been conducted even in the absence of R&D tax
credits. For instance, these projects may just be incremental innovations, so that ﬁrms
report higher sales share with new products, but on average the proﬁts or domestic market
share may not increase. Instead, the new products might simply replace the existing ones
without a signiﬁcant improvement of ﬁrm performance. Given the short lag between the
innovation and their impact imposed by the data used in the present study it is possible
that the economic contribution of some innovations may not yet have fully materialized.
For future research it would be useful to have panel data on R&D tax credits and objec-
tively measured rather than self-reported performance indicators. Panel data would also
allow reducing the potential endogeneity problem in covariates as (longer) lags could be
utilized.
In spite of its limitations, the present study suggests that the expected private eco-
nomic beneﬁts from the public support of innovation by R&D tax credits may be over-
rated. The reduced cost of R&D funds may shift ﬁrms’ allocation of funding for innovation
activities away from the necessary complementary activities such as marketing and after-
sales service toward R&D. However, there is evidence that each tax credit dollar increase
R&D in the recipient ﬁrm by about one dollar [Hall and Reenen (2000)], the increased
R&D will also generate more knowledge spillovers from which society will beneﬁt in the
long-run. Even if we do not ﬁnd a positive eﬀect on private returns or similar economic
indicators besides innovation measures, social beneﬁts of the tax credit might be huge. It
would be an interesting avenue for further research not only to analyze outcome variables
of recipient ﬁrms, but to take into account knowledge spillovers. This would reﬂect the
social beneﬁts of the policy instead of the private beneﬁts only.
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Appendix: L. Variable descriptions
Variable Deﬁnition Description
GVTTAX Dummy=1 if yes to the following question: Has your ﬁrm used any of
the following types of programs sponsored by the federal government
or provincial government during the last three years, 1997-1999
Measure of the treatment eﬀect (public instrument to
support R&D activities)
LNEMP(1997) Logarithm of the total working employees Measure the size of the ﬁrm in 1997)
RDDEP Dummy=1 if yes to the following question: is research and
development (R&D) carried out in your ﬁrm by a separate and
distinct research and development department?
Indication that the ﬁrm maintains its own R&D department
between 1997 and 1999
RDCONTR Dummy=1 if yes to the following question: is research and
development (R&D) contracted out to other ﬁrm?
Indication that the ﬁrm contract out some of their R&D
activities between 1997 and 1999
NEWNT Dummy=1 if the importance of the following question are >=4 (where
1 is low importance and 5 is high importance): Looking at Markets
and Products, how important is: Seeking new market (or)
developing niche or specialized markets
Indication that the ﬁrm seeks new or specialized market
EXPMT Dummy=1 if the importance of the following question are >=4 (where
1 is low importance and 5 is high importance): Looking at Markets
and Products, how important is: Developing export markets
Indication that the ﬁrm is oriented towards export markets
PCM(1997) The price-cost margin=[total shipments 1997-(salaries and wages 1997
+ cost of fuel 1997 + cost of total material 1997)]/total shipments
1997
Measure the ﬁnancial resources of the ﬁrm prior to the tax
credit period
INDRD(1997) Intensity of R&D expenditures by dollars of sales by industry Measure the industry-speciﬁc technological opportunities
PFCV Dummy=1 if the ﬁrm received venture capital from the government Measure a speciﬁc source of public funds
NEWPROD Ordinal scale from 0 to 6 (see table 5.2 Measure the number of new and signiﬁcantly improved
products
NEWSALES Ordinal scale from 0 to 6 (see table 5.2 Measure the share (in percentage) of new sales from new
products introduced between 1997 and 1999
WFIRST Dummy=1 if yes to the following question: Was this most important
new or signiﬁcantly improved product (good or service) or
product/manufacturing process a world ﬁrst?
Indication of the originality of the innovation
CAFIRST Dummy=1 if yes to the following question: Was it a ﬁrst in Canada? Indication of the originality of the innovation
Others variables for the ﬁrm’s performance
Proﬁtability Dummy=1 if the importance of the following question are = 5 (where
1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree): What impact did new
and signiﬁcantly improved products (goods or services) and new
signiﬁcantly improved production/manufacturing processes developed
and introduced during the last three years, 1997-1999 have on your
ﬁrm? Increased the proﬁtability of your ﬁrm
Measure the innovative performance of the ﬁrm in terms of
proﬁts
Domestic
market share
Dummy=1 if the importance of the following question are = 5 (where
1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree): What impact did new
and signiﬁcantly improved products (goods or services) and new
signiﬁcantly improved production/manufacturing processes developed
and introduced during the last three years, 1997-1999 have on your
ﬁrm? Increased your ﬁrm’s domestic market share
Measure the innovative performance of the ﬁrm in terms of
domestic market share
Int’l market
share
Dummy=1 if the importance of the following question are = 5 (where
1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree): What impact did new
and signiﬁcantly improved products (goods or services) and new
signiﬁcantly improved production/manufacturing processes developed
and introduced during the last three years, 1997-1999 have on your
ﬁrm? Increased your ﬁrm’s international market share
Measure the innovative performance of international market
share
Keep up with
competitors
Dummy=1 if the importance of the following question are = 5 (where
1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree): What impact did new
and signiﬁcantly improved products (goods or services) and new
signiﬁcantly improved production/manufacturing processes developed
and introduced during the last three years, 1997-1999 have on your
ﬁrm? Allowed your ﬁrm to keep up with its competitors
Measure the innovative performance of the ﬁrm compared to
competitors
Source: Canadian Survey of Innovation 1999 and Annual Survey of Manufacturing (ASM).
Chapter 6
General conclusion
In this chapter we not review the main ﬁndings of the thesis, as this has already been
done in the general introduction and in the introduction of each chapter. Instead, some
selected results will be discussed in light of the research questions stressing the limitations,
the potential policy implications and the contribution to this ﬁeld of economic literature.
6.1 Summary and contribution
All organizational matters related to ﬁnancing R&D are complex and diﬃcult because
they can lead to changes in productivity of the enterprise and compromise future R&D
activities. In the last decade, economists interested by the research topic on the R&D
Make and/or Buy decisions have focused their attention on the implications of those
choices on ﬁrms’ performance. The article of Leiblein and Dalsace (2002) has initiated
the start of a series of empirical studies dedicated to this ﬁeld of research. Despite
considerable progress, no study has considered simultaneously the following elements:
the reconsideration of the conceptual framework of the (Make-Buy) decision taking into
account the dynamics of these decisions as well as the correlations between the choices
via the individual unobserved heterogeneities and ﬁnally, the evaluation of the impacts
of transitions between choices of R&D strategies on ﬁrm’s performance. The ﬁrst goal of
this thesis was precisely to address these gaps.
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First, this dissertation has pointed out the importance of expanding the traditional
concept of technological governance namely the “Make and/or Buy” decision by draw-
ing a more complete picture of the type of interactions between institutions and R&D
performers (Cf. Chapter 2). We have shown that R&D performers can do R&D for them-
selves (the Make decision), have it done by others (the Buy decision) or for others (the
Sell decision). This extension of the traditional conceptual framework has shown that
the R&D expenditures performed intramurally for others (including aﬃliated or parent
ﬁrms), although infrequent are higher than the R&D expenditure performed by others.
Refocusing this conceptual framework according to the sources of funding has shown that
62% of the total R&D transactions are of internal origin, 14% are contracted by others
and 24% are in fact intended to other institutions, although 81% of this last portion
comes from transactions between subsidiaries (mainly from aﬃliated foreign enterprises).
Thus, excluding subsidiaries, the portion of total R&D expenditure dedicated to the sale
of technological services represents only 4% of the total transactions.
A second central aspect of this dissertation was to use the conceptual framework pre-
sented above (The Make-Buy-Sell decisions) to evaluate the inﬂuence of the characteristics
of R&D performers on the probability for a ﬁrm to switch from an R&D strategy to an-
other. Also, we examined the impacts of the transitions between those R&D strategies
on the ﬁrm’s labour productivity growth. Although the issue of the impacts of choices
between internal and external R&D strategies on ﬁrm’s performance had recently been
addressed by Lokshin and Carree (2008), this study contributes to the existing empirical
evaluation research by focusing on the dynamic aspect of the ﬁrm’s decision in matter
of R&D strategies. These decisions are not totally independent of each other. Indeed,
when a ﬁrm takes a decision related to its R&D organization, all alternatives are inves-
tigated simultaneously. Ignoring this simultaneity in the modeling leads to misleading
estimates. In chapter 3 we have estimated a dynamic multinomial Logit model with un-
observed heterogeneities correlated over alternatives allowing to overcome the unrealistic
limitation of non-correlation between alternatives contained in the standard multinomial
Logit model. We have shown that R&D strategies are strongly persistent (strong state
dependence) at the ﬁrm level, in particular for the sub-sample of ﬁrms performing R&D
on a continuous basis from 1997 to 2006. Thus, R&D performers mainly tend to maintain
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the same strategy from one period to another. In addition, the analysis has also shown
that whatever the initial state, when the ﬁrm changes its strategy, the ﬁrm is more likely
to opt for the most open strategy that is to say the strategy (Make-Buy-Sell). The past
R&D experience turns out to be an important driver in the manner that ﬁrms ﬁnance
their R&D activities as compared to other determinants such as size, being a startup or
the technological absorption capacity. Despite these facts, the impact analysis has shown
that the labour productivity growth of R&D performers increased the most when the
ﬁrm changes its current strategy (switch from an initial strategy to a diﬀerent strategy
in the following period). In this sense, risk-taking and opting for change seems to be a
good thing for a ﬁrm. In general, our results have shown that the rate of return to R&D
is highest when the ﬁrm adopts a strategy that consists in making R&D for itself and
for others that is to say the strategy (Make-Sell). This latter strategy corresponds to
the development stage of the ﬁrm where it dedicates all its research eﬀorts for its own
development and for selling R&D services. In other words, at this stage the ﬁrm is com-
pletely specialized in research. Besides, it was observed that performing R&D for oneself
exclusively provides a very high return compared to external strategies that consist in
buying R&D services such as the strategy (Make-Buy) and the strategy (Make-Buy-Sell).
In Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis, we have analyzed how ﬁrms internalized or outsourced
their R&D expenditures. In chapter 4 we have shown how these same ﬁrms diﬀuse their
technological knowledge to universities in a background where geographical proximity is
a central tenet in the choice of localization.
Third, our study adds a piece to the puzzle of the literature related to knowledge
spillovers by testing whether the distance that separates Canadian R&D performers and
universities is an obstacle to knowledge transfers between these two institutions. There
was already a rich literature regarding the relationship of knowledge transfers between
businesses and universities, but most of these empirical studies used either qualitative or
quantitative data on patents or patents citations. We have quantiﬁed the impacts based on
unexploited data, namely R&D expenditures dedicated to universities at the ﬁrm level and
at the transaction level. More importantly, by conducting separate analyses for codiﬁed
and uncodiﬁed transactions in order to put in perspective the importance of the nature
of knowledge on the ﬁrms decision to be located near of a university, we found that a 10
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percent increase in the distance decreases the proportion of total R&D paid to a university
by 1.4 percent for enterprises that do not report any codiﬁed transfer of knowledge ﬂow,
and by 0.7 percent for enterprises that report codiﬁed knowledge ﬂows. The evidence
suggests that geographic proximity matters to explain the knowledge transfers between
businesses and universities but the magnitude of the impact remains relatively weak when
the econometric analysis is conducted at the level of individual transactions rather than
at the ﬁrm level. Our ﬁndings are important in that they highlight ﬁrst the relevance of
the level of data analyzed for the results (at the ﬁrm or at the transaction level) but also
because the nature of knowledge has a considerable inﬂuence on the magnitude of the
impacts.
Finally, the last chapter of this thesis (Cf. Chapter 5) tackled with the issue related to
the eﬀectiveness of R&D tax incentive measures and instruments to support innovation.
This study has been one of the ﬁrst Canadian studies assessing the eﬀect of R&D tax
credits on recipient ﬁrms’ general economic performance indicators when ﬁrms are subject
to a selection bias. Using a non-parametric matching approach in order to control for
a possible selection bias, we have evaluated the impact of tax credits on innovation and
economic performance of innovating ﬁrms in Canadian manufacturing based on data from
Statistics Canada Survey of Innovation. We have shown that compared to a hypothetical
situation in the absence of R&D tax credits, recipients of tax credits show signiﬁcantly
better scores on most but not all performance indicators. In other words, ﬁrms that
beneﬁted from tax credit measures were signiﬁcantly more innovative in terms of number
of new products. Also, the credit recipients have performed more R&D, have sold a
higher percentage of new and improved products and have achieved a higher probability
to introduce a world ﬁrst in the market. However, the model has failed to demonstrate
that ﬁrms receiving tax credits perform better in terms of proﬁtability, domestic and
international market share and keeping up with competitors. This result suggests that tax
credits may allow ﬁrms to substitute their long-term investments by short-term projects
that have a lower marginal rate of return than projects that would have been conducted
even in the absence of tax credits.
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6.2 Limitations and policy implications
The ﬁrst important limitation of this dissertation was that there were too few charac-
teristics about the R&D performers restricting the explanatory power of econometric
speciﬁcations, mainly because the ﬁrst objective of the R&D survey data used in three
out of the four chapters of this thesis were intended to the compilation of tables for na-
tional accounts. Hence, we were neither able to consider the stock of physical capital nor
its depreciation in the productivity equation, these drawbacks have possibly lead to an
over-estimation of parameters measuring the return to R&D. Moreover,we were unable to
endogenized each R&D strategy by lack of valid instruments in the model of chapter 3.
This would have allowed us to characterize each decision in a singular way rather than
using the same variables for diﬀerent decisions. This contribution would certainly have
allowed a more realistic modeling.
A second important shortcoming of my dissertation is related to the attrition issue
of the second essay (Cf. Chapter 3). Some ﬁrms have left the sample during the ten
years covered by the study. As long as the unobserved ﬁrm heterogeneity inﬂuencing the
R&D decision process is not correlated with the unobserved term inﬂuencing the attrition
process, no problem occurs. But a potential correlation between these terms could lead
to biased estimates see Uhlendorﬀ,(2006). In our approach we have not considered the
issue of attrition as it would have enormously complicated the estimation of the likelihood
function. To overcome this failure we conducted all the estimates on a balanced sample
and therefore without attrition. A promising direction for further research would be in
terms of empirical methods, that is to say taking into account the attrition issue in the
dynamic Logit multinomial model with heterogeneity and to investigate additional general
distributions of ﬁrm’s unobserved heterogeneities.
Third, the analysis conducted in the fourth essay of this thesis was motivated, in
large part, by an attempt to improve on the previous empirical work in order to mea-
sure the incidence of physical distance on knowledge transfers between R&D performers
and universities. This study provides an interesting econometric model for some of the
policy issues related to the transfer of knowledge and its spillovers though technological
changes. This issue is a central theme in the new theory of endogenous economic growth
and regional development. The econometric model used in this essay explores rich unex-
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ploited quantitative data of R&D transactions taking into account the direct measure of
distances between individual enterprises and universities. This methodology could easily
be extended to improve our understanding of the quality of the knowledge transfers. Also,
this study can be easily adapted to stress the importance of the impact of public funded
science and the relationships with the private science and their consequences on regional
development. However, I have to recognize that the use the ﬂows of R&D expenditure be-
tween businesses and universities as a measure of knowledge transfers says nothing about
the complexity of the mechanism by which the network has been formed nor about the
quality of the knowledge transfer. For example, the knowledge transfer could be the con-
sequence of long-standing relationship based on the creation of a social network between
a ﬁrm and an university. Thus, in some circumstances the social network (knowledge
controlled by inventors) could play a bigger role on knowledge transfer than the physical
distance simply because the social network is not aﬀected by the distance. Without an
indicator to capture the impact of social networks in the model, our results could be
overestimated. In addition, the measure of distance used in our analysis is done from the
head oﬃce of the company and not from the establishments that perform the R&D. This
problem may have aﬀected the distance measurements for the 8% of multi-establishments
of the sample.
Finally, we have studied the role of public support to innovation using a non-parametric
approach. The approach of matching method used in our evaluation has the advantage of
controlling for the observable ﬁrm’s characteristics and the disadvantage of not controlling
for unobservable as compared to experimental techniques. To fully realize this advantage,
we need to assume that the selection bias is eliminated by the observables (conditional
independence) or then be conﬁdent that the beneﬁciary and non-beneﬁciary samples are
similar. On the other hand, contrary to parametric methods, the matching estimator does
not require a functional form assumption for the outcome equation. This latter practical
consideration in our case favours the matching estimator over parametric methods. Ide-
ally, I would like to use a mix method that combines the advantage and disadvantage of
both approaches (Parametric and non-parametric methods). For example, if the data had
allowed, I would have combined a matching method (pre-treatment) with a diﬀerence in
diﬀerence estimator (to estimate the eﬀect of R&D tax credit) in order to improve the
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chances to totally eliminate the potential selection bias.
Although interesting from the empirical point of view, our attempt to measure the
eﬀects of tax credits on alternative measures of ﬁrm’ performance does not allow us
to state without ambivalence that the substitution eﬀects between the least and most
proﬁtable projects are generated by R&D tax credits. In the absence of a measure on
the duration of the projects, it appears diﬃcult to demonstrate that tax credits allow
businesses to substitute long-term potentially less proﬁtable projects by short-term more
proﬁtable projects. Despite this warning, in our study we have done some speculations
about this substitution eﬀect. From the political point of view, this problem appears
crucial because it raises not only the question of the performance of private projects but
in a broader framework raises the issue of the social impact of long-term R&D projects.
In addition, we assigned a dichotomous variable to identify the recipients of R&D tax
credit. The availability of quantitative information (the amount of government support)
would have allowed to evaluate more precisely the magnitude and the eﬀectiveness of the
R&D tax credits eﬀects.
Despite these drawbacks, the work of empirical evaluation conducted in this thesis has
certainly helped to highlight the tremendous analytical potential for research contained
in the R&D database of Statistics Canada. Exploring longitudinal data allowed the use
of econometric models more suited to research questions such as the persistence in R&D
and the control for unobserved individual-ﬁrms eﬀects.
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Summary in Dutch
Deze thesis bestaat uit vier essays die micro-datasets gebruiken uit de onderzoeken van
Statistics Canada over onderzoek en ontwikkeling (O&O) en innovatie om hoofdzakelijk
de relaties tussen de bedrijfsstrategien in O&O te onderzoeken. In het eerste essay wer-
pen we licht op hoe bedrijven beslissingen nemen bij het verwerven van technologie aan
de hand van de onderzoeks- en ontwikkelingsactiviteiten Meer bepaald stellen wij voor
om het conceptuele kader ”Produceren en Kopen” uit te breiden naar een keuze tussen
verschillende soorten deelname aan O&O-partnerschap. Wij zijn van mening dat de O&O-
uitvoerder, O&O kan doen voor zijn eigen doeleinden, het kan laten doen door andere
organisaties, of het zelf kan doen voor andere organisaties, of het nu om externe part-
ners of dochterondernemingen gaat. De intensiteit van de relatie wordt gekwantiﬁceerd in
termen van geld (O&O-uitgaven) en niet door een klein aantal van de betrokken onderne-
mingen, zoals vaker wordt gedaan in de empirische literatuur. De beschrijvende tekst
toont aan dat gedurende de periode 1997 tot 2002, de meerderheid van de O&O-uitgaven,
ongeveer 62%, van interne oorsprong was en gebeurde onder leiding van de uitvoerder.
Het overige deel (38%) bestond uit twee groepen: de ene groep (24%) voerde O&O uit
namens andere organisaties, dat wil zeggen, dat ze iemand hebben gecontracteerd. De
andere 14% liet de O&O uitvoeren door een andere uitvoerder, dat wil zeggen, dat ze
hebben uitbesteed. Naar schatting werd 13% van onderzoek en ontwikkeling uitgevoerd
zonder externe partnerschappen.
In het tweede essay beschouwen wij hetzelfde idee, maar in een context waarin de
beslissingen over technologische keuzes niet onafhankelijk zijn van elkaar. Verder laten
we zien hoe overgangen in het verwerven van O&O na verloop van tijd de arbeidspro-
ductiviteit van het bedrijf kan benvloeden. De paneeldimensie van de gegevens laat het
controleren op individuele niet-geobserveerde heterogeniteit toe om de overgangen van
de beslissingen, met betrekking tot de locatie van de ﬁnanciering (uitvoering) van O&O
die wordt gegenereerd door een primair Markov-proces, te analyseren. Door een ges-
imuleerde meest aannemelijke schatter toe te passen laten we zien dat er een sterke mate
van afhankelijkheid is in alle staten van O&O (de manier van het verwerven van O&O).
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We zien ook dat niet alleen de manier van het organiseren van de O&O-zaken van belang
is, maar dat ook de groei van de arbeidsproductiviteit in het bedrijf afhankelijk is van de
aard van de O&O en van haar doorzettingsvermogen. Deze factoren kunnen gemakkelijk
het rendement voor O&O verhogen voor alle uitvoerders in Canada. Onze bevindingen
over het belang van O&O dat intern wordt uitgevoerd lijkt tot enigszins in contrast te
staan met de resultaten van andere onderzoeken die gelijkaardige kwesties behandelen,
waarbij de O&O die buiten het bedrijf wordt uitgevoerd, een hogere impact heeft op de
productiviteit van het bedrijf.
Het derde essay gaat over de eﬀecten van de geograﬁsche afstand die O&O-uitvoerders
scheidt van universiteiten op het vlak van kennis spillovers. Het is gebleken dat een toe-
name van 10% in afstand het aandeel van de totale O&O die betaald wordt aan de
universiteiten doet dalen met 1,4% voor bedrijven die geen gecodiﬁceerde kennisstroom
rapporteren, en met 0,7% voor bedrijven die gecodiﬁceerde kennisstromen rapporteren.
Tot slot, gezien het groeiende belang van de rol van de overheid bij het stimuleren
van innovatie, is de laatste essay gewijd aan de evaluatie van de eﬀecten van O&O-
belastingkredieten op een reeks innovatie-indicatoren. Met gebruik van een niet para-
metrische bijpassende aanpak, vinden we dat, in vergelijking met een hypothetische situ-
atie van geen O&O-belastingkredieten, ontvangers van ﬁscale O&O-kredieten aanzienlijk
hogere percentages tonen van wereld-eerste en Canadees-eerste nieuwe producten, aan-
tallen nieuwe producten en aandelen uit verkoop als gevolg van nieuwe producten. Deze
bedrijven presteren echter niet beter in termen van winstgevendheid, binnenlands mark-
taandeel, internationale verkoop of het vermogen om gelijke tred te houden met concur-
renten. We besluiten daarom dat belastingkredieten leiden tot extra innovatie-output,
maar niet noodzakelijk tot betere bedrijfsresultaten.
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